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Abstract
Safety-Critical Java (SCJ) introduces a new programming paradigm for applications that
must be certified. To aid certification, SCJ is organised into three compliance levels, which
increase in complexity from Level 0 to Level 2. The SCJ language specification (JSR 302)
is an Open Group Standard, but it does not include verification techniques. Previous work
has addressed verification for Level 0 and Level 1 programs. This thesis supports the much
more complex SCJ Level 2 programs, which allow for the programming of highly concurrent
multi-processor applications with Java threads, and wait and notify mechanisms.
The SCJ language specification is clear on what constitutes a Level 2 program but not
why it should be used. The utility of Levels 0 and 1 are clear from their features. The
scheduling behaviour required by a program is a primary indicator of whether or not Level 0
should be used. However, both Levels 1 and 2 use concurrency and fixed-priority scheduling,
so this cannot be used as an indicator to choose between them. This thesis presents the first
examination of utility of the unique features of Level 2 and presents use cases that justify
the availability of these features.
This thesis presents a technique for modelling SCJ Level 2 programs using the state-rich
process algebra Circus. The model abstracts away from resources (for example, memory) and
scheduling. An SCJ Level 2 program is represented by a combination of a generic model
of the SCJ API (the framework model) and an application-specific model (the application
model) of that program. The framework model is reused for each modelled program, whereas
the application model is generated afresh.
This is the first formal semantics of the SCJ Level 2 paradigm and it provides both top-
down and bottom-up benefits. Top-down, it is an essential ingredient in the development
of refinement-based reasoning techniques for SCJ Level 2 programs. These can be used to
develop Level 2 programs that are correct-by-construction. Bottom-up, the technique can be
used as a verification tool for Level 2 programs. This is achieved with the Failures Divergences
Refinement checker version 3 (FDR3), after translating the model from Circus to the machine
readable version of CSP (CSPM ). FDR3 allows animation and model checking, which can
reveal sources of deadlock, livelock, and divergence. The CSPM version of the model fits the
same pattern, with a generic model of the API being combined with an application-specific
model of the program. Because the model ignores scheduling, these checks are a worst-case
analysis and can give false-negatives.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces our work and puts it into context within the literature. Section 1.1
presents the background and motivation for the work. Section 1.2 describes our objectives
and includes the thesis statement. In Sect. 1.3 we summarise the contributions of our work.
Finally, Sect. 1.4 describes the structure of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Safety-critical systems permeate everyday life; they are required to operate unfailingly and
in real time. Examples include medical equipment, cars, aeroplanes, and power plants: areas
in which failures can lead to ecological or financial disaster, serious injury, or death.
Of similar concern are systems such as deep-sea submersibles, automatic exploration vehi-
cles (for example, the Mars rover), and other scientific monitoring systems. These systems are
termed mission-critical and, while their failure may not risk life, it can cause large data- and
financial-losses. Therefore, ensuring that both safety- and mission-critical systems operate
as intended, in a safe and robust manner, is fundamentally important.
Java is not traditionally associated with safety-critical programming; its useful abstrac-
tions often reduce control over the predictability of execution. For example, Java’s garbage
collection automatically reclaims the memory used by unreachable objects, but this can delay
program threads. General purpose languages are often restricted for safety and extended for
expressiveness to make them amenable to safety-critical programming.
Java has features useful for safety-critical programming: a strong type system; object
references, which are easier to use safely than pointers; a precise language definition; threading
and synchronisation, which allow the expression of common real-time abstractions using first-
class constructs; and exception handling. Java also has a wide user base, so the standard
language is well understood. Finally, Java has a large variety of implementations and libraries,
and is highly portable, which allows for a comprehensive range of target platforms.
Despite its useful features, Java is not expressive enough and needs restriction and exten-
sion to make it more suitable for safety-critical programming [88]. Java lacks explicit support
for condition variables and the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) can spuriously wake suspended
threads. Java does not support absolute time delays or detecting if a thread has resumed
due to a time out (as opposed to it resuming due to being woken). Threads must hold a lock
on an object before suspending on it, and when a thread resumes it attempts to reacquire
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the lock. However, no preference is given to resuming threads over threads attempting to
gain a lock for the first time. Further, threads that suspend while holding multiple locks only
release the lock on the object that they are suspending on. Workarounds for these problems
can lead to less efficient executions, race conditions, or deadlocks. Finally, Java’s support for
scheduling and priorities is not comprehensive enough for real-time programming.
Java Specification Requests (JSRs) are a process for adding features to Java. JSR 1
produced the Real Time Specification for Java (RTSJ) [8], which introduces: real-time ab-
stractions; region-based memory, to obviate garbage collection delays; and better control over
memory usage and scheduling. The RTSJ has several implementations [3, 44, 45], but its
programming paradigm is rather complex for safety-critical programs.
An international effort, led by The Open Group in JSR 302, produced Safety-Critical
Java (SCJ) [79] to take the final step in creating a real-time Java language that is suitable
for safety-critical programs. SCJ is aimed at applications that must be certified, for example,
against standards like DO-178C/ED-12C[30]. To do this, SCJ builds on the RTSJ and adopts
a new programming paradigm that is simpler to use for constructing safety-critical programs.
SCJ uses the real-time constructs and region-based memory, introduced in the RTSJ,
avoiding the problems with garbage collection mentioned above. The memory areas are
arranged hierarchically; associated safety rules prevent dangling references. Scheduling is
achieved in SCJ with a fixed-priority scheduler that uses Priority Ceiling Emulation. These
features require specialised virtual machines [72, 75] to run SCJ programs.
SCJ is organised into three compliance levels, which increase in complexity from Level 0
to Level 2. Each level defines a set of features, which include and expand on all the features
of the level below. This aids certification by controlling the complexity of SCJ; if you are
certifying a Level 1 program you need not worry about any of the features defined at Level 2.
Compliance Level 0 only allows simple single-processor programs that adopt a cyclic exec-
utive scheduling model. Level 1 introduces concurrency and less-restricted release patterns.
Level 2 is the least restricted, compliance level. Level 2 programs are highly concurrent,
potentially multi-processor, and allow suspension and a variety of release patterns.
SCJ has received attention from both industry and academia, but mostly aimed at Lev-
els 0 and 1. Case studies using SCJ include: a port of the CDx benchmark to SCJ Level 0 [64];
an implementation of a cardiac pacemaker in SCJ Level 1 [74]; and a 3D printer, with con-
trol software written in SCJ Level 1 [76]. However, to our knowledge, there is only one
implementation of Level 2: provided by the Icelab SDK[46]. Currently, the only examples of
applications that exercise Level 2’s features come from [89], which presents a simplified space
craft and discusses a railway control system from [43].
The SCJ Language Specification does not cover techniques to verify SCJ programs; pro-
viding support for this has been left to the community. Available development and verification
tools provide support for checking: memory safety [57, 24], memory consumption [4], execu-
tion time [53], schedulability [7], and functional correctness [53, 93]. These tools are discussed
in Sect. 2.5, however they are also mostly aimed at Levels 0 and 1.
SCJ provides an interesting new programming paradigm, but support for Level 2 remains
an open problem. The features of Level 2 are well defined in the language specification, but
their utility is not well understood. Further, Level 2 example applications are difficult to
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find. Tools that support SCJ development are rarely explicitly aimed at Level 2, and there
are no techniques for providing program verification for Level 2 programs.
1.2 Aim, Objectives, and Thesis Statement
The aim of this thesis is to support safety-critical programming in SCJ Level 2, by investi-
gating the utility of the features provided by Level 2, and devising a model of SCJ Level 2’s
programming paradigm and programs. Our models are written in the state-rich process al-
gebra Circus, which combines Z and CSP, guarded commands and refinement. Extensions to
Circus provide features for capturing objects and time. These features make Circus a useful
language for modelling object-oriented real-time languages, like SCJ.
Our first objective is to investigate the structure and execution of SCJ Level 2 programs
and identify use cases where Level 2, as opposed to Levels 0 or 1, should be used. Ensuring
safe use of Level 2 programs is difficult without an understanding of how its API should be
used. However, example applications for Level 2 are sparse. We examine the features of SCJ
Level 2 and provide example applications for which Level 2 is suited. This is the first such
investigation of SCJ Level 2 programming practice.
The next objective of our work is to develop a Circus model of the SCJ Level 2 paradigm,
as described in the SCJ language specification. This has been achieved for SCJ Level 1 [93]
but not for Level 2. Our model captures the generic behaviour of SCJ Level 2, allowing it to
be reused in the model of any Level 2 program. We do not just add Level 2 features to the
Level 1 model; we also extend the coverage of Level 1 features.
We model the generic paradigm behaviour of SCJ separately from the program-specific
behaviour of particular applications. By focussing on SCJ Level 2, we provide impetus for
the development of more tools and techniques that are designed to make the use of Level 2
safer. In modelling SCJ Level 2, we also illustrate the utility of Circus.
Our model of the SCJ Level 2 paradigm abstracts away from scheduling and resources.
This means that the model does not capture the global multi-processor support, scheduling,
or region-based memory management present in Level 2. Section 2.5 discusses techniques
for the verification of various program safety criteria, including schedulability and memory
safety, and how suitable these techniques are for SCJ programs. In Sect. 6.3 we discuss the
potential for extending our model to cover these features.
Our third objective is to develop a translation strategy to capture the program-specific
behaviour of a Level 2 program and generate a Circus model representing its behaviour. The
combination of this model with the generic model of the API provides a full specification of
the program. Capturing the program-specific behaviour separately from the API reduces the
complexity of both the translation strategy and application models.
Our final objective is to mechanise the translation strategy and build an automatic trans-
lation tool to produce Circus models of SCJ Level 2 programs. These artefacts improve the
utility of our modelling approach and increase our confidence in its validity.
With the stated aim and these objectives, our thesis statement is:
The paradigm embedded in SCJ Level 2 provides features unique (within SCJ) to
Level 2, which support useful applications that Levels 0 and 1 do not. Further, the
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Level 2 paradigm can be formally modelled using a language that captures state
and behaviour, in order to show that neither the SCJ paradigm nor a given Level 2
program introduce undesirable program states such as deadlock or divergence.
1.3 Contributions
The work we present in this thesis provides three contributions:
1. An examination of the utility of the features of SCJ Level 2,
2. A formal model of the SCJ Level 2 API, and
3. A strategy to translate SCJ Level 2 programs into our model.
Our first contribution is the examination of the utility of the features provided by SCJ
Level 2. The SCJ language specification describes in detail what constitutes a Level 2 pro-
gram, but not why Level 2 should be used. We provide the first examination of the features,
some of the first public example applications for which Level 2’s features are suited, and
propose improvements to Level 2.
Our second contribution is a formal model of the API of SCJ Level 2. We model the
programming paradigm described in SCJ’s (natural-language) specification. This is the first
formalisation of Level 2, though a model exists for Level 1. This model is generic and reusable
for models of any Level 2 program.
Our final contribution is a translation strategy that captures the application-specific be-
haviour of SCJ Level 2 programs and constructs a model for them. This strategy gives a
behavioural semantics to SCJ Level 2 in denotational style.
Our semantics combines the model of the API and the output of the translation strategy
to form a model of the whole program. This complete Circus model can be used to support
top-down and bottom-up verification of programs. In a top-down approach, our model is a
target for a correct-by-construction technique for building Level 2 programs. In a bottom-up
approach, our model can be used as a verification tool.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The outline of the rest of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the details of SCJ and
presents the example applications we use in later chapters. It places SCJ in context alongside
other languages used for safety-critical systems, identifying their strengths and weaknesses
as indicated by several programming language standards and guidelines. It introduces Circus
and discusses similar notations. Finally, it places this work in the wider context of verifying
SCJ programs by describing the tools available for SCJ program verification.
Chapter 3 examines the utility of the features found in SCJ Level 2 and presents some
example applications for which Level 2 is particularly suited. This is an essential step in
understanding the sorts of programs for which Level 2 is likely to be used.
Chapter 4 presents our approach to modelling the SCJ Level 2 API and Level 2 programs.
Further, we describe how our model captures the more complex situations of inheritance and
polymorphism, and synchronisation and suspension.
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Chapter 5 describes in detail how to construct models of Level 2 programs that are
compatible with our model of the API. This translation completes our approach to providing
a bottom-up technique to verify Level 2 programs, and supports the validity of our models.
We present the formalisation of part of our translation strategy in Z and describe a prototype
tool for automatic translation of Level 2 programs.
Finally, Chap. 6 provides a summary of the thesis contributions. It also discusses the
utility and validity of our modelling approach and translation strategy. Finally, it discusses
future work that builds on our approach.
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Chapter 2
SCJ, Circus, and Verification
This chapter introduces Safety-Critical Java (SCJ), the features that make it a useful safety-
critical language, and its applicable verification techniques. Section 2.1 describes SCJ’s fea-
tures in detail. In Sect. 2.3 we discuss the utility of SCJ as a safety-critical language. Sec-
tion 2.4 introduces Circus and compares it to similar notations. In Sect 2.5 we describe the
current verification techniques that are applicable to SCJ programs, including a technique
based on Circus. Finally, Sect. 2.6 summarises the main points raised in the chapter and their
impact on our work.
2.1 Safety-Critical Java
In this section we describe SCJ in detail. Section 2.1.1 provides a full overview of SCJ’s
features. We discuss the structure of SCJ programs, memory management, and compliance
levels. However, as mentioned in Sect. 1.2, the model that we present in Chap. 4 abstracts
away from scheduling and resources. So, Sect. 2.1.1 describes features of SCJ Level 2 that
are not covered by our model. Finally, Sects. 2.1.3 and 2.1.2 provide example applications
written in SCJ, which we reuse in later chapters.
2.1.1 SCJ Overview
SCJ is a version of Java that adopts a new programming paradigm to support the development
of software that must be certified. It uses region-based memory management to avoid garbage
collection delays and improve control of memory usage; rules prevent dangling references. SCJ
also provides common real-time abstractions to support tasks. These features mean that SCJ
programs require specialised virtual machines [72, 75].
SCJ borrows its real-time abstractions and region-based memory management from the
Real-Time Specification for Java (RTSJ), which is a version of Java designed for real-time
systems. However, its programming paradigm is rather complex, which makes it less suitable
for constructing safety-critical programs. SCJ takes the real-time elements of the RTSJ and
provides its own, restricted, programming paradigm to make it easier to construct safe and
certifiable programs.
The SCJ API relieves the programmer of most of the burden of adhering to SCJ’s pro-
gramming paradigm by providing its generic behaviour and structure. This collection of
classes and interfaces must be overridden or implemented to construct a program.
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Name Description
Safelet Controls the whole infrastructure and starts the
MissionSequencer
MissionSequencer Instantiates and starts a sequence of Missions
Mission Controls a set of tasks, represented by subclasses of
ManagedSchedulable
ManagedSchedulable The super-interface of all schedulable objects
PeriodicEventHandler A schedulable that executes once every period
OneShotEventHandler A schedulable that executes once after a time offset
AperiodicEventHandler A schedulable that executes when triggered by a method call
ManagedThread A schedulable that executes immediately, when the mission
starts
Table 2.1: SCJ Paradigm Components
Figure 2.1: SCJ Mission Phases, from [79]
At the top of every program hierarchy is a safelet, which controls the entire program.
The safelet chooses and starts a mission sequencer, which defines a sequence of missions to
be executed. The mission is the key component in structuring SCJ programs; each mission
encapsulates a function of the system and controls a set of tasks to achieve the required
behaviour. In SCJ, tasks are called schedulable objects and can take one of four release
patterns that we describe later. These paradigm components are summarised in Table 2.1.
Each mission progress through three phases, as shown in Fig. 2.1. First, in the initialisa-
tion phase, it registers its schedulable objects and initialises any data structures it requires.
Next, in the execution phase, each of the registered schedulables begins executing. Termina-
tion of a mission is triggered by all of its registered schedulables finishing or at the request of
one of its schedulables. During termination, the mission terminates each of its schedulables,
then the mission enters the clean up phase, where it can reset any changes it made to shared
resources. At the end of the clean up phase, the mission sends a signal to indicate if its
controlling mission sequencer should load another mission or not.
Although real-time Java garbage collection mechanisms are available [73, 71], SCJ uses a
hierarchical and region-based memory model that avoids heap use. The memory hierarchy is
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Immortal Memory: Safelet
Scoped Memory: Top-Level Mission Sequencer
Scoped Memory: Mission
Scoped Memory: 
Periodic Event 
Handler
Scoped Memory: 
Aperiodic Event 
Handler
Temporary 
Private 
Memory
Scoped Memory: Schedulable Mission Sequencer
Scoped Memory: 
Managed Thread
Temporary 
Private 
Memory
Temporary 
Private 
Memory
Scoped Memory: 
One-Shot Event 
Handler
Scoped Memory: Mission
Figure 2.2: SCJ Memory Hierarchy
illustrated in Fig. 2.2, where each box is a memory area and the bold text shows the type of
memory area: immortal memory or scoped memory. Each SCJ API class has a memory area
in which its allocations are made by default, the default allocation context, which is shown
in Fig. 2.2 after the bold text. Other memory areas can be entered during execution. The
immortal memory area is the top-level memory area, which persists for the lifetime of the
application. It is the default allocation context for the safelet.
Each scoped memory area persists for the lifetime of the component with which it is
associated. Each mission has its own scoped memory area, called mission memory, which
is cleared at the end of its clean up phase. Each schedulable has a scoped memory area
that is cleared after its release; this includes the mission sequencers, which are a subclass
of ManagedEventHandler. Data that is shared between schedulables must be stored in a
mission memory area or in immortal memory.
Temporary private memory areas are a scoped memory area that may be entered during a
mission’s initialisation or by schedulable objects during their release. This changes the default
allocation context, to the temporary private memory area, until the execution running inside
it terminates, which triggers the clearing of the memory area.
In an SCJ program, these memory areas form a hierarchy (shown in Fig. 2.2) where each
memory area uses some of the space reserved for its parent. At the top of this hierarchy is
immortal memory, followed by the private memory area of the mission sequencer loaded by
the safelet: the top-level mission sequencer. Next is the mission memory area used, in turn, by
each mission loaded by the top-level mission sequencer. As new components become active,
their associated memory areas are added to the hierarchy; when a component terminate, its
memory area is removed.
Figure 2.2 shows the memory hierarchy of a program that has a mission that is running
a periodic event handler and a schedulable mission sequencer. The periodic event handler is
active and has entered a temporary private memory area. The schedulable mission sequencer
has loaded a mission, which is running three schedulable objects. One of these schedulables,
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Level Unique Schedulables Nested Missions Suspension Processor
Level 0 Periodic No No Single
Level 1 Aperiodic, One-Shot No No Multi
Level 2 Managed Thread, Mission
Sequencer
Yes Yes Global Multi
Table 2.2: SCJ Features by Compliance Level
the aperiodic event handler, has (sequentially) entered two temporary private memory areas.
These memory areas are nested, indicating that the space for the second temporary private
memory area is taken from the space reserved for the first.
Memory areas further down the hierarchy have a shorter lifetime. To avoid dangling
references, a reference may only point to an object stored in the same memory area or in a
memory area that is further up the hierarchy. That is, references can only point to objects in
memory areas that are cleared after, or at the same time as, the memory area that contains the
reference. We note that our model in Chap. 4 abstracts away from SCJ memory management.
Techniques for checking adherence to the SCJ memory safety rules, to show that a program
is memory safe, are discussed in Sect. 2.5.
SCJ is organised into three compliance levels, which ascend in complexity from Level 0
to Level 2. Our work is aimed at Level 2, which is the most complex, or least restricted,
compliance level. Each compliance level provides some unique features, while maintaining
the features of the level(s) below it. The features available at each compliance level are
summarised in Table 2.2 and described in detail below.
Level 0 is for sequential programs that adopt a cyclic executive, where a set of compu-
tations are executed periodically. Level 0 programs only contain a single mission sequencer,
but may use multiple (sequential) missions. A Level 0 program’s schedulable objects may
only consist of periodic event handlers, which execute their behaviour periodically after a
time offset. At Level 0, the scheduling of programs is restricted to one processor only. An
example of a Level 0 program is a simple aircraft collision detection application [92].
Level 1 programs contain only one mission sequencer and may use multiple sequential
missions, as at Level 0. However, a Level 1 program’s schedulable objects my include periodic
event handlers, one-shot event handlers, and aperiodic event handlers. A one-shot event
handler executes its behaviour once, after a time offset. An aperiodic event handler has
no set release time; it executes its behaviour when requested by a method call. Further, a
specialised type of aperiodic event handler, called an aperiodic long event handler, takes a
long parameter to allow information to be passed to the event handler during execution.
At Level 1, schedulables are concurrent. Active schedulables may preempt each other
based on their respective priorities. Access to shared data can be controlled with synchronised
methods, to avoid race conditions; synchronised blocks are not allowed in SCJ. At Level 1,
multiple processors may be used, but each schedulable may only be assigned to one processor.
An example of a Level 1 program is a cardiac pacemaker [74].
Level 2 is the most complex compliance level, suitable for highly concurrent programs.
Level 2 programs may use the three event handlers available at Level 1, and managed threads.
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Figure 2.3: Object Diagram of the Buffer Example Application
A managed thread is a real-time thread that is released immediately, executes it behaviour,
and then terminates. Level 2 programs may contain multiple mission sequencers, each reg-
istered to a mission. This is possible because a mission sequencer is a schedulable object.
This feature allows a Level 2 program to have multiple active missions. However, there may
only be one active mission per mission sequencer; the maximum number of active missions is
equal to the number of active mission sequencers.
Level 2 programs are able to use a restricted version of Java’s suspension model. The
Object.wait() and Object.notify() family of methods may be used, but they may only
be invoked on this. That is, the target of the call can only be the current object – the object
containing the code currently being executed. Further, all queuing threads wait in eligibility
order. The most eligible waiting thread has the highest priority and has been waiting the
longest. Finally, Level 2 programs may be scheduled globally over multiple processors. That
is, the scheduler may select from several processors when executing a schedulable object. Our
work is concerned with the SCJ paradigm; since scheduling is handled by the SCJ virtual
machine, we do not discuss this feature further.
Below, we present two example applications to show the utility and complexity of Level 2.
The first is a simple producer-consumer program, the second is a simplified aircraft control
system. Further examples of applications that are supported by Level 2’s features are dis-
cussed in Chap. 3.
2.1.2 Buffer: A Producer-Consumer Application
In this section we present a buffer application, which is a simple solution to the Producer-
Consumer problem. This basic example illustrates how to compose an SCJ program, and
shows the use of managed threads and suspension. The full program listing can be found in
Appendix A.
An object diagram of the buffer application is shown in Fig. 2.3, where the arrows rep-
resent instantiation of the target object. The application contains a buffer object, which is
instantiated by the mission during its initialisation phase. Two managed threads, one pro-
ducer and one consumer, share access to this buffer. Access to the buffer is controlled using
suspension. The producer suspends if the buffer is full; if not, then it writes and notifies the
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Figure 2.4: Simplified Object Diagram of Aircraft Example Application
consumer. The consumer suspends if the buffer is empty; if not, then it removes a value from
the buffer and notifies the producer. Suspension is achieved with a call to Buffer.wait().
Notification is achieved by a call to Buffer.notify(). After reading from the buffer 5 times,
the consumer requests that the mission terminates. When both the managed threads have
terminated, the program terminates.
2.1.3 Aircraft: a Multi-Mode Application
To show the complexity of Level 2’s features, we present a simplified aircraft control program
as an example application. This example is adapted from one in [89] that shows the complex-
ity of concurrent missions in Level 2. The full program listing can be found in Appendix B.
Our simplified aircraft has three modes of operations, which correspond to the phases of
flight: Take Off, Cruising, and Landing. Each of these has mode-specific behaviours that are
only pertinent during that phase of flight. The aircraft also has persistent behaviours that
are pertinent during all modes. A simplified object diagram of the aircraft control application
is shown in Fig. 2.4, where the arrows represent instantiation of the target object.
The program is controlled by the ACSafelet, which starts the MainMissionSequencer.
The MainMission controls the persistent schedulables, including the mission sequencer that
is used to change between modes. The missions representing the modes (TakeOffMission,
CruiseMission, LandMission) are controlled by the ACModeChanger. Each of these missions
controls its mode-specific schedulables, which are omitted from Fig. 2.4 for brevity.
SCJ Level 2 is particularly suited to capturing systems like the aircraft application, which
have multiple modes with their own schedulables and schedulables that run during all modes.
As discussed in Sect. 3.2.1, Level 1 can be used to program applications with multiple modes,
but persistent schedulables must be duplicated because Level 1 programs cannot have concur-
rent missions. The duplication of the persistent schedulable disrupts their operation during
mission changes, therefore Level 2 provides better control over programs with multiple modes.
32
2.2 Safety-Critical Standards and Language Assessment
Because safety-critical systems are often complex and their correct functioning is of such
paramount importance, standards and guidelines are used to ensure that the software func-
tions correctly. The SCJ Language Specification [79] is specifically aimed at software systems
that require certification, so the understanding of what is prescribed in such standards is
important. Section 2.2.1 discusses standards for safety-critical programs, and Sect. 2.2.2
assesses Ada, C and C++, and Java-based languages against these standards.
2.2.1 Standards and Guidelines
Safety-critical programming standards typically restrict the behaviour of programs, prescribe
or proscribe certain language features, or specify the processes that must be followed during
program development. More complicated standards combine some or all of these approaches.
Some standards are specific to certain languages – Ada or C, for example – or specific sectors
of industry – such as avionics or nuclear reactors – whereas others provide more general
guidelines. There are standards that were designed for a specific industry but are now more
widely used. For example, MISRA C [60], which was designed for the automotive industry
but has gained wider use within the safety-critical community.
During the mid 1970’s the USA Department of Defense (US DoD) produced the ‘Steel-
man’ requirements [84], which contains features that were used to create Ada, in 1983. The
requirements are grouped as either application, environment, or commonality features. The
application requirements are the ability to specify user interfaces, exception handling fea-
tures, real-time control, and the ability to perform parallel processing. The environmental
requirements are that programs have to be reliable, modifiable, and efficient. Lastly, the com-
monality requirements are that the language should be machine independent, be easy and
inexpensive to implement, be completely defined, and have easily accessible support software.
The Steelman requirements have been an influential benchmark. For example, they have
been used to compare Ada95, Java, C, and C++ [90]. This is useful, not only to compare
versions of the Ada language, but to compare other languages used in the area of safety-
critical programming based on the requirements for the creation of Ada83, which is one of
the most popular languages in the domain.
The book ‘Safer C‘, aimed at making the use of C safer in safety-critical programming,
contends that “it is not how safe a language is, but how safe the use of a language can be
made that matters” [37]. This book compares C to other contemporary languages, including
Ada83. These comparisons include non-functional features of language use, such as its user
base and the availability of appropriate tool support.
Given this holistic approach to language safety, it is no surprise that Safer C accepts the
flaws in C and strives to identify the potentially dangerous language features and restrict
their use. The book identifies the dangerous language features: dynamic objects, because of
their potential for causing memory leaks if not properly deallocated; recursion, because of its
potential to exhaust the available memory; overloading operators, because of the potential
confusion this brings; and inheritance, specifically multiple inheritance because it can lead
to highly complex architectures. Safer C also mentions the importance of the language’s
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grammar, in terms of reading and writing a complier for the language. Some of these features
are simply prohibited, such as recursion, and others are only cautionary points, such as
warning of the problems with multiple inheritance.
The comparisons that Safer C makes between C and other languages are very detailed
and use varying sources. For example, language definitions, experiments, and interviews with
developers are all used. However, each comparison is only made pair-wise with C. This is
because the work is focussed around making C safer for use in safety-critical software. It is
no surprise to find, therefore, that the book concludes that C is a better option for reasons
such as its large user base (and so wider user testing), extensive libraries, and tool support.
The MISRA C standard [60] defines a subset of C for use in embedded automotive systems.
It also promotes the safe use of C and raises awareness of language-choice issues generally. A
further goal was to encourage the developers of commercial-off-the-shelf programming tools to
ensure their tools are suitable for the automotive industry. MISRA C contains 93 mandatory
and 34 advisory rules. The rules themselves are grouped into 17 different categories, which
include sections on basic language features (like types, identifiers, and constants) and more
complicated constructs (such as pointers and arrays). It recognises that vulnerabilities exist
in C and provides a series of rules concerning the use of the language. Vulnerabilities it
notes for C include: programming mistakes, like typing ‘==’ instead of ‘=’; programmer
misunderstanding, for example, of the operator precedence in the language; compiler errors;
and run-time errors. MISRA C also recognises that language vulnerabilities are only a small
part of program safety, and so it gives guidance for ‘best-practice’ development processes.
The DO-178/ED-12, “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certi-
fication”, series of civil avionics standards have been very influential in safety-critical program
certification. The DO-178B/ED-12B [29] version of the standard was published in 1992 and
adopted in Europe and North America; it is concerned with the safety of software-controlled
systems in the air. The DO-178/ED-12 is specifically mentioned in the SCJ Language Spec-
ification as an example of the level of certification at which SCJ is aimed. It presents 66
guidelines for programming software safely and specifies a series of outputs from the devel-
opment process, which provide enough evidence that the software has been built correctly.
It intentionally does not emphasise any particular development method, so that certification
can be applied to a wide range of development processes.
The DO-178B/ED-12B has been adopted in areas other than civil avionics. The NASA
Software Safety Guidebook uses the definition of certification from the DO-178B/ED-12B and
a NASA report on certification for safety- and mission-critical software essentially adopts the
standard, adding extra details. The standard is also referenced in two standards adopted by
the US military. The MIL-HDBK-516B uses DO-178B/ED-12B as a reference in its section on
software safety, along with two other documents, and the Software System Safety Handbook
makes reference to the DO-178B/ED-12B amongst others [52].
In 2012 the DO-178B/ED-12B was updated, the new DO-178C/ED-12C [30] contains
updates in vocabulary and concepts, to bring them into line with current usage and the state
of the art. For example, the phrase ‘target computer’ was felt to be outdated and was changed
to ‘execution platform’ [49]. This accommodates the use of virtualisation in which the phrase
‘target computer’ is ambiguous. The updated standard gains four technology supplements,
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including one for Object Oriented Programming [69] and one for Formal Methods [68] to
provide guidance for prevalent technologies in the safety-critical programming domain.
The DO-178C/ED-12C Object-Oriented Technology Supplement [69] presents the vulner-
abilities of using OO programming languages and describes how they may be dealt with. The
supplement aims to resolve the problems with the features core to most OO languages. There
is also a section discussing heap memory management in which real-time garbage collection is
allowed for the first time. The Formal Methods Supplement [68] provides guidance for their
use in the development of the software to be verified by the standard. This does not mean
that testing can be eliminated, but the standard does mention that appropriate use of formal
methods can reduce the burden on program testing.
The inclusion in the DO-178/ED-12 family of standards of the topics of virtualisation
and garbage collection is particularly useful for Java-based languages in avionics, and in
safety-critical software generally, given that they generally run on a virtual machine and use
automatic garbage collection [42]. The guidance provided in the Formal Methods Supplement
also adds credence to the proposed development of formal methods for SCJ Level 2.
2.2.2 Safety-Critical Language Assessment
There have been profiles and subsets of Ada, C and C++, and Java and the RTSJ that
improve on the ease of producing a safe program of the base language. Given the popularity
of these languages and their subsequent adaptations there has been much discussion in the
literature regarding their safety. The results of assessing these languages against various
standards and their pertinent safety features are presented below.
Ada
As previously mentioned, Ada was constructed from the ‘Steelman’ requirements [84], which
are grouped into application, environment, and commonality features. Unsurprisingly, Ada95
was found to meet 93% of the Steelman requirements [90]. However, this shows that Ada95
still satisfies most of its original requirements. But, the relevance of the Steelman require-
ments is questionable, as they have not been updated and so do not include features regularly
found in modern programming languages – such as object orientation.
When comparing the suitability of Ada83 and Ada95 for use in safety-critical systems,
Ada95 was found to be an improvement on the safety of Ada83 [22], which again is no
surprise. The analysis used a framework of 10 categories of features, organised into four
sections: predictability, analysability, traceability, and engineering concerns. Each feature
in the Ada Reference Manual for each version of the language was assessed against this
framework. However, this does not represent a contemporary view of Ada.
Ada83 has also been compared to assembly languages, C, and three other languages,
along with their subsets and possible subsets [23]. Each language was assessed against a
set of questions designed to elicit the insecurities of a programming language when it is
used in safety-critical systems. This list includes questions regarding: wild jumps, memory
overwrites, well defined semantics, strong data typing, exception handling, and the language
being well understood. This analysis showed that, at that time, a subset of ISO Pascal was
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the safest choice out the languages assessed. But a hypothetical Ada subset – based on work
like the foundations of SPARK Ada [14] – was the next safest choice, though this is based
purely on theoretical considerations.
A comparison between Ada95 and both standard Java and the RTSJ [70] found that
Ada95 provides much better concurrency control; a range of pitfalls in the Java concurrency
model can be solved or prevented with the use of Ada95. However, Java was not designed
for hard real-time programming and has had to rely on the RTSJ to remedy problems in
the Java concurrency model, for example the delays caused by garbage collection. Despite
this, the study concludes that Java is ‘adequate’ for safe real-time programming, but that
Ada95 provides better confidence in the safety of the real-time systems it can construct. This
is because Ada provides particular features designed for real-time safety such as: protected
objects, which have an associated monitor and locks on all their operations; the provision
of condition synchronisation; the resumption of the most eligible waiting thread; and the
prevention of an operation blocking while holding a mutually exclusive lock.
Ada is unique in having a strong type system, a wide range of static types, a consis-
tent semantics defined in an international standard, support for abstraction, and validated
compilers. This makes makes it well suited for safety-critical applications programming.
However, to achieve full predictability, static analysis, and testing of programs written in
Ada, it may still be necessary to restrict or control certain features within the language [47].
Due to its popularity and safety features, Ada subsets have been developed. These subsets,
SPARK [15] and Ravenscar [28], for example, aim to improve on the already stable base
provided by standard Ada.
The SPARK Ada subset [15] provides a set of annotations to add extra semantic infor-
mation to a program. Not only are these useful when it comes to the human-readability
of program source, they also present hooks for static analysis. Tools – such as the SPARK
Examiner – can use this embedded information to check that the program performs as the
annotations dictate, using the annotations as fragments of specification embedded in the
program itself. However, using annotations like this adds an overheard to the development
process. SPARK Ada also provides a much simpler programming model, when compared to
Ada, while still maintaining the expressiveness needed for real-time programs. This has the
dual-purpose of improving a program’s amenability to verification tools and improving the
likelihood that the programmers intentions will be encoded into the program correctly.
C and C++
C is still commonly used in safety-critical systems; there are reports of C being used even
in situations where Ada has been mandated or is required [37]. When assessed against the
Steelman requirements, C was 53% and C++ was 68% compliant, neither coming close to
the 93% that Ada95 scored on the same assessment [90]. C failed an assessment against a
set of criteria for languages in safety-critical systems and so its use in such systems is not
advised [23]. However, Safer C [37] contends that this study was done before the C standard
was finalised and because it did not include tool support, its assessment of C was too heavy-
handed. Summarising both [37] and [55], [36] lists some of the difficulties with using C
for safety-critical programs, for example: weak typing, dynamic memory allocation, pointer
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arithmetic, undefined data types, potential ambiguities in if conditions, and increment or
decrement operators.
Safer C [37] takes the opinion that the potential for making a language safe to use is more
important than its intrinsic safety. Safer C [37] considers the wide user base of C in making
an assessment of how safe it is, realising that this needfully brings a wide understanding of
the language. Safer C also takes an holistic view of the software being developed, in that
tool support, language profiles or subsets, and the wide user base, are all factors affecting the
development process and therefore all contribute the safety of the final program.
C was compared pair-wise with Ada83, C++, FORTRAN, and Modula-2, which con-
cluded that, while areas of Ada83 are fundamentally safer, the tool support for C is so good
that in places it can match or exceed this safety [37]. This is a useful point: assessing the
intrinsic safety of a language does not provide a full view of the safety of its programs, assess-
ing a language coupled with its prevalent tool support provides a fuller picture of language
suitability for safety-critical programming. If commonly used tools or a particular language
subset provide a safety feature, it is likely that this will have a positive effect on the safety
of the software produced.
Java and the RTSJ
Java has long been dismissed for use in safety-critical programs due to its root as a general-
purpose programming language. Though Java’s automatic garbage collection prevents ac-
cidental or forgotten deallocation, it also reduces the predictability of a running program
because program threads may be delayed by the garbage collector. Java has some redeem-
ing features, for example its strong typing, precise definition, and the inclusion of language
features like exceptions [40]. When assessed against the Steelman requirements, Java 1.0
met 72% of them [90]. Java 1.1 was assessed [41] in terms of defects found in the language,
using evidence from experiments, the Java language specification, web sources, and published
research. Java was found to have fewer defects, and therefore be far safer, than both C or
C++. However, this study also assessed Ada95, which had the fewest defects.
Java 1.5 was assessed against a conglomerate framework of several safety-critical stan-
dards [48]; this assessment concluded that the language has some weaknesses and, while
standard Java is very useful for general purpose programming and contains several useful
features, it is still not appropriate for high-integrity systems. This assessment also concludes
that safety-critical subsets that use Java as their base could be developed. Coupled with
the development of formal analysis techniques – for example, model checking – such a subset
could make Java a viable option. This work resulted in a subset of the RTSJ, which uses
Ravenscar Ada as its template and focusses on reliability, called Ravenscar-Java.
The RTSJ was aimed at addressing some of the problems of standard Java and making
it amenable for use in real-time software. It introduces memory scopes, which are not sub-
ject to automatic garbage collection, and improves support for handling interrupts [70]; it
also increases the control programmers have on the scheduling of concurrent activities [88].
RTSJ also succeeds in preventing dangling references though its memory allocation rules and
provides explicit support for paradigms like asynchronous or periodic events [9].
The features introduced in the RTSJ add expressiveness to the language, but certain
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pitfalls are retained from standard Java. These include problems like the ability to program
synchronized blocks of code within methods and the lack of explicit support for condition
variables. While the scoped memory system of the RTSJ does improve the predictability of
programs, because all scopes other than the heap are not subject to garbage collection, it is
complicated and requires common programming paradigms to be rethought [9].
However as these problems are well known they can be overcome; for example, develop-
ment tools that are aware of the problems can help a programmer identify when they might
occur. Real-time Java profiles remain an attractive prospect for a safety-critical system
where Java is the chosen technology [9]. With specific regard to problems encountered due
to the complexity of the RTSJ scoped memory model, programming patterns have already
been developed that either adapt current programming patterns to be scope-aware – like the
adapted Singleton Pattern or Memory-Aware Factory Pattern [21] – or use memory scopes
more effectively – for example the Handoff Pattern [63].
The next section provides a detailed discussion of the relationship between the features of
SCJ and safety-critical standards. It provides an analysis of how easily certifiable SCJ pro-
grams are, under the categories of predictability and reliability, analysability, and pragmatic
design.
2.3 SCJ and Safety-Critical Standards
In this section we discuss how the features of SCJ improve the certifiability of its programs.
We combine the categories given in several safety-critical programming standards and guide-
lines to frame our discussion. We address how SCJ improves the predictability and reliability
(Sect. 2.3.1), analysability (Sect. 2.3.2), and pragmatic design (Sect. 2.3.3) of its programs.
Safety-critical programming languages should focus on providing features that allow
program verification because it is the main prerequisite for the certification of software-
systems [36]. Certain language features can frustrate program verification, and are often
prohibited or controlled by safety-critical standards.
Given that Ada was created with safety-critical systems in mind, we consider the ISO/IEC
technical report ‘Guide for the use of the Ada programming language in high integrity sys-
tems’ [47], which focusses on the control or removal of language features in Ada that prevent
program verification. It considers four motivations for rules that require or reject a particular
language feature: predictability, testing, modelling, and pragmatism.
 Rules to achieve program predictability strive to ensure that program code is unam-
biguous. These rules, which are separate from the analysis methods, include side-effects
in functions and evaluation-order effects.
 Rules to facilitate testing aim to remove any features that might prevent the verification
of dynamic program behaviour. These features include constructs that disrupt the
program flow or complicate the view of the system state.
 Rules to aid modelling are concerned with control of language features that are difficult
to model or produce intractable models. These features include aliasing of objects,
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parameters, and other identifiers; and features causing complicated execution – like
recursion and concurrency. The report considers both formal and informal modelling.
 Pragmatic considerations deal with features that promote good program design. These
features are important because the architecture of the application, variable scope, visi-
bility, and so on, affect how easy it is to relate the program to its specification.
The report also considers additions to the language that can aid verification. For example,
loop invariants and hidden state, which are understood by the programmer, but are not
expressed in the program. This additional information can particularly aid formal verification,
and often takes the form of program annotations, like those present in Spark Ada or SCJ, to
embed the information within the program.
The DO-178C/ED-12C (‘Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment
Certification’) civil avionics standard [30], and its previous versions, have been very influential
in safety-critical program certification. It is specifically mentioned as a standard at which SCJ
programs are aimed. Its predecessor (DO-178B/ED-12B [29]) has been adopted in several
areas other than civil aviation [52]. The DO-178/ED-12 standards contain four themes:
reliability, predictability, analysability, and expressiveness.
DO-178C/ED-12C has four technology supplements, adding guidance for particular soft-
ware development technologies. Crucially for our work, these include a supplement for Object-
Oriented Programming [69] and for Formal Methods [68]. This aids the certification of SCJ
programs and formal methods for safety-critical development.
Craigen et al [22] construct a framework for comparing the suitability of different versions
of Ada for use in safety-critical systems. It draws on the DO-187B/ED-12B, British Ministry
of Defence MD00-55 and MD00-56 standards, and the Canadian Trusted Computer Product
Evaluation Criteria. Its features are organised into four themes:
 predictability, so that the system behaves unambiguously;
 analysability, so that language features allow tractable analysis;
 traceability, so that requirements can be tracked through the development process; and,
 engineering, features that aid the flexibility of design choices.
During the construction of an earlier Java profile for safety-critical programming, Ravenscar
Java [48], the features of Java and the RTSJ were assessed against a framework combining
several standards and guidelines, including DO-178B/ED-12B. The framework is organised
into three broad categories, which each have two levels: mandatory and desirable.
The categories and mandatory features are:
 Syntax and Semantics, which is subdivided into
– Type Safety and Strong Type Rules,
– Clear Description of Side Effects and Operator Precedence,
– Modularity and Structures,
– Formal Semantics and International Standards,
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– Well Understood Semantics,
– Embedded Systems Support, and
– Concurrency;
 Predictability and Verification, which is subdivided into
– Functional Predictability,
– Temporal Predictability and Timing Analysis, and
– Resource Usage Analysis; and
 Language processors, Run-Time Environment, and Tools, which is subdivided into
– Certified Translators, and
– Run-Time Support and Environment Issues.
The features in the framework are rather broad, but they are useful to structure the discussion
that follows. Below, we discuss how the features of Java fit into the categories of predictability
and reliability, analysability, and pragmatic design. Predictability and reliability are key
features that are present in all of the standards discussed above. Analysability covers features
that aid the testing, modelling, and verification of a program. The pragmatic design category
covers features that improve the traceability, expressiveness, or engineering capabilities of the
language, which includes language translators and tools.
2.3.1 Predictability and Reliability
SCJ improves the predictability and reliability of it programs over Java. It uses the region-
based memory model introduced in the RTSJ, in which memory areas are deallocated by
the infrastructure when there are no threads active inside the memory area. This avoids
garbage collection reclaiming unused memory at an arbitrary point in time. Though there
are predictable garbage collection techniques [73, 71], SCJ chooses memory areas to simplify
its infrastructure. Further, the size of each memory area in an SCJ program can be defined
and fixed at compile-time. The memory usage and safety are analysable, as we discuss in
Sects. 2.5.2 and 2.5.3.
SCJ restricts the permissible structure of its programs, which makes their execution more
predictable. As discussed in Sect. 2.1, SCJ programs are hierarchical. This structure adds
a predictable instantiation order during the set up of the program. The predictable use of
memory and tasks execution times during execution are discussed below.
The time predictability of SCJ tasks is achieved using the real-time constructs introduced
in the RTSJ. Each of the three handler classes have release times and may have deadlines,
which can be defined and fixed at compile-time. Techniques are available for Worst Case
Execution Time analysis, which we discuss in Sect. 2.5.1.
The SCJ suspension behaviour is also more predictable than Java’s. Threads queue for
locks in order of eligibility. This provides a more predictable order for thread resumption.
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2.3.2 Analysability
SCJ is designed to produce analysable programs, ensuring that they can be tested and mod-
elled, because this aids the development of safe programs. This occurs in several areas of the
language. The restrictions to SCJ’s memory model allow static memory usage analysis and
its simplified concurrency model aids schedulability analysis [40].
The novel SCJ paradigm is implemented on top of standard Java, which is widely un-
derstood and has a publicly available language specification. The popularity of standard
Java means that there are many testing tools that can be applied to the core parts of SCJ
programs. JUnit, for example, can be used to perform unit testing on the methods that
implement the behaviour of the schedulable objects in a program. The assert statement,
which is built into Java, can be used to test assertions during development.
The safety-critical features of an SCJ program, however, require SCJ-specific techniques.
There are techniques available for: memory safety [57, 24], memory consumption [4], execu-
tion time [53], schedulability [7], and functional correctness [53, 93]. These tools are discussed
in Sect. 2.5, however they are mostly aimed at Levels 0 and 1.
SCJ is defined informally in its language specification. However, this is an invaluable
resource for understanding the purpose and meaning of language features when modelling
SCJ programs. This specification has been the main source of information used in many
efforts to model and test SCJ programs, particularly as a full implementation of SCJ only
emerged at the beginning of 2015 [46].
SCJ has been the focus of a series of formal models written in Circus, which can be re-
lated by refinement to produce concrete SCJ models from abstract specifications [19]. This
technique can be used to develop programs that are correct-by-construction. The SCJ mem-
ory model [16] has been captured in Circus. This model does not cover the control flow of
programs, as this is addressed elsewhere. It is explicitly aimed at Level 1 programs: it only
uses a single mission memory area, which makes it unsuitable for Level 2.
The paradigm of SCJ Level 1 programs has been modelled in Circus [93], which provides
the refinement strategy with a target for Level 1 programs and allows programs to be model
checked. We build on this work in our model of SCJ Level 2. At a level of abstraction that is
closer to the programs themselves, SCJ-Circus [59] provides a formal notation for capturing
the components of SCJ. Its syntax and semantics are defined by mapping its constructs back
to standard Circus.
These efforts show that SCJ is analysable. Features of the language aid program testing,
and the information that programs contain can be used by analysis tools and for modelling.
The techniques that are available for analysing SCJ programs, however, generally ignore
Level 2, so this is an open area.
2.3.3 Pragmatic Design
SCJ is based on the firm foundation of Java, which is a popular and well understood language.
This makes it a good base on which to build a new safety-critical language. With such a
large pool of programmers who understand Java, the jump to understanding SCJ is relatively
small, compared to the jump from Java (or other C-like languages) to a language like Ada.
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Further, SCJ is strongly typed and object-oriented, which means that common programming
errors are detected at compile-time.
The potential of tools to prove properties about SCJ programs is greater than that for
C or C++, because its semantics are less ambiguously defined. Java features like keywords,
which aid readability, and only using single inheritance help here. Further, Java applications
are compiled to standardised bytecode, and tools can analyse programs at this level [40].
SCJ’s basis in standard Java means that porting existing programs into SCJ is easier.
Further, SCJ uses common real-time abstractions such as periodic and aperiodic tasks, and
threads. This, again, eases the porting of real-time programming patterns to SCJ.
SCJ’s novel memory model can seem complicated, at first. Programming patterns have
been adapted, for the RTSJ, to be scope-aware – like the adapted Singleton Pattern and
Memory-Aware Factory Pattern [21] – or to use memory areas more effectively – like the
Handoff Pattern [63]. These patterns can be applied or adapted for use in SCJ to helps
programmers with the SCJ memory architecture.
Despite standard Java not being traditionally associated with safety-critical programming,
one key feature of SCJ’s utility in this area is its foundation in Java. Its familiar syntax and
some of its intrinsic features provide a stable base for SCJ.
2.4 Circus Introduction
Circus is a state-rich process algebra that combines Z, CSP, guarded commands, and refine-
ment. This allows us to capture the state and behaviour of SCJ programs that we model. Our
model also uses features from other members of the Circus family. OhCircus [18] introduces
a notion of object orientation and inheritance, and we use features from CircusTime [86] to
specify time budgets and deadlines. Figure 2.5 sketches the BNF description of the syntax
of Circus. Below, we describe the elements of the syntax that are pertinent to the discussion
of our formal model. A comprehensive account of Circus can be found in [62].
Circus programs, defined in Fig. 2.5 by the syntactic category Program, are formed by a
sequence of Circus paragraphs. Each Circus paragraph (CircusPar) may be either a Z paragraph
(the Par category), a channel declaration, a channel set declaration, or a process declaration.
The syntactic category N contains the valid Z (and, therefore, Circus) identifiers.
Circus programs use bi-directional channels to allow processes to communicate. All of
the channels used in a Circus program must be declared before use: channel declarations
are defined by the CDecl category. If a channel takes any parameters, their types must be
declared. Parameter types are drawn from Exp, which is the category of Z expressions. For
convenience, channels may be collected into a channel set – defined by elements of the CSExp
category. Channel sets allow easy specification of the interface of a process.
Each Circus process has a name and a body (process N =̂ ProcDef) and may take pa-
rameters. In our model, processes are often parametrised by an identifier of a particular
object. The body of a Circus process (begin PPar∗ state SchemaExp PPar∗ • Action end) is
delimited by begin and end; it may contain a state, which is modelled using a Z schema;
and some actions, modelled using a free combination of Z state operations, constructs of a
simple imperative language, and CSP constructs (PPar∗). A process’s state can be altered
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Program ::= CircusPar∗
CircusPar ::= Par | channel CDecl | channelset N =̂ CSExp | ProcDecl
CDecl ::= SimpleCDecl | SimpleCDecl; CDecl
SimpleCDecl ::= N+ | N+ : Exp | [N+]N+ : Exp | . . .
CSExp ::= {| |} | {|N+ |} | N | CSExp ∪ CSExp | CSExp ∩ CSExp
| CSExp \ CSExp
ProcDecl ::= process N =̂ ProcDef | . . .
ProcDef ::= Decl • ProcDef | Proc . . .
Proc ::= begin PPar∗ state SchemaExp PPar∗ • Action end . . .
NSExp ::= { } | {N+} | N | NSExp ∪ NSExp | NSExp ∩ NSExp
| NSExp \ NSExp
PPar ::= Par | N =̂ ParAction | nameset N =̂ NSExp
ParAction ::= Action | Decl • ParAction
Action ::= Command | N | CSPAction | . . .
CSPAction ::= Stop | Chaos | Pred & Action | Action u Action
| Action \ CSExp | ; Decl • Action | . . .
Comm ::= N CParameter∗ | . . .
CParameter ::= ?N | ?N : Pred | !Exp | .Exp
Command ::= N+ := Exp+ | if GActions fi | var Decl • Action
| val Decl • Action . . .
GActions ::= Pred−→ Action | Pred−→ Action @ GActions
Figure 2.5: Partial BNF Syntax of Circus
by Z schemas or by a direct assignment (N+ := Exp+, from the Command category).
A Circus process always has a main action, at the end of the process after a •, that
dictates the combination of Z schemas and CSP actions that define the behaviour of the
process; these actions may reference other local actions for structuring. Both the state and
actions of a Circus process are local to that process. This makes Circus processes similar to
classes in object-oriented programming.
CSP has many operators that are adopted in Circus; actions defined using CSP operators
all belong to the syntactic category CSPAction. Table 2.3 provides a description of the
operators that we use in our model, some of which are omitted in Fig.2.5. Most of them are
familiar to users of CSP. We describe them to support the discussion of our model. We note
that Circus processes can also be combined using most CSP operators.
A simple operator is Skip, which terminates and does nothing else. A prefix c −→ A
waits for a communication on the channel c and then proceeds to behave like the action A.
Channel parameters can be either an input (c?x −→ A), an output (c!x −→ A), or added to
the channel name to indicate a specific communication on that channel (c.x −→ A). This
latter form is often used in our models to restrict an action to synchronise on a channel only
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Action Syntax Description
Skip Skip A simple operator that terminates
Simple Prefix c −→A Simple synchronisation with no data
Input Prefix c?x −→A Synchronisation that binds a the input
value to x
Output Prefix c!x −→A Synchronisation outputting the value of
the variable x
Parameter Prefix c.x −→A Synchronisation with some data x
Sequence A ; B Executes A then B in sequence
External Choice A @ B Offers a choice between two actions A
and B
Conditional if (x = TRUE )−→A8 (x = FALSE )−→B fi Performs A if x = TRUE and B if x =FALSE
Interrupt A4 c −→ Skip Executes A unless c occurs, which ter-
minates A
Parallelism A J nsa | cs | nsb K B Parallelism, synchronising on the chan-
nels in c, where A alters the variables in
nsa and B alters the variables in nsb
Interleaving A J nsa | nsb K B Parallelism with no synchronisation,
where A alters the variables in nsa and
B alters the variables in nsb
Iterated Interleaving 9 x : S • A(x ) Interleaving of all actions A(x ) where
x ∈ S
Recursion µX • A ; X A process X that executes A then X
Wait wait t Waits for t time units and then termi-
nates
Chaos Chaos The action that immediately diverges
Table 2.3: Summary of Circus operators
if it is parametrised by the identifier of a particular Circus process.
A related operator is sequential composition (; ), which connects two processes, instead
of a channel communication and a process like the prefix operator −→. Hence A ; B executes
the action A until it terminates and then executes B .
The external choice operator @ allows an action to offer the choice of two or more different
channel communications. Hence c1−→A @ c2−→B proceeds to A if there is a communication
on c1 or B if there is a communication on c2. Circus also contains a simple conditional
statement, as shown in the syntactic category Command in Fig. 2.5. It takes a familiar
if. . . then. . . else form. Hence if (x = TRUE )−→ A 8 (x = FALSE )−→ B fi performs the
action A if x = TRUE and the action B if x = FALSE . The interrupt operator 4 allows
a process to execute unless another process can proceed, in which case the second process
interrupts the first. Hence, A4 c −→ Skip allows the process A to execute, until c occurs
(provided that c is not offered by A).
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Two actions A and B may be placed in parallel: A J nsa | cs | nsb K B , specifies a
synchronisation set of channels cs over which both processes must agree to communicate;
and name sets (nsa and nsb) containing the variables that each side of the parallelism may
alter, which must be disjoint to avoid write conflicts. For example, in the execution of
A J ∅ | {| c1, c2 |} | ∅ K B , the actions A and B execute in parallel, but they must agree to
communicate on the channels c1 and c2 at the same time; further, the use of the empty
set (∅) indicates that neither A nor B can alter any variables.
A related operator is interleave, which is similar to the parallel operator except that it
does not specify a synchronisation set. Hence, A J nsa | nsb KB allows the processes A and B
to execute in parallel with no synchronisations between them. The two name sets, nsa and
nsb obey the same rules as described above for the parallel operator.
The name sets used by actions in parallel (A J nsa | cs | nsb K B) or interleaved actions
(A J nsa | nsb K B) control variable access during the parallelism. Essentially, this runs the
two actions in parallel, each with its own copy of their process’s state. On co-termination,
the two copies of the state are merged, according to the variables in the name sets. Where a
variable is a member of a name set, its final value is taken from the state of the associated
process. If it is in neither name set, then its value remains unchanged. This mechanism
does not prevent actions writing to variables not in their name set, but these writes are lost
because the version of the variable that is altered is discarded after termination.
In our model, we occasionally need to read a variable on one side of a parallelism or
interleaving that is being altered by the other side. To accommodate this we use an internal
channel to request the local copy of the variable from the action that is altering it. For
example in A J varA | | get a | | varB K B , we may have that the action A alters varA and
the action B needs to read the new value of varA. If B simply uses varA, then it reads the
version from before the parallelism. Instead, we can use the get a channel to request the
current value of varA from A. In this example, A encapsulates the variable varA in much
the same way as a Circus process encapsulates the variables in its state component.
Several operators, for example external choice, sequence, parallel, and interleave, can be
used in an iterated form. This allows the operator to be applied to all the values in a given
set. For example, 9 x : S • A(x ) creates an interleaving of all actions A(x ) where x ∈ S .
Recursion is defined with the µ operator. Hence, µX • A ; X defines a process X that
executes the action A then recurses back to X . This is usually combined with an external
choice or conditional to provide some condition to break out of the recursion.
Drawn from the CircusTime variant of Circus, the wait operator allows a process to wait
for a number of time units. Hence, wait t waits for t time units and then terminates. We
use this operator to capture time budgets and deadlines.
Finally, the Chaos operator is an action that immediately diverges. We use this to
model incorrect program states, which allows us to prove that a model does not exhibit these
incorrect states by checking for divergence-freedom.
Analysis of Circus programs can be performed using ProB [54] and FDR [33]. This requires
some skill in manual translation. A tool for automatic translation of Circus specifications to
CSPM , the input language for FDR, has recently emerged [5]. However, it is a prototype
tool that only accepts single-file specifications and potentially has a scalability problem with
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regard to its translation of state. We return to this issue in Chap. 5.
There are several alternatives to Circus as a modelling language. We consider a few
below. For example, Event-B [2] is a notation that extends the B method to capture some
behavioural information. The behavioural aspects of the specification are captured by event
guards, which dictate when an event is enabled.
ABS [10] is an executable specification language that has similar capabilities to Circus.
Both ABS and Circus have an object-oriented model that is similar to Java’s and capture
concurrency. However, Circus contains a refinement calculus that ABS lacks. Refinement is
key to the contribution of our model as a target for the Circus refinement strategy [19].
CSP
f
B [82] takes a similar approach to Circus. It is a combined notation that uses CSP
to capture behaviour, and B to capture state. It aims to utilise the existing tool support
for both languages, so the CSP and B [1] parts of a model are each separate and complete.
The similarity between CSP
f
B and Circus is underscored by a technique to translate Circus
specifications in to CSP
f
B for model checking [91]. This exposes a key benefit of CSP
f
B :
tool support. Because the behaviour and state models remain separate, each part of the
specification can be model checked by ProB and FDR, respectively. While this is a strength,
in terms of analysis, having separate models can be less convenient than Circus’s combined
approach.
The existing work modelling Java and SCJ in Circus means that it is a good choice when
approaching formal methods for SCJ. A translation from Circus to JCSP, a Java library that
implements CSP constructs, has been developed [61]. This technique has been used to model
standard Java programs using a translation strategy that transforms Circus programs into
Java code [31]. This technique is automated in a tool called JCircus, which produces a simple
GUI for the translated program to facilitate quick prototyping of Circus specifications. JCircus
has recently been adapted to provide an automatic translation from Circus to CSPM [5].
The refinement strategy in [19] provides a technique to relate Circus models of different
levels of abstraction. A low-level model of SCJ Level 1 already exists [93], which is a target
for the refinement strategy. Providing the strategy with a similar target for Level 2 programs
is one of the contributions of our work.
2.5 Verification of Safety-Critical Java Programs
Despite being a relatively young language, there are several techniques to verify various prop-
erties of SCJ programs. Some of these tools rely on annotations, either custom annotations
or the set defined in the SCJ Language Specification. Other tools focus on the source code
alone, without annotations, or analyse the Java bytecode. Table 2.4 provides examples of
tools available for verifying SCJ programs and the criteria they support.
In the sections below, we discuss the tools and techniques available for verifying SCJ
programs, mentioned in Table 2.4. Most of these tools are explicitly aimed at Levels 0 or 1,
often ignoring the features of Level 2 entirely. This often makes it difficult to assess their
applicability to Level 2 programs. However, we have tried to judge the updates required to
make each technique compliant with Level 2 programs.
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Criteria Tool
Worst-Case Execution Time SafeJML [53] and TetaJ [32]
Worst-Case Memory Consumption SpideyBC [4]
Memory Safety privmem [24], JOP Single Nesting Level [67], and
TransMSafe [57]
Schedulability TRSL [7] and TetaSARTS [80]
Functional Correctness SafeJML [53], Java PathExplorer [39], RSJ [51], and
TransCircus [93]
Table 2.4: SCJ Tools and the Safety-Criteria they Address
2.5.1 Worst-Case Execution Time
SafeJML [35] is a specification language for checking functional and timing constrains. It is
an extension of the Java Modelling Language (JML) [53], which has minimal memory and
timing features. Java source code is annotated with specifications of behaviour and compiled
with an extended open-source JML compiler to check the annotations against the code.
JML contains an annotation for specifying the duration of a method, which is effectively
its Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET). The duration is measured in JVM cycles, which
is not useful in a real-time context. In SafeJML, the duration annotation uses nanoseconds
and can check a program’s adherence to a WCET specification for methods or blocks.
SafeJML can be used for specifying other properties, as we discuss in Sect. 2.5.5. Further,
despite not being explicitly mentioned, it appears to be applicable to all compliance levels.
On the other hand, the annotation of programs adds to the overhead of verifying a program.
TetaJ [32] is a tool that translates Java bytecode into a network of timed automata for
analysis in the Uppaal model checker. The model of a program is combined with models
of the JVM and hardware on which the program will run. This allows model checking of
the entire system to estimate the WCET of the program on that JVM and hardware. This
analysis is achieved without annotations.
TetaJ seems to be aimed at Level 0 programs. The example application they describe
(an implementation of the mine pump control system) runs using a cyclic executive, which
is indicative of a Level 0 program. Applicability of TetaJ to other compliance levels is
not addressed. The authors mention that the process of modelling a JVM is automated, so
integrating a Level 2 compliant JVM (such as the icecap HVM [46]) may be possible. However,
it is unclear if the approach to modelling programs is easily adaptable to Levels 1 or 2, which
have a different structure to Level 0 programs.
2.5.2 Worst-Case Memory Consumption
Worst-Case Memory Consumption (WCMC) analysis is covered by a tool called SpideyBC,
which provides a static analysis of the memory usage of an SCJ program to determine the
worst-case consumption [4]. The analysis provides safe upper bound values for the backing
store required for memory regions and stack sizes for tasks.
SpideyBC analyses program bytecode to construct a call graph and a control flow graph
for each method. The graphs are used to find the most expensive paths through the pro-
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gram in terms of allocated bytes and method invocations that result in frames on the stack,
respectively. These paths provide the WCMC values for the backing store and the stack.
SpideyBC restricts the programs it can analyse. All loops and arrays must have explicit
bounds, recursion is not supported, and the entire program must be available at compile-time
(meaning that dynamic class loading cannot be used, which is trivially satisfied since it is not
available in SCJ). The explicit bounds on loops and arrays are specified using annotations in
the source code, which we assume to be custom annotations designed by the authors.
To our knowledge, this is the only technique for calculating WCMC for SCJ programs.
The authors test their technique on three small example applications and manually compare
the most expensive paths suggested by SpideyBC with other possible paths. They hope that
their technique provides the impetus for others by providing a useful benchmark.
SpideyBC is explicitly aimed at Levels 0 and 1. The underlying technique (discovering
the most expensive execution paths) is compliance-level agnostic. But, to ensure that is
it amenable to Level 2, SpideyBC needs updating to accept programs with multiple active
missions and managed threads so that it can build accurate graphs.
2.5.3 Memory Safety
Early versions of the SCJ Language Specification contain a set of annotations for ensuring
the safety of memory references. The memory areas in which objects reside are tagged
within the program, and the checker tool analyses these annotations to prove the memory
safety of a program [77]. Problematically, the implementation of the checker tool revealed
that if a class is required in several memory areas, then it must be duplicated. Further, in
the current draft (v 0.100) they have been moved to an appendix because they ‘were not
ready for standardization’ [79]. This means that SCJ implementations need not include the
annotations, so their presence cannot be depended upon as a general technique for analysing
SCJ memory safety.
A hardware-based technique for checking memory safety of Level 0 or 1 programs has been
implemented on the Java Optimised Processor (JOP) [67]. This technique assigns a nesting
level to each of SCJ’s memory areas: immortal memory is level 0, the top-level mission
memory is level 1, and so on.
When assignments are made, the nesting level of the variable is compared to the nesting
level of the reference being assigned. If the variable is static, then its nesting level must be
0, because all static variables reside in immortal memory. For other variables, the reference
must be at a lower (more deeply nested) nesting level than the variable. These checks ensure
that memory references only point to longer-lived memory areas.
Using a single nesting level only caters to the simpler memory hierarchy of Levels 0 and 1,
where the the memory areas can only be nested linearly. In Level 2, the memory hierarchy
can grow as a tree, because of the nested memory areas. However, this technique can be
used to check parts of a Level 2 program where the relationship between the memory areas
is linear. For example, an outer nested mission memory cannot reference an inner mission
memory.
The privmem tool [24] performs a static analysis of Java bytecode to prove that a program
does not attempt to violate the SCJ memory rules, without the need for annotations. If the
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input program does violate the memory rules, then privmem provide a counter-example. The
privmem analysis constructs an over-approximation of potential memory rule violations by
recording all the possible references from variables to objects. This is achieved by tracking
the current allocation context throughout the program, following the methods that alter it,
and updating the allocation contexts of new objects.
However, privmem does not track allocations made using the methods that allow allo-
cations directly into other scopes: newArray(), newArrayInArea(), and newInstance().
Further, it allows the SCJ infrastructure to make temporary memory rule violations: if such
violations occur, they are ignored. This diverts from the SCJ language specification, without
making a case for why the infrastructure needs to violate the memory rules.
Privmem struggles to track the usage of mission memory. The mission’s initialize()
method is used to track the initial entry to the mission memory, but there is no API method
that the tool can use to track the re-entry to mission memory before the schedulable objects
are activated. Also, because privmem performs its analysis on Java bytecode, tracing the
location of a counter-example back to the source code can be more difficult than with source
code analysis. Finally, the example applications used to evaluate privmem all appear to be
Level 0, since they only mention periodic event handlers.
While the technique of tracking where the program allocates memory is compliance-level
agnostic, the privmem tool needs updating to cater for Level 2 features, such as nested
mission sequencers and managed threads. This seems possible, but one challenge is how the
technique would deal with multiple active mission memory areas, particularly as it struggles
to track the usage of a single active mission memory.
TransMSafe [57] automatically analyses the memory safety of SCJ programs. It translates
the source code of an SCJ program into SCJ-mSafe, which is a novel abstract language for
describing the memory usage in SCJ programs. The translation is formalised in Z, which
paves the way to a proof of the soundness of the technique.
To check the SCJ-mSafe program, the tool builds an environment of reference variables
mapped to their reference contexts. A reference context is any of the memory areas available
in the program, plus a context for primitive values. Building this environment covers all
execution paths, so it captures all possible allocations that the program might make. This
environment is checked to ensure it adheres to the SCJ memory rules.
TransMSafe over-estimates the allocations that can occur in the program, so it can raise
false negatives. Further, it is explicitly aimed at checking the memory safety of Level 1 pro-
grams, so it is not directly applicable to Level 2 programs. However, this technique could
be extended to cover Level 2. Currently, an SCJ-mSafe program only allows one mission
sequencer, where Level 2 programs may have many. Further, the technique does not address
managed threads because they are only available at Level 2. Finally, the analysis treats mis-
sions individually, since they are sequential, in Level 1 programs. To accept Level 2 programs,
TransMSafe needs to either analyse each of the top-level mission sequencer’s missions along
side all of the missions from other mission sequencers or be adapted to take execution order
of missions into account.
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2.5.4 Schedulability
The Time and Resource Specification Language (TRSL) [7] provides an approach for check-
ing the schedulability of SCJ programs. TRSL specifications of execution time and locking
behaviour are included in the program as annotations. A specification is an abstract trace,
which is composed of a sequence of blocks. Each block can be: skip, which takes no time; a
time interval; a trace; a usage block, which describes a critical section protected by locks; a
repeat block, which describes the repetition of a block a number of times; or a select block,
which is a non-deterministic choice between a set of traces.
To check the schedulability of the program, its traces are translated in to a network of
timed automata, which is checked using Uppaal. Schedulability of the modelled program is
indicated by deadlock freedom. The technique also allows a program to be checked to ensure
that it implements its specification.
A similar approach, TetaSARTS [80], merges many ideas, including the TetaJ WCET
technique discussed in Sect. 2.5.1. TetaSARTS generates a network of timed automata for
the SCJ input program and analyses it using Uppaal, to perform schedulability analysis.
TetaSARTS differs from the TRSL approach in that it generates the model from Java
bytecode, however it still requires annotations for loop bounds, like the TetaJ tool. Schedu-
lability of the model is, again, shown by deadlock freedom of the model.
The example applications used to evaluate both of these techniques make no mention of
Level 2 features, so we assume that they are aimed at Level 0 or 1. It appears that they are
both applicable to Level 2 programs. But, their respective tools need to be updated to accept
Level 2 programs for analysis by, for example, ensuring that they are expecting managed
threads and multiple mission sequencers. Further, the techniques need to be able to handle
the ability of Level 2 programs to allocate schedulable objects to multiple processors, which
is not present at the lower compliance levels. Finally, both techniques require annotations,
which increases the programming overhead. TetaJ requires the annotation of all the program’s
methods; TetaSARTS only needs annotations on loop bounds, which is less onerous.
2.5.5 Functional Correctness
The SCJ Language Specification contains a set of annotations that can be used to specify
that a class or class member may only be used in a particular compliance level, that a
method may only be used during a particular phase, that a method may self suspend, and
the memory areas that a method may allocate in. The SCJ annotation checker [77], discussed
in Sect. 2.5.3, can be used to statically check SCJ’s behavioural annotations.
The checker tool was constructed to be compliant with an earlier version of the SCJ
Language Specification, and some of the annotations have changed in the current version of
the specification [79]. First, the @SCJAllowed annotation defines that code is visible to other
code at a particular compliance level or infrastructure code (using the SUPPORT argument).
However, the checker tool allows further values of the annotation’s argument, which have been
subsequently removed. Three separate annotations in the current version of the specification
(@SCJMayAllocate, @SCJMaySelfSuspend, and @SCJPhase) are arguments to one annotation
(@SCJRestrict) in the version with which the checker tool is compliant. Finally, as previously
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mentioned, the memory safety annotations that the checker tool accepts are not included in
the main SCJ Language Specification because they are not yet ready for standardisation.
The annotation checker statically checks the conformance of the program with its annota-
tions. However, the overhead of annotating an entire program, particularly with SCJ’s novel
programming and memory paradigm, potentially outweighs the usefulness of being able to
automatically check them. While the annotations cover useful metadata about the program,
they are inflexible and cannot be extended to check for custom program properties.
SafeJML [35] has also already been mentioned; it extends JML and uses custom Java an-
notations to specify functional and timing constraints of SCJ programs. The input program’s
source code, complete with annotations, is compiled by the SafeJML compiler to check that
the program complies with its annotations. SafeJML reports violations of statement annota-
tions by throwing an error.
SafeJML can be used to annotate a method or block with its duration, which (as we
discuss in Sect. 2.5.1) can be used to specify and check WCETs. Other annotations include
specifications of: maximum loop iterations, maximum executions of condition-guarded blocks,
and execution paths. Further, SafeJML handles subtype polymorphism. It uses ‘model
methods’ (side-effect free methods at are only intended for specification purposes) to allow
the specification of properties that can vary with the runtime type of an object. Again, the
downside of this technique is that the entire program must be annotated with behavioural
specifications.
Java PathExplorer [39] (JPE) is a tool that provides online monitoring of Java execution.
This is achieved by instrumenting the Java bytecode of a program to emit events to an
observer module, which is used to verify the execution of the program. This can either be high-
level verification, where the executing program is compared to user-provided requirements
specifications, or lower-level error detection, which is usually concerned with concurrency
related problems like race-conditions and deadlocks.
JPE accepts high-level specifications in Maude rewriting logic [20], which can be checked
using the Maude rewriting engine or translated to, and checked in, Java. JPE is intended to
aid testing, particularly the integration of formal methods with testing to avoid the problems
with ad-hoc testing and the complexity of theorem proving. It can also be used to provide
run-time verification and to influence program behaviour if its requirements are violated.
Java PathFinder (JPF) is a model checker for Java. The first version of JPF [38] translates
Java programs into Promela models, which are checked for deadlock freedom and adherence
to assertions (which are translated from any assert statements in the input program). This
technique requires the input program to have a finite and tractable state space.
While the first version of JPF is a useful approach to model checking Java programs, it
suffers from two drawbacks. Firstly, every Java expression has to be mirrored in Promela.
This is not always possible: for example, Promela does not support floating point numbers.
Secondly, the translation requires access to the source code. Again, this is not always possible:
for example, programs may use libraries for which only the Java bytecode is available [85].
The updated version of JPF in [85] departs from the idea of translating the input program
and, instead, uses a novel custom model checker, which consists of a custom JVM and a search
component to guide executions. JPF executes input programs to ensure that every possible
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execution path is explored, from each choice point or instance of nondeterminism. A choice
point occurs when the program takes input values or a thread is chosen for execution.
The RSJ tool [51] extends the JPF to allow it to accept SCJ programs. This is achieved by
providing a novel scheduling algorithm to execute in an SCJ compliant way. RSJ can discover
memory access errors, race conditions, priority ceiling emulation protocol violations, and
other application-specific run-time errors, like dereferencing a null pointer, invalid arguments
to library code, array bound violations, division by zero, and failed assertions.
RSJ is explicitly aimed at Levels 0 and 1, but without aperiodic event handlers because
their arbitrary release times cause state explosion. It is, therefore, not directly suitable for
Level 2 programs. Since aperiodic event handlers lead to intractable models, it is unlikely
that RSJ would scale well to the more complex concurrency available at Level 2.
As previously mentioned, the model of SCJ programs in [93] provides directly represents
the expressions in the program, but at a more abstract level. It captures the SCJ paradigm
and the programs separately in Circus. The paradigm model is generic and reusable; programs
are translated by an automatic tool called TransCircus. Combining the two separate Circus
components produces a model that exhibits the behaviour of the program and is amenable
to model checking, via a translation of the model into CSPM for input to FDR.
The aim of the work in [93] is not solely to provide a model checking technique for SCJ
programs. It it also an important part of a Circus refinement strategy [19] that translates
abstract specifications of behaviour into concrete models of SCJ programs. This provides a
correct-by-construction technique for SCJ.
The model and translation provided by [93] are explicitly aimed at Level 1, and do not
cover some features that were either considered to be too complex or were not part of the
language specification at the time of modelling. We take this work as inspiration in modelling
SCJ Level 2. We describe our approach in full, in Chap. 4. Hence, the work presented in this
thesis addresses the functional correctness of SCJ Level 2 programs.
2.6 Summary
SCJ is a Java-based programming language for systems that must be certified. It restricts
the region-based memory and concurrency abstractions of the RTSJ, and provides a novel
hierarchical programming paradigm. Despite SCJ’s restrictions, its programs, especially at
Level 2, can be very complex. Level 2’s unique features can capture safety-critical use cases
that are not possible at Levels 0 or 1. Importantly for our work, however, SCJ programs are
amenable to modelling, as shown by the Circus models of different aspects of SCJ [16, 93, 59].
Circus and its extensions provides features for modelling state, behaviour, objects, and
time. This makes it useful for modelling languages like SCJ, which are object-orientated
and real-time. Circus produces readable specifications, but tool support is a weakness. In
particular, model checking Circus requires translation to CSPM for FDR. This can be achieved
manually, which requires some skill, or with a translation tool [5], which has limitations that
we discuss further in Chap. 5.
Despite being a young language, there are already several verification techniques aimed
at SCJ. However, the majority of techniques are not aimed at Level 2. There are some
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techniques, such as SafeJML [35], that are applicable to all SCJ compliance levels. However,
Level 2 has not been the direct focus of verification of WCET, WCMC, memory safety,
schedulability, or functional correctness.
Despite its restricted structure, Level 2 programs can become very complex. This has
likely lead to the lack of verification techniques aimed at Level 2. Most of the techniques
available for SCJ seem to be amenable to extension for Level 2, as long as their tool support
is updated to cater to Level 2’s features. The Circus model of the Level 1 paradigm strikes a
useful balance between abstraction and close correspondence with programs, so we use this as
the foundation for our approach to address the functional correctness of Level 2 programs.
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Chapter 3
Applications and Evaluation
of SCJ Level 2
This chapter discusses in detail the utility of the unique features of SCJ Level 2 and presents
use cases that justify the availability of these features. This is the first such examination
of the features and utility of SCJ Level 2. This chapter is based upon the work published
in [89] and [56]. Section 3.1 describes Level 2’s features, which frames the discussion in
this chapter. Section 3.2 describes two programming patterns that require Level 2’s unique
features. Section 3.3 shows the utility of managed threads, in providing extended release
patterns, when combined with suspension, and better encapsulation of state. In Sect. 3.4
we describe specific challenges arising from Level 2’s unique features identified following the
studies reported in Sects. 3.2 and 3.3. To meet these challenges, we propose changes to the
SCJ specification, one of which has already been accepted by the standardisation group.
Finally, in Sect. 3.5, we summarise the utility and challenges of SCJ Level 2.
3.1 SCJ Level 2: Unique Features
The SCJ Language Specification is clear on what constitutes a Level 2 program but not why
it should be used. From the features of SCJ Levels 0 and 1, described in Sect. 2.1, their utility
is clear. Level 0 programs are periodic and executed by a cyclic executive. So a program’s
required scheduling behaviour is a primary indicator of whether or not Level 0 should be
used. However, both Levels 1 and 2 use concurrency and fixed-priority scheduling, so this
cannot be used as an indicator to choose between them.
To understand the purpose of Level 2, we examine the application-level programming
requirements for which its functionality is necessary. These requirements are not included
in the rationale for the compliance levels in the SCJ Language Specification. We broadly
classify Level 2’s unique features into four groups:
 Nested MissionSequencers,
 ManagedThreads,
 Suspension, and
 Global Scheduling over Multiple Processors.
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Since our modelling approach is agnostic to the number of processors in use, we ignore the
issue of global scheduling.
The most prominent of Level 2’s unique features, in terms of structure, is the possibility
of multiple active missions. This is achieved by allowing nested mission sequencers, which
are started by a mission. Each nested mission sequencer has a separate sequence of missions.
By contrast, Level 0 or 1 programs only have one mission sequencer, which is started by the
safelet and has a single sequence of missions.
Managed Threads have a simpler release pattern than that of SCJ’s event handlers: they
are released immediately and run to completion, with no deadline. Their release behaviour
is captured in their run() method; its default memory area is active for the duration of this
method. The length of a managed thread’s release can be as long as required; a loop may be
used within its run() method, or the thread may suspend. The practical outcome of this is
that the memory area of a managed thread can be kept active for as long as needed. Finally,
SCJ Level 2 programs are allowed to use the the Object.wait() and Object.notify()
family of methods from standard Java to perform suspension-based waiting
3.2 Nested Mission Sequencers
The ability to construct applications composed of nested mission sequencers is, perhaps, the
most important aspect to be considered when choosing between Levels 0 or 1 and Level 2.
The benefit of nested mission sequencers is primarily structural. They provide better control
over the schedulables in the program and the way that they execute.
In this section we identify two software architecture patterns that require nested mission
sequencers, and sketch an example application for each. We call these two patterns Multiple-
Mode Applications and Independently Developed Subsystems. Since both of these pattens are
examples of the utility of nested mission sequencers in SCJ Level 2 programs, we pick an
implementations of the Multiple-Mode Applications pattern (described in Sect. 3.2.1) to help
evaluate our translation in Sect. 5.4.
3.2.1 Multiple-Mode Applications
This pattern captures the typical architecture of systems that operate in multiple modes.
There may be persistent tasks, which operate in all modes, and mode-specific tasks, which only
operate in one mode. Schedulability analysis techniques can be used to guarantee the timing
properties in the steady-state situations of execution in each mode. Analysis techniques also
exist for handling the transitions between modes, but only on a single processor [81, 66].
This pattern can be programmed at Level 1, but Level 2 captures the requirements of
the application better. Level 1 lacks nested mission sequencers, so persistent tasks must be
duplicated in each mode. This duplication means that their execution is interrupted by mode
changes. If the persistent tasks have state, it must be stored in a higher-level memory area
(such as the immortal memory area) to prevent it from being lost during mode changes.
Level 2 allows persistent tasks to run uninterrupted by mode changes and, as we discuss
in Sect. 3.3.3, retain their state locally. Further, Level 2 allows a multiple-mode system to
be included as a component in a more complex program.
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Figure 3.1: Multiple-Mode Applications Pattern
Architecture Components
The components that characterise this pattern are shown in Fig. 3.1. A coordinator controls
a mode changer and any persistent tasks. Persistent tasks are required to operate during
all modes. A mode changer encapsulates several modes, and each mode encapsulates mode-
specific tasks. A mode changer can only have one active mode at a time. Mode changes are
typically requested by tasks from the currently active mode.
In SCJ, a mode changer can be conveniently implemented as a mission sequencer, each
mode as a mission, and each task as a schedulable. The coordinator component also has a
natural correspondence with a mission, often the main mission, which registers the persistent
tasks and the mode changer, and controls their operation.
Example Application
An example application that uses this pattern is a simplified Space Shuttle1, as shown in
Fig. 3.2. Each of its three modes is associated with a phase of operation, and has several
mode-specific schedulables. Fig. 3.2 only shows two mode-specific schedulables per mode and
two persistent schedulables (EnvironmentMonitor and ControlHandler), for brevity.
At the start of the execution phase of the main mission, the persistent schedulables begin
executing alongside those from the LaunchMode. Once the launch is complete, the LaunchMode
is requested to terminate. When it has, the mode changer loads the CruiseMode, and its
schedulables execute alongside the persistent schedulables, which remain active during the
mode change. When the craft needs to land, the CruiseMode is terminate and the LandMode
is loaded, which runs until the craft lands and the program can terminate.
Adequacy of SCJ Support
Using missions to support individual modes of operation and mission sequencers to control
the mode-changes has two main advantages. The first is that encapsulating each mode in a
mission enhances the modularisation of the program and the traceability of its structure to
its architectural design. This is especially important when each mode is a significant software
component in its own right, as is the case in our example.
1The code for this example can be found at http://www.cs.york.ac.uk/circus/hijac/case.html
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Safelet : Safelet
MainMissionSequencer : MissionSequencer
MainMission : Mission
EnvironmentHandler : 
AperiodicEventHandler
ControlHandler : 
AperiodicEventHandler
ModeChanger:MissionSequencer
LaunchMode:Mission CrusieMode:Mission LandMode:Mission
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫ ≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫ ≪instantiates≫ ≪instantiates≫
EnvironmentHandler : 
AperiodicEventHandler
ControlHandler : 
AperiodicEventHandler
≪instantiates≫ ≪instantiates≫
EnvironmentHandler : 
AperiodicEventHandler
ControlHandler : 
AperiodicEventHandler
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫
EnvironmentHandler : 
AperiodicEventHandler
ControlHandler : 
AperiodicEventHandler
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫
Figure 3.2: Space Shuttle with Multiple Modes
The second advantage is that SCJ supports a well-defined process for mission termination,
where schedulables can complete their current release before the mission terminates. Usefully,
this protocol supports mode change requests when they are planned events. Planned mode
changes occur at well defined points in a system’s operation. By contrast, unplanned mode
changes usually occur as a result of error conditions being detected. Such errors may be
anticipated, but the time of their occurrence can not be predicted. Hence the time at which
a mode change is required cannot be predicted; they are unplanned.
Using the multiple-mode applications pattern in SCJ raises some timing issues. First, in
order to execute a new mode, it is necessary to create all the new objects that are to reside
in the mission memory, during the initialization phase of the mission (mode). Hence, for
unplanned mode changes or applications that require fast and predictable planned changes,
there may be some efficiency or latency concerns.
Further, there is no automatic single release time for all of a program’s schedulables. The
persistent schedulables start before those in the first mode. A single start time can be created
manually for event handlers, using a periodic or one-shot event handler’s start time offset
(aperiodic event handlers are only released upon request). However, managed threads are
released immediately. Controlling their start time would require manually programming a
release mechanism, as discussed in Sect. 3.3.
Multiple-mode applications can be analysed for timing properties by treating the mission
sequencer implementing the mode changer as an aperiodic task. Its minimum inter-arrival
time is equal to the minimum time between mode change requests. Its deadline represents
any time constraints on the mode change operation.
An SCJ mission sequencer is a subclass of event handler so it only has a priority (for
scheduling) and storage parameters (for the size of its memory area); it does not have any
release parameters. To perform schedulability analysis on mission sequencers, their release
properties must be captured outside the program. We discuss this concern further in Sect. 3.4.
Finally, SCJ does not support hierarchical scheduling, which makes it challenging to
support compositional time analysis of the application. SCJ schedules persistent and mode-
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Figure 3.3: Independently-Developed Subsystem Pattern
specific schedulables in competition. Hence, the whole application must be analysed in each
mode along with each mode transition. We return to this issue in Sect.3.4.3.
3.2.2 Independently Developed Subsystems
Complex systems can be composed of one or more subsystems, which encapsulate and control
similar behaviour. These subsystems may be developed independently of each other and of
the main program. This pattern considers these subsystems to be a program in their own
right, each performing particular related behaviours. Nested mission sequencers are the key
to supporting this approach to constructing systems in SCJ.
Level 1 can capture the functionality of this programming pattern. However, at Level 1, all
the behaviours would have controlled by one mission, effectively flattening all the subsystems
into one. This complicates the independent development of a subsystem. Level 2 provides
better encapsulation and control of individual subsystems. For example subsystems can be
terminated or restarted independently of the main program and other subsystems. Using this
programming pattern at Level 2 provides a uniform method of plugging an independently
developed subsystem into a program.
Architecture Components
The architecture that characterises this pattern is shown in Fig. 3.3. Each subsystem con-
tains several tasks that perform related behaviours; they may also contain other subsystems.
Each subsystem may be developed independently and then integrated into the program. A
coordinator component controls and integrates the subsystems.
In SCJ, each subsystem can be implemented using: a mission sequencer, which allows the
integration of the subsystem into the program, and a single mission that manages the tasks
within that subsystem. Each task can then be implemented by an appropriate schedulable.
The coordinator component corresponds naturally to a mission, often the main mission, that
registers the mission sequencers controlling each subsystem.
Example Application
A good example of this pattern is the railway system described by Hunt and Nilsen [43]:
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Safelet : Safelet
MainMissionSequencer : MissionSequencer
TrainMission : Mission
NavigationServices : 
MissionSequencer
NavigationMission : 
Mission
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫
NavigationOversight : 
ManagedThread
≪instantiates≫
GPSDriver : 
ManagedThread
≪instantiates≫
CommunicationsServices : 
MissionSequencer
CommsMission : 
Mission
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫
TimeServices : 
MissionSequencer
TimeMission : 
Mission
≪instantiates≫
TrainControl : 
MissionSequencer
TrainControlMission : 
Mission
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫
≪instantiates≫
Figure 3.4: Railway System with Multiple Subsystems
‘Collision avoidance in rail systems is a representative safety-critical application.
A common approach to the challenge of avoiding train system collisions divides
all tracks into independently governed segments. A central rail traffic control
system takes responsibility for authorizing particular trains to occupy particular
rail segments at a given time. Each train is individually responsible for honouring
the train segment authorizations that are granted to it. Note that rail segment
control addresses multiple competing concerns. On the one hand, there is a
desire to optimize utilization of railway resources. This argues for high speeds
and unencumbered access. On the other hand, there is a need to assure the
safety of rail transport. This motivates lower speeds, larger safety buffers between
travelling trains, and more conservative sharing of rail segments.’
Their example considers the structure of the on-board software (illustrated in Fig. 3.4),
which supports the following requirements:
 maintain reliable and secure communication with the central rail traffic control author-
ity, provided by the CommunicationServices subsystem;
 monitor progress of the train along its assigned route, provided by the NavigationSer-
vices subsystem;
 control the train’s speed in accordance with scheduled station stops, rail segment au-
thorizations, local speed limit considerations, and fuel efficiency objectives, provided
by the TrainControl subsystem; and,
 maintain global time, provided by the TimeServices subsystem.
In the implementation described in [43], each of these subsystems is implemented as a nested
mission sequencer registered to the main mission (TrainMission), and each subsystem con-
trols a single mission that registers the subsystem-specific schedulables. There are multiple
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tiers of nested mission sequencers within the subsystems. Each tier represents further sub-
systems that can be developed independently. For brevity, Fig. 3.4 only shows that two
subsystem-specific schedulables of the Navigation Services subsystem and omits the deeper
tiers of nested mission sequencers.
Adequacy of SCJ Support
Although the encapsulation provided by missions is ideal for structuring subsystems, there
are issues that need to be addressed when adopting this approach. The first is that in order
to compose a system from many subsystems, each of the missions that controls a subsystem
must be controlled by its own mission sequencer. This is natural if each mission has multiple
modes of operation, but can become cumbersome otherwise.
Secondly, as already mentioned in Sect. 3.2.1, when a system is composed of subsystems,
there is no automatic common release time for all the schedulables. If required, this has to
be programmed explicitly. For multiple nested mission sequencers, this can become awkward
because the system start time needs to be passed down to all schedulables in the program.
Whilst the above limitations can be seen as minor, the third is more significant. Namely,
it is difficult to decompose timing constraints when subsystems are independently developed,
because neither SCJ nor the RTSJ directly support hierarchical scheduling. The RTSJ sup-
ports processing groups, which allow several schedulables to share a CPU budget, but these
are too general and difficult to use in a multiprocessor environment [13, 87]. Hierarchical
scheduling techniques for single processor and partitioned multiprocessor systems are well
established [26] and techniques are beginning to emerge for globally scheduled multiprocessor
systems [11, 27]. The lack of this facility in SCJ severely limits its support for the timing
analysis of applications using this pattern. We return to this issue in Sect. 3.4.3.
3.3 Managed Threads and Suspension
The managed threads and suspension available in SCJ Level 2 applications provide several
benefits. Their utilities often complement each other, so we discuss them both here. We use
an application that combines managed threads and suspension (described in Sect. 2.1.2) to
help evaluate our translation, presented in Sect. 5.4.
SCJ provides four release patterns: periodic, aperiodic, one-shot, and the simple run-to-
completion exhibited by managed threads (which is only available at Level 2). The simple
run-to-completion release pattern of managed threads can be used to support background
activities that run as fast as possible when they have access to the processor. For example, a
logging task that processes data from application logs whenever it is scheduled. There is no
notion of release events for these activities, other than their initial release.
At Level 1, this could be achieved with an aperiodic event handler that is only released
once, when the program starts, or by a one-shot event handler that has no start time offset and
is released immediately. However, this is a misuse of these tasks, which embody a particular
release pattern. Although there is no negative consequence for this misuse, managed threads
are a cleaner abstraction to support this sort of activity.
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Combining managed threads and suspension allows the programming of release patterns
not provided by SCJ, which we discuss in Sect. 3.3.1. Suspension itself is a useful feature,
and we discuss its utility in Sect. 3.3.2. Finally, we show how managed threads allow better
encapsulation of the state of schedulables than can be programmed at Level 1, in Sect. 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Extended Release Patterns
As previously mentioned, SCJ provides four release patterns, each implemented as a different
schedulable. By combining managed threads and suspension, one can program extended
release patterns. In SCJ, a periodic event handler is released either immediately or after an
absolute or relative delay from when it is started. Here we consider the example of a periodic
task that is released by a software notification. Such a release pattern supports a mechanical
system that requires periodic control, but is started by an aperiodic button press.
Using Level 2’s suspension features to allow a periodic event handler to wait for a noti-
fication, is not sufficient. Deadline monitoring of event handlers begins when the handler is
first released and they cannot be dynamically changed. This means that it is not possible to
set an initial deadline and then update it after the notification has occurred.
Managed threads can be extended to provide this release pattern. We consider, for exam-
ple, the class shown in Fig. 3.5, which extends ManagedThread to provide a periodic thread
that is released by a method call. The run() method (lines 24-34) is final and waits for the
initial release before calling the work() method periodically. The abstract work() method
declared on line 36 must be overridden to provide the functionality to be called each period.
The firstRelease() method (lines 38-44) is called during the mission to release the periodic
activity. This example illustrates the additional flexibility that is available at Level 2; the
periodic thread in Fig. 3.5 cannot be programmed using SCJ Level 1.
This release pattern can be extended to program the thruster control system described
by Wellings [88, Page 235]. Here, an astronaut activates the thruster and supplies a duration
for the engine ‘burn’. The engine requires periodic control to avoid the mechanical drift of
its valves. This requires an activity that is released by an event, executes periodically for a
certain duration (determined either by time itself or by another event), and then waits to be
started again. This can be programmed in SCJ by adapting the periodic thread in Fig. 3.5
to call waitFirstRelease() after a certain time offset and wait to be released again.
3.3.2 Suspension-based Waiting
Level 2 programs may use suspension-based waiting, which allows them to capture many use
cases that Levels 0 and 1 cannot. A simple example is device drivers, which often busy-wait
for input or output to complete because the expected delay is small and context switching
away from the driver is inefficient.
There are ways to integrate this delay into a driver’s scheduling (see [12, Section 14.6])
or allowing the driver to delay when it has no other activity to perform. But, when the delay
is relatively long, it is necessary to allow the system to schedule some alternative activities.
Since it is not possible to have a suspension-based delay in Level 1 programs, this re-
quirement can only be implemented at Level 2. Another example of where suspension-based
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1 public abstract class PeriodicThread extends ManagedThread {
2
3 private final int period;
4 private final int deadline;
5 private AbsoluteTime nextRelease; // the next release time of this thread
6 private AbsoluteTime nextDeadline; // the next deadline of this thread
7 private DeadlineMissHandler deadlineMissDetection;
8 private Mission myMission; // this thread ’s controlling mission
9 private boolean hadFirstRelease = false;
10
11 public PeriodicThread(int period , int deadline , PriorityParameters priority) {
12 super(priority);
13 this.period = period;
14 this.deadline = deadline;
15 nextRelease = new AbsoluteTime ();
16 nextDeadline = new AbsoluteTime ();
17 deadlineMissDetection = new DeadlineMissHandler ();
18 myMission = Mission.getCurrentMission ();
19 }
20
21 private synchronized boolean waitFirstRelease () {
22 while(! hadFirstRelease){
23 try {
24 wait();
25 } catch(InterruptedException ie) {
26 // mission is to be terminated
27 return false;
28 }
29 }
30 return true;
31 }
32
33 public final void run() {
34 if (waitFirstRelease ()) {
35 while(! myMission.terminationPending ()) {
36 nextRelease.add(period ,0);
37 work();
38 nextDeadline.add(period ,0);
39 deadlineMissDetection.scheduleNextReleaseTime(nextDeadline);
40 Services.delay(nextRelease); // waitForNextPeriod
41 }
42 }
43 }
44
45 protected abstract void work(); // override to provide thread ’s behaviour
46
47 public synchronized void firstRelease () {
48 hadFirstRelease = true; notify ();
49 nextRelease = Clock.getRealtimeClock ().getTime(nextRelease);
50 nextDeadline.set(nextRelease.getMilliseconds () + deadline);
51 deadlineMissDetection.scheduleNextReleaseTime(nextDeadline);
52 }
53 }
Figure 3.5: A Periodic Task Released by Software Notification
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1 public class Consumer extends ManagedThread {
2 private final PCMission pcMission;
3 private final Buffer buffer;
4
5 ...
6
7 public void run() {
8 while (! pcMission.terminationPending ()) {
9 try {
10 result = buffer.read();
11 } catch (InterruptedException e) {
12 e.printStackTrace ();
13 }
14 Console.println("Consumer Read " + result + " from Buffer");
15 }
16 }
17 }
Figure 3.6: Consumer thread
waiting is needed is producer-consumer systems.
Producer-Consumer Systems
Producer-consumer systems involve tasks generating data (the producers) that is to be pro-
cessed by other tasks (the consumers). The data is written to and read from a shared
bounded buffer. Here, the data often comes in bursts. A common solution to producer-
consumer problems uses suspension: the producers suspend when the buffer is full and the
consumers suspend when the buffer is empty.
Clearly these requirements cannot be met at Level 1, as it does not allow suspension. It
initially seems that producers and consumers could be implemented using aperiodic event
handlers, where a handler is released each time the buffer is full or empty – depending on if
it is a producer or a consumer. However, SCJ does not allow a queue of outstanding release
events for aperiodic event handlers, so they are not appropriate. Level 2 enables this release
pattern to be programmed using managed threads and suspension.
As an example, we consider a simple producer-consumer system with one producer, one
consumer, and a Buffer object to which they share access. Figure 3.6 shows the consumer
task, which extends ManagedThread. It holds a reference to its controlling mission and the
Buffer object – which is held in mission memory. In this simple example, the Buffer, shown
in Fig. 3.7, holds a one-place buffer.
The consumer’s run() method calls the synchronised buffer.read() method, which
encapsulates the behaviour of reading from the buffer (including the potential suspension).
The read() method first checks the status of the buffer, using the bufferEmpty() method.
The call to bufferEmpty() is in a while loop to guard against spurious wake ups. If the buffer
is empty, then it calls this.wait(), which suspends the consumer thread on the buffer. If
the buffer is not empty or the consumer has resumed, then the consumer: reads and clears
the buffer, then calls this.notify() to wake the producer. The producer thread has similar
behaviour, except it will wait when the buffer is full.
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1 public class Buffer {
2
3 private volatile int buffer;
4
5 public boolean bufferEmpty () {
6 return buffer == 0;
7 }
8
9 ...
10
11 public synchronized int read() throws InterruptedException {
12 while(bufferEmpty ()) {
13 this.wait();
14 }
15 // Read buffer
16 int out = buffer;
17 buffer = 0;
18 this.notify ();
19
20 return out;
21 }
22 }
Figure 3.7: Buffer Object
3.3.3 Encapsulation of State Information
Memory usage is another differentiating factor between managed threads and event handlers.
An event handler has its private memory area cleared at the end of each release, which
means that for state to persist across releases it must be saved in a memory area further
up the hierarchy, usually the mission memory. But, a managed thread’s memory area is
only cleared when its run() method returns. This means that, with careful programming
to avoid memory leaks, data can be stored locally and preserved over successive application-
implemented ‘releases’ of the thread.
The thread’s memory area can last for as long as the memory area of its controlling mis-
sion, which is where persistent data used by an event handler is normally stored (although it
could be stored in a memory area higher up the memory hierarchy, like immortal memory).
However, this ability to encapsulate state is important from a software engineering perspec-
tive, since storing a schedulable’s private data in the memory area of its controlling mission
makes this data more widely visible than it should be.
As an example, we consider several schedulables that log changes to the system’s envi-
ronment into local bounded buffers. When a buffer becomes full (which may take several
releases), the data is copied into a single global buffer in mission memory, which another
schedulable uses to write the system log to secondary storage.
If the logging schedulables are event handlers, then the local buffers need to be stored in
mission memory because the event handler’s private memory areas are cleared at the end of
each release. Using managed threads, the local buffers can be stored in the private memory
areas, because they are not cleared until their associated managed threads terminate. This
means that the buffers do not become exposed to access by other schedulables.
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1 Runnable runWork = new Runnable () {
2 public void run() {
3 work();
4 }
5 };
6
7 public final void run() {
8 if (waitFirstRelease ()) {
9 while(! myMission.terminationPending ()) {
10 nextRelease.add(period ,100);
11 ManagedMemory.enterPrivateMemory(privateMemorySize , runWork);
12 nextDeadline.add(period ,100);
13 deadlineMissDetection.scheduleNextReleaseTime(nextDeadline);
14 Services.delay(nextRelease);
15 }
16 }
17 }
Figure 3.8: Augmented Periodic Schedulable Object
Application-implemented releases, such as those discussed in Sect. 3.3.1, can be aug-
mented with a nested private memory area to provide a location for objects that can be
deallocated at the end of each application-implemented release. This allows a thread that
can store local data until it is terminated and allocate temporary objects during a ’release’.
This is illustrated in Fig. 3.8, which just shows the augmented run() method (and an asso-
ciated runnable) of Fig. 3.5. This would provide more efficient use of memory if the thread
allocates temporary objects during its application-implemented release.
3.4 SCJ Level 2 Challenges
During our investigation of Level 2’s features, we have identified three challenging areas where
SCJ’s support could be improved. In this section we discuss these challenges and propose
changes to the SCJ API to improve the support in that area. First, in Sect. 3.4.1, we discuss
a problematic corner case involving thread termination. This problem was present in SCJ
v0.94, but has since been fixed, after we identified it in [89]. Section 3.4.2 discusses the idea
of giving deadlines to a mission sequencer’s getNextMission() method. Finally, Sect. 3.4.3
discusses an approach to adding support for compositional timing analysis to SCJ.
3.4.1 Managed Thread Termination
In SCJ, a managed thread terminates when it returns from its run() method. Level 2
programs may suspend their execution, which the discussion in Sect. 3.3 shows to be useful
in SCJ. We found that, in a previous version of the draft SCJ language specification [78]
(v0.94), the combination of managed threads and suspension could lead to a problematic
corner case during mission termination where a thread might not terminate.
The previous version of SCJ defined the following activities to be performed on receipt of
a mission termination request:
 invoke this mission’s terminationHook() method;
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 invoke the signalTermination() of each of this mission’s registered schedulables;
 disable each of this mission’s periodic event handlers, so that no further firings occur;
 disable each of this mission’s aperiodic event handlers, so that no further firings are
honoured;
 clear the pending release event (if any) for each of this mission’s event handlers so that
they can be terminated after completing any active event handling;
 wait for all of this mission’s schedulables to terminate;
 invoke the cleanUp() method for each of this mission’s registered schedulables; and,
 invoke the cleanUp() method of this mission.
We note that the termination activities do not include invoking interrupt() on each of the
schedulables, which would result in waking all blocked schedulables with an exception and
expedite termination. This must be programmed using the Mission.terminationHook()
method, which can be inconvenient when the mission has many schedulable objects.
As an example, we reconsider the event-released periodic thread in Sect. 3.3.1, which
shows the example of a periodic thread that waits for its first release using the Object.wait()
method. However, if the periodic thread is waiting when its controlling mission begins ter-
mination, then it may not finish its current release – its run() method may remain active.
To aid the termination of managed threads (and other schedulables) that are suspended
when a termination request is received, we proposed (in [89]) that either the SCJ infras-
tructure interrupts each of the mission’s registered schedulables or that all the mission’s
schedulables are informed of a pending termination request. The latter proposal can be
achieved via a new method (terminationSignalled()), which each schedulable must imple-
ment. The intention of this method is to allow the programmer to manually interrupt those
schedulables that may be blocked when mission termination is signalled.
In the current version of the language specification [79] (v0.100), Section 3.3.6 now con-
tains specific guidance regarding termination in Level 2 programs. The approach taken by
SCJ is that programmers should manually interrupt schedulables that may be suspended
using the signalTermination() method, which is called on each of a mission’s registered
schedulables during termination. The Mission.terminationHook() method has been re-
moved. This partial adoption of out proposal does not automatically solve the problem, but
it does provide a uniform way of handling custom termination behaviour.
3.4.2 Deadlines on Mission Sequencers
Section 3.2.1 identifies that mission sequencers can be used to program multiple-mode ap-
plications, and that Level 2 provides more flexibility in such applications. However, an SCJ
mission sequencer does not have any release parameters, so it cannot have an associated
deadline or deadline-miss handler. Multiple-mode systems often have deadlines associated
with their mode changes. Level 2 would be improved by the addition of these features, for
situations where a mode change does not occur promptly.
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1 @SCJAllowed(Level_1)
2 public final void requestTerminationOfCurrentMission(AbsoluteTime deadline ,
3 AperiodicEventHandler deadlineMiss);
4
5 @SCJAllowed(Level_1)
6 public final void requestMissionChange(AbsoluteTime deadline ,
7 AperiodicEventHandler deadlineMiss);
Figure 3.9: Proposed New Methods for the MissionSequencer Class
Adding aperiodic release parameters to mission sequencers undermines the mission pro-
gramming model, particularly where they control a single non-terminating mission. Instead,
we propose adding the methods shown in Fig. 3.9 to the MissionSequencer class. These
methods invoke a mission change or termination with a deadline and a deadline-miss handler.
Both methods behave as Mission.requestTermination(), but provide additional be-
haviour. The requestTerminationOfCurrentMission method sets a timer, which counts
down to deadline. If the timer expires before the mission’s termination is complete, then it
releases deadlineMiss. If the mission terminates before the timer expires, then it is cancelled.
Similarly, the requestMissionChange method sets a timer to count down to deadline.
However, this method’s miss-handler is released if the mission change does not occur before
the timer expires. This approach allows SCJ to implement deadlines on mission changes and
terminations, without altering their standard protocols. We note that these facilities might
also prove useful at Level 1.
3.4.3 Support for Compositional Timing Analysis
Section 3.2.2 identifies a role for mission sequencers as a mechanism for the composition of
systems from independently-developed subsystems. We represent a subsystem in SCJ with a
mission sequencer controlling a single mission, which controls that subsystem’s schedulables,
as detailed in Sect. 3.2.2. Hence, we consider that the mission sequencer is the top component
of the subsystem.
Hierarchical scheduling (and its associated schedulability analysis) is a well established
technique that facilitates composition of components that have real-time attributes, such as
deadlines. Unfortunately, hierarchical scheduling is supported by neither SCJ nor the RTSJ,
possibly because of the lack of support by real-time operating system vendors.
We propose using two elements of hierarchical scheduling in SCJ to improve its sup-
port for independently-developed subsystems and components: CPU budgets, to implement
execution-time servers; and multi-level priorities, to isolate the scheduling of subsystems.
Developing an SCJ program made of subsystems can be achieved broadly in three steps.
First, each subsystem is allocated an execution-time server, which is given a capacity, a
priority order, and a replenishment period. These parameters need to be assigned
carefully to obtain good schedulability [25].
Second, the priority ordering of the schedulables in each subsystem is determined.
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1 public class ProcessingGroupParameters {
2 public ProcessingGroupParameters (HighResolutionTime start ,
3 RelativeTime replenishmentPeriod , RelativeTime budget){
4 ...
5 }
6 ...
7 }
Figure 3.10: Sketch of a ProcessingGroupParameters class for SCJ
Third, an integration step assigns concrete priorities to the schedulables based on their
priority ordering and the priority order of their server.
The result of this process is that the schedulables within a subsystem are only scheduled
for execution (and in priority order) when their execution-time server server has the highest
priority and has available capacity. Once the parameters of the execution-time servers and
the schedulables are set, schedulability analysis must be performed for each subsystem and
the system as a whole. In the rest of this section we describe the integration of our proposal
into SCJ. We consider only two tiers in the program hierarchy here, for brevity.
CPU Budgets
The first aspect of hierarchical scheduling required is that each subsystem is allocated a bud-
get of CPU execution time, which is consumed whenever one of its schedulables is executing,
and a period after which its budget is replenished. When a subsystem’s budget is exhausted,
all of its associated schedulables are suspended until its next replenishment. In the RTSJ,
this functionality can be supported by processing groups, if all the schedulables run on the
same CPU.
Processing groups ensure that members of a group, collectively, are not given more
CPU time per period than their group’s budget. The RTSJ defines an optional class called
ProcessingGroupParameters, an instance of which is associated with each schedulable in
the processing group. This allows the RTSJ’s schedulables to share a budget while retaining
their individual priorities, deadlines, and periods.
Processing groups support the requirements of compositional timing analysis. So a pos-
sible solution is for SCJ to implement the class sketched in Fig. 3.10, which is a restricted
version of RTSJ’s ProcessingGroupParameters. Here, the processing group’s deadline is
equal to its replenishment period. However, this technique inherits the limitation that the
schedulables within a subsystem must execute on the same processor.
Simulating Multi-Level Priorities
The second aspect of hierarchical scheduling that we require is multi-level priorities, which can
be simulated in SCJ by manipulating the priorities of mission sequencers and schedulables.
For each mission sequencer, we propose:
 defining a priority range, from the priority of this mission sequencer to the priority of
the next highest priority mission sequencer, and;
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 setting the priorities of all the schedulables in this subsystem within this range, while
maintaining their original priority order, to ensure that they only run when their sub-
system has the highest priority of all the subsystems.
This priority manipulation is performed statically, before the program is executed, in the
integration step of our proposed process. It may be that priorities of the program’s mission
sequencers must be changed during integration to accommodate the schedulables. This is
allowed, as long as the priority order of the mission sequencers is maintained.
For example, we consider a simple two-subsystem program using rate-monotonic schedul-
ing (where higher priorities are assigned to tasks with shorter periods). The parameters of
the execution-time servers of each subsystem are shown in Table 3.1. At the top level, the
Period (ms) Budget (ms)
Server 1 100 40
Server 2 50 15
Table 3.1: Execution-Time Server Parameters
execution-time server Server 1 has a replenishment period of 100 milliseconds and a budget
of 40 milliseconds. The execution-time server Server 2 has a replenishment period of 50
milliseconds and a budget of 15 milliseconds. The top-level is schedulable when the priority
of Server 2 is greater than the priority of Server 1.
Schedulable Priority
Server 1 10
S1 10
S2 11
S3 12
Server 2 20
Table 3.2: Execution-Time Server and Schedulable Priorities
The subsystem associated with Server 1 contains three schedulable objects, S1, S2, and
S3. They require a priority ordering where S3 has a higher priority than S2, which has a
higher priority than S1. During system integration, the priorities of the servers and schedu-
lables could be assigned so that the priority of Server 2 is greater than that of Server 1, plus
at least 3, in order to allow the priorities of the schedulable objects to be assigned between
those of the two servers. Table 3.2 shows an example of the priorities of this system, assigned
to simulate multi-level priorities, because the schedulables of the subsystem associated with
Server 1 are not able to run if Server 2 is executing.
Incorporation into SCJ
As detailed above, to support CPU budgets, SCJ needs to implement processing groups, and
SCJ can already support multi-level priorities, by manipulating the priorities of an applica-
tion’s schedulables and mission sequencers. To aid the integration of these two aspects of
hierarchical scheduling into SCJ applications, a new subclass of mission sequencer can be
added to encapsulate the concerns of a subsystem, as sketched in Fig. 3.11.
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1 public class Subsystem extends MissionSequencer{
2 public Subsystem (PriorityParameters pri , StorageParameters storage ,
3 ProcessingGroupParameters params , int priRange){
4 ...
5 }
6 ...
7 }
Figure 3.11: The Subsystem Class, which Provides an Interface for Subsystems
The constructor in Fig. 3.11 takes a ProcessingGroupParameters object (Sect. 3.4.3). To
encapsulate the information needed for the priority manipulation described in Sect 3.4.3, the
values of pri (which is the priority of this mission sequencer) and of pri + priRange define
the priority range for schedulable objects encapsulated by this subsystem.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presents the first investigation of the utility of Level 2’s features. The three
unique features that we examine – nested mission sequencers, managed threads, and suspen-
sion – all have uses in SCJ. Nested mission sequencers are useful for programming multiple-
mode applications and independently-developed subsystems; Levels 0 and 1 cannot. Managed
threads can be used to program background tasks and provide better encapsulation of state
than SCJ’s event handlers. Suspension enables Level 2 to capture systems that require it,
such as producer-consumer systems. When combined, managed threads and suspension can
provide extended release patterns.
Level 2’s unique features, and some of the use cases we identify, have revealed some
challenges for Level 2 programs. In v0.94 of the SCJ Language Specification [78] there was a
problematic corner case where suspended schedulables were not interrupted during the termi-
nation of their controlling mission. We proposed that all schedulables are interrupted during
mission termination, or that a method call be used to signal a mission’s registered schedu-
lables. The current version of the language specification [79] (v0.100) guides programmers
to manually interrupt schedulables that may be suspended using the signalTermination()
method, which is called on each of a mission’s registered schedulables during termination.
The second challenge was the inability to place a deadline on a mission sequencer changing
or terminating missions. We propose adding two methods to the MissionSequencer class to
request the termination or change of a mission, giving a deadline and a deadline-miss handler
for the process. This is yet to be added to SCJ.
The final challenge is the lack of support for compositional timing analysis of SCJ pro-
grams. To address this difficulty, we propose three things. First, the implementation of
a version of the RTSJ’s processing group parameters to support CPU budgets. Second, a
technique for manipulating the priorities of a program’s schedulables to simulate multi-level
priorities. Third, to aid integration we propose a subclass of mission sequencer to encapsulate
a subsystem. However, these proposals are also yet to be integrated into SCJ. In the next
chapter, we describe a model of SCJ Level 2. We do not include the unadopted proposals:
our model is faithful to v0.100 of the SCJ Language Specification.
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Chapter 4
Safety-Critical Java Level 2
Modelling Approach
This chapter describes our approach to modelling the paradigm of Safety-Critical Java (SCJ)
Level 2 v0.100 [79]. Our model is written in the state-rich process algebra Circus; a primer for
which is provided in Sect. 2.4. Section 4.1 introduces at a high level our approach to modelling
the SCJ Level 2 paradigm. Section 4.2 details the components of our model, showing how
we capture Level 2’s features. As described in Sect. 1.2, our model abstracts away from
scheduling and resources, which means that it does not capture SCJ’s global multi-processor
support, task scheduling, or region-based memory management. The full model of the SCJ
Level 2 paradigm can be found in Appendix C.
In Sect. 4.3 we describe how our model captures synchronisation and suspension, and
Sect. 4.4 describes how our model captures inheritance and polymorphism. Section 4.5 dis-
cusses using our model to show that the termination protocol from SCJ v0.94 was overly
complicated, and the current termination protocol (which we proposed in [56]) is simpler.
Finally, Sect. 4.6 summarises our modelling approach.
4.1 Modelling Overview
We provide the first formal semantics of the SCJ Level 2 programming paradigm, as described
in the SCJ language specification. We capture the paradigm of SCJ v0.100 [79], as described
in Chap. 2. We take the view that this paradigm is separate to its realisation in Java; we
capture the paradigm, abstracting away from the implementation details.
Our model is beneficial for both top-down and bottom-up SCJ development. Top-down,
our model provides a target for the Circus refinement strategy [17] to cater to Level 2 pro-
grams. The strategy allows refinement of abstract specifications of behaviour into concrete
specifications that capture the SCJ paradigm. Combining our model with the strategy would
allow the development of SCJ Level 2 programs that are correct-by-construction. Bottom-up,
our model can be used to aid program verification. Level 2 programs can be translated into
our model (which we discuss further in Chap. 5) for analysis. We can then use the model of
a program to catch program errors, such as deadlock, livelock, and exceptions.
Our overall modelling approach is illustrated in Fig 4.1. Firstly, we capture the behaviour
of the SCJ API (as described in the SCJ language specification) in the component called
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Figure 4.1: High-Level Modelling Approach
the framework model. The framework model is generic, in that it captures the behaviour
common to all programs, and is reused when modelling each new program. Next, we capture
the program-specific behaviour of a particular program in a component called the application
model, which must be generated afresh for each input program.
These two models are combined to form a Circus program that captures the behaviour
of an input program. The separation of the generic from the program-specific behaviour in
our model has two main benefits. First, the framework model can be validated in isolation,
before we start checking programs for errors. Second, it simplifies the application model and,
therefore, the translation from an SCJ program to its application model. The communication
and cooperation between these two models is discussed in more detail in Sect. 4.2.
To verify programs using this technique, we must first translate our model from Circus
to CSPM – machine readable CSP, which is the input language for FDR3. Then we can use
FDR3 to check the model for deadlock, livelock, and divergence. The latter check also shows
if the model may throw an exception, because of the way we model exceptions. The extra
translation step is needed because there is currently no model checker for Circus. However,
it has the added benefit of decoupling the Circus model from the CSPM version, which is
adapted to enable tractable analysis in FDR3.
Our approach is based on that of a model of SCJ Level 1 [93], but instead of simply adding
Level 2 features to this model we also capture Level 1 features that it did not: exceptions,
synchronisation, and period or deadline overrun. We also, in contrast to the Level 1 model,
provide separate framework processes for each of the three event handlers, which considerably
simplifies their application processes and translation. Further, our model raises an exception
if a schedulable is registered twice, as specified by the API. Finally, since our model is based
on a newer version of the SCJ Language Specification, we capture API updates that were
implemented after the model of Level 1 was constructed.
Our model of Level 2 is commensurately larger than the Level 1 model [93]. Table 4.1
summarises the relative sizes of both models, showing the number of lines of Circus that
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Component
Level 1 Level 2
Safelet 27 107
Mission Sequencer 36 153 + 236
Mission 120 360
Event Handler 49 N/A
Aperiodic Event Handler N/A 252
Oneshot Event Handler N/A 316
Periodic Event Handler N/A 267
Managed Thread N/A 360
Java Thread N/A 145
Java Object N/A 731
Total Lines in SCJ API 232 2671
Other Definitions 469 695
Total Lines of Circus 701 3366
Table 4.1: Summary of the Sizes of Level 1 and Level 2 Models
model each component and capture the other definitions. The Level 1 model comprises ∼
700 lines of Circus and the SCJ API is captured by 4 processes, which total ∼ 232 lines. In
contrast, our model of Level 2 comprises ∼ 3360 lines of Circus and the SCJ API is captured
by 10 processes, which total ∼ 2600 lines. The Level 1 model uses one process for all three
event handler classes, whereas our Level 2 model uses three separate processes to capture
these three classes. Also, mission sequencers are modelled by two separate processes in our
Level 2 model, as opposed to a single process in the Level 1 model.
Each class in the SCJ library and object in the program is represented in our models by a
Circus process. We use OhCircus classes to capture non-reactive behaviour, such as methods
that are purely data operations. OhCircus classes are similar to Java classes: they may hold
variables, specify constructors, make use of inheritance, and must be instantiated before use.
Specifically, data operations are captured in methods, which may be called from processes.
We also use constructs from CircusTime to capture deadlines and timed offsets.
Each process takes the name of the class it models, suffixed with ‘FW ’ for framework or
‘App’ for application processes. Each application process is parametrised by a unique identi-
fier, which is used to identify the process in channel communications and allows framework
processes to communicate with their application counterparts. The exception to this is the
SafeletFW process, which only has one instance because there is only one safelet in an SCJ
program. Multiple instances of the same class in a program each have their own identifier.
Each of an object’s methods are modelled by an action in the process that represents
that object. Calls to and returns from a method are represented by a pair of channels, which
signal the start and end of the action modelling the method. These channels take the name
of the method, suffixed with ‘Call ’ for a channel representing the call to the method, or ‘Ret ’
for a channel representing the return from the method. In the framework model, some of the
API methods are simple enough that they are modelled by only one channel. For example,
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the Mission.missionActive() method, which returns a boolean representing if this mission
has been started or not. Using channels to represent calls to and return from methods allows
method calls between processes. We handle method calls between processes using a separate
process to ‘route’ the calls to the right process, which we discuss in Sect. 4.4.
We capture exceptions, but not the Java exception handling mechanism. Exceptions are
used in two ways in the SCJ language specification: as an artefact of SCJ’s implementation
in Java and as a way of indicating misuse of the paradigm. We model the latter category, as
we consider that exceptions are used in lieu of preventing paradigm misuse. We model these
exceptions with the throw event followed by Chaos, which is an in-built divergent process
that allows us to detect exceptions during analysis.
We capture exceptions thrown by the API when: a thread is interrupted, a method
receives an inappropriate argument, a thread attempts to use suspension without holding the
lock, a thread attempts to lock an object with a priority lower than the thread’s, or a mission
attempts to register a schedulable that is already registered to another or the same mission.
We also capture exceptions thrown by the Java assert statement, to support programs that
use it to thrown application-specific exceptions that indicate a misuse of the paradigm.
4.2 Model Structure
As previously mentioned, we model the state and behaviour of application objects in the
program as two cooperating components: the framework model and the application model.
The processes in these two components must communicate with each other to form the full
model of a program. This section discuses the communication and cooperation between the
framework and application processes representing the main SCJ API classes.
Figure 4.2 shows the main processes in the framework model and the channels that
they use to communicate. The channels with underscores in their names are control signals
(for example, start mission) and those in camel case represent method calls (for example,
initializeCall and initializeRet). Some of the channels have been omitted for brevity, indi-
cated by three dots. The layering indicates potentially multiple instances in one model. Each
of these framework processes communicate with an application process, which are also not
shown in Fig. 4.2.
The framework and application models cooperate to represent the behaviour of the input
program. When a framework process encounters application-specific methods, it signals its
application counterpart to take control and perform that method’s behaviour. Another signal
returns control to the framework. These signals are call-return event pairs that retain the
method name, suffixed with ‘Call ’, for the event modelling the method call, or ‘Ret ’, for the
event modelling its return.
We illustrate this in Fig. 4.3, which shows how we model a mission MyMission using an
instance of the MissionFW process and an instance of MyMissionApp. The MyMission class
implements the initialize() and cleanUp() methods, which it inherits from the Mission
class. The instance of MissionFW contains actions representing these two methods; since
their default implementations contain no behaviour, the actions representing those methods
simply contain the associated pair of call and return events.
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Figure 4.2: Level 2 Model Structure
The instance of MyMissionApp also contains actions representing the initialize() and
cleanUp() methods. However, because MyMissionApp models the behaviour of MyMission
the actions it contains describe the full behaviour of the methods from MyMission. Because
the two processes are associated via a shared identifier, they can communicate so that the
MissionFW process can hand control to the MyMissionApp process to achieve a model of
the behaviour of MyMission.
In the rest of this section we discus our models of the API classes and how they commu-
nicate with their application counterparts to model a program. We use the aircraft control
system, described in Sect. 2.1.3, to illustrate how we model an application. Section 4.2.1 pro-
vides a more detailed examination of the modelling pattern, because the safelet is relatively
simple. But the description in the other sections below needfully omits some of the behaviour
that is not pertinent to the main control flow of SCJ programs.
4.2.1 Safelet
The framework process SafeletFW , shown in Appendix C.8, handles the behaviour specified
by the Safelet interface. It is the process that defines the main execution flow of the program.
It contains an action modelling the generic behaviour of the getSequencer() method, which
gets the identifier of the top-level mission sequencer from its counterpart application process
and signals that it should start.
Additionally, the SafeletFW process tracks which schedulables in the program are reg-
istered to a mission. This collection of globally registered schedulables is used to trigger
a MissionFW process to raise an exception if it attempts to register a schedulable that
is already registered. This behaviour can be seen in the communication between the the
SafeletFW ’s Register action (in Appendix C.8) and the MissionFW ’s Register action (in
Appendix C.10) over the checkSchedulable channel. The SCJ Language Specification states
that this exception should be raised, but it is not part of the safelet’s specification. The
safelet was chosen to keep track of which schedulables are registered globally because it is at
the top of the program hierarchy.
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Figure 4.3: Modelling a Mission Using Two Components
The application model of a class that implements the Safelet interface provides the
application-defined behaviour of the getSequencer() method. This method returns a refer-
ence to the top-level mission sequencer object. We model it using an action that returns the
identifier of a mission sequencer process. The safelet application model also contains actions
modelling any application-defined methods.
4.2.2 Mission Sequencers
Two framework processes model the behaviour of the MissionSequencer class, because it may
be used in two different contexts. The TopLevelMissionSequencerFW process (shown in Ap-
pendix C.9) models the top-level mission sequencer and the SchedulableMissionSequencerFW
process (shown in Appendix C.11) models a nested mission sequencer, which is used as a
schedulable – as described in Sect. 3.2. This simplifies both processes because they each only
need to be involved in events relevant to their context.
The TopLevelMissionSequencerFW process is started by the SafeletFW process. When
it begins termination, it signals the SafeletFW to indicate that the program has terminated.
A SchedulableMissionSequencerFW process is started by its controlling mission, and signals
to its controlling mission once it has terminated. Since it is a schedulable, it must respond
to termination requests from either its controlling mission or the mission it is executing.
The framework models of both flavours of mission sequencer contain an action modelling
the generic behaviour of the getNextMission() method. This method returns a reference
to the next mission that this mission sequencer executes. The action modelling the method
fetches a mission identifier, from the application counterpart of this framework process, and
starts that mission.
Despite having two separate framework models, the application model of either a top-
level or a nested mission sequencer fits the same pattern. The application model of a mission
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Register =̂
register ? s ! mission−→
(
checkSchedulable .mission ? check : (check = True)−→
AddSchedulable
)
@
checkSchedulable .mission ? check : (check = False)−→
throw .illegalStateException−→
Chaos


Figure 4.4: The MissionFW ’s Register Action
sequencer provides the application-defined behaviour of the getNextMission() method: the
behaviour that returns a mission identifier. The application model of a mission sequencer
also contains actions representing any application-defined methods.
4.2.3 Mission
A MissionFW process is started by a mission sequencer process and models the generic
behaviour of the Mission class. It has actions that model the methods initialize(),
requestTermination(), and cleanUp() from the Mission. Here we present the Circus model
of a mission in more detail than the processes of the other paradigm objects, because it is
ideal for illustrating our modelling approach.
The InitializePhase action models the initialize() method, and controls the schedula-
bles being registered to this mission. The events initializeCall and initializeRet model the call
to and return from initialize(). InitializePhase comprises other actions that each control
a particular part of the registration protocol. For example, the Register action (shown in
Fig. 4.4), which controls the registration of one schedulable.
The Register action (Fig. 4.4) is triggered by the initializeCall event, and is then ready to
register schedulables. The registration of a schedulable is modelled by the event register . s .m,
where s is the identifier of the schedulable being registered and m is the identifier of the
mission registering the schedulable. The Register action accepts a register event, with
any schedulable identifier as long as the mission identifier matches the identifier of this
MissionFW process. These register events originate in the MissionFW ’s application coun-
terpart.
Next, Register waits for the checkSchedulable event, which indicates, via the variable
check , if a schedulable may be registered. This event comes from the SafeletFW process,
which listens to all register events and tracks globally registered schedulables. This allows
the detection of an attempt to register a schedulable more than once. If check is True, then
the schedulable can be registered. If check is False, then the schedulable is already registered
and we use the throw channel to model an exception being thrown and then diverge (Chaos).
Once all of a mission’s schedulables have been registered, the MissionFW process enters
its execution phase, where it starts all of its registered schedulables simultaneously and then
waits to handle method calls and schedulable termination. This is captured by the Execute
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InitializePhase =̂
initializeCall .MainMission−→
register ! ProducerSID ! MainMission−→
register ! ConsumerSID ! MainMission−→
initializeRet .MainMission−→
Skip

Figure 4.5: The MainMissionApp’s InitializePhase Action
action, shown in Appendix C.10. The signal to terminate a mission is accepted from any
of that mission’s registered schedulables, and triggers the termination and clean up of that
mission’s active schedules.
Once the termination and cleanup of a mission’s schedulables is complete, it enters its
own cleanup phase. This is controlled by the Cleanup action, which models the CleanUp()
method. This simply indicates to the SafeletFW process that this mission’s schedulables are
no longer registered and triggers the Cleanup action of this mission’s application counterpart.
As an example of a mission application process, we examine the model of the MainMission
class in the Buffer application, described in Sect. 2.1.2. The MainMission is modelled by
the MainMissionApp process, which captures the reactive application-specific behaviour of
the mission. It cooperates with an instance of the MissionFW process to capture the be-
haviour of the mission. Channels on which the instances of MissionFW and MainMissionApp
communicate are parametrised by the mission identifier MainMission; this ensures that the
MainMissionApp process communicates with the right process instance. These channels are
used by the MissionFW process to hand control to the MainMissionApp process so that it
can execute application-specific behaviour.
The application model of a mission provides the application-defined behaviour of the
methods initialize() and cleanUp(). The initialize() method is modelled by the
InitializePhase action, and clearly illustrates the simplification of the application model of a
mission in comparison to its framework model.
In an SCJ program, the Mission’s initialize() method is overridden to register the
schedulables that this particular mission controls. Figure. 4.5 shows the InitializePhase action
of the MainMissionApp process, which models the initialize() method in the MainMission
class (shown in Appendix A).
The InitializePhase action is triggered by the initializeCall event and then proceeds to
register schedulables, which is modelled by the same event as in the MissionFW process,
register . s .m. The register events shown in Fig. 4.5 send the identifiers ProducerSID and
ConsumerSID , respectively, to the MissionFW process with the identifier MainMission. The
order of registration shown in Fig. 4.5 corresponds to the order in the program.
The cleanUp() method is modelled by the CleanupPhase action. In the buffer application,
there is no application-defined behaviour in the cleanUp() method, so the CleanupPhase
action simply performs the call and return events. In a program with cleanup behaviour,
events modelling it would be inserted in-between the call and return events.
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PriorityQueue == PriorityLevel → (iseq ThreadID)
∀ pq : PriorityQueue • nullThreadId 6∈ ran(⋃(ran pq))
Figure 4.6: Priority Queue Function
4.2.4 Schedulables
The generic behaviour of each of the five schedulables is modelled by a different process:
the PeriodicEventHandlerFW process (shown in Appendix C.12) models a periodic event
handler, the AperiodicEventHandlerFW process (Appendix C.13) models either an aperi-
odic event handler or an aperiodic long event handler, the OneShotEventHandlerFW process
(Appendix C.14) models a one-shot event handler, the ManagedThreadFW process (Ap-
pendix C.15) models a managed thread, and the SchedulableMissionSequencerFW process
(Appendix C.11) models a schedulable mission sequencer. Each schedulable process is started
by a mission, performs its behaviour, accepts termination requests from the mission that
started it, and cleans up after it terminates.
Each event handler process has actions that control its specific release pattern. The release
behaviour of an event handler class is contained in its handleAsyncEvent() method, which
is modelled by an action that is triggered in accordance with the handler’s release pattern.
Event handlers may have deadlines, and periodic event handlers have a period. Our
models consider that periods may be overrun and deadlines may be missed, and captures the
response to this. This means that our model is capable of being used for checking potential
deadline or period overruns, for example. However, we note that implementing these check
is left as future work – as discussed in Sect. 6.3.
Managed threads are simpler and begin their release as soon as they are started. The
release behaviour of a managed thread is contained in its run() method, the generic behaviour
of which is modelled by an action that is called as soon as the managed thread is started.
Mission sequencers used as schedulables are described in Sect. 4.2.2.
Each of the schedulable application processes has an action modelling the method that
captures its release behaviour. For an event handler, this is the handleAsyncEvent() method.
For a managed thread, this is the run() method. Because the release patterns of the event
handlers are captured by their framework processes, the application models for these classes
are very simple; they only require the release behaviour. The application models of the
schedulables also contain actions modelling any application-defined methods.
4.3 Synchronisation and Suspension
The synchronisation model of SCJ constrains that of standard Java. First, SCJ programs
cannot use synchronized blocks, only synchronized methods. Second, threads queue for a
lock in order of eligibility. In SCJ, the most eligible thread is the thread at the highest priority
level that has been waiting for the longest time. We model this using the type PriorityQueue
(Fig. 4.6), which is a total function from PriorityLevel to injective sequences of ThreadID .
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PriorityLevel is a free type containing the priorities available to the system and ThreadID is
the set of thread identifiers.
Our models use extra framework processes to control synchronisation and suspension.
In SCJ, each schedulable is executed by a thread. In our model, schedulables that call a
synchronised method are associated with an instance of the ThreadFW process – shown in
Appendix C.6. ThreadFW holds the thread identifier and keeps track of its priority and
interrupted status. Overall, the framework model of a schedulable that calls a synchronised
method is the parallel composition of its associated ThreadFW process with the appropriate
framework process, which depends on the type of schedulable (event handler, managed thread,
or mission sequencer).
Additionally, each object used as a lock is associated with an instance of the ObjectFW
process, which stores the threads waiting on this object and controls the threads trying to lock
this object. Again, the overall framework model of each object that represents a paradigm
component and is used as a lock is its framework process in parallel with an instance of
ObjectFW . Non-paradigm objects used as locks are modelled in the framework by just an
instance of ObjectFW .
As an example, we revisit the buffer application described in Sect. 2.1.2, in which a
producer and consumer thread each share access to a bounded buffer. The Buffer object
controls access to the buffer with the methods read() and write(), which are synchronised,
to control the concurrent access. We consider the read() method here as an example of
our approach to modelling synchronisation and suspension. The read() method, shown in
Fig. 4.7, suspends the calling thread (by calling wait()) if the buffer is empty. This is
wrapped in a loop that checks if the buffer is empty, to deal with spurious wake ups by the
Java Virtual Machine.
The instance of ObjectFW that is associated with the BufferApp process (which models
the reactive behaviour of the Buffer object) controls the synchronisation and suspension be-
haviour using the startSyncMeth, lockAcquired , and endSyncMeth events. The startSyncMeth
event models the beginning of a synchronized method and triggers the ObjectFW process to
request a lock on this object by the thread calling this action.
Because the lock may already be held by another thread, the readSyncMeth action waits
for the lockAcquired event (from the ObjectFW process) to signal that it has the lock and
can proceed. After the body of the method, the endSync event signals that the synchronised
method is complete, to trigger ObjectFW to release the lock on the mission currently held by
the calling thread. We note that SCJ does not support Java’s ReentrantLock, however, SCJ
does support reentrant locking by allowing synchronised methods to call other synchronised
methods in the same object. The ObjectFW process provides this behaviour; to unlock the
object, after the first lockAquired event, each subsequent startSyncMeth event (which must be
from the same thread) must be matched by an endSyncMeth event from the locking thread.
We model the call to wait() using the call-return event pair waitCall and waitRet . These
events take the identifier of the associated ObjectFW instance (BufferOID , in Fig. 4.7) and
the identifier of the thread calling this action. The instance of ObjectFW associated with the
mission adds thread to its queue of waiting threads. The process calling waitCall waits for
waitRet to communicate its identifier.
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readSyncMeth =̂ var ret : Z •
readCall .BufferID ? caller ? thread−→
startSyncMeth .BufferOID . thread−→
lockAcquired .BufferOID . thread−→
var bufferEmpty : B • bufferEmpty := bufferEmpty();
µX •
var loopVar : B • loopVar := bufferEmpty;
if (loopVar = True)−→
; X8 (loopVar = False)−→ Skip
fi

;

waitCall .BufferOID . thread−→
waitRet .BufferOID . thread−→
Skip;
bufferEmpty := bufferEmpty()
 ;
var out : Z • out := buffer ;
ret := out

;
endSyncMeth .BufferOID . thread−→
readRet .BufferID . caller . thread ! ret−→
Skip


Figure 4.7: The BufferApp Proceess’s readSyncMeth Action
We model the call to notify() with the event notify . As with waitCall and waitRet ,
notify also takes the identifier of the associated ObjectFW process and the identifier of the
thread calling this action. The notify event triggers the ObjectFW process to resume the most
eligible thread. If there are no waiting threads, then ObjectFW allows the call to notify , but
does nothing. To resume a thread, ObjectFW calls waitRet with the identifier of the thread
to be resumed.
SCJ Level 2 can also use the notifyAll() method, which resumes all the waiting threads
in eligibility order. We model a call to notifyAll() with the event notifyAll . It triggers
the NotifyAll action in the ObjectFW process to call the NotifyAllHandler action, which
uses waitRet to resume the most eligible thread and then recurses if there are more threads
waiting.
4.4 Inheritance and Polymorphism
Inheritance and polymorphism are key features of object-oriented programming. An SCJ
program’s paradigm objects (the safelet, mission sequencer, mission, etc) each extend an
SCJ API class, except for the safelet, which implements an interface. As in standard Java,
SCJ classes may extend one super class and implement one or more interfaces.
When modelling inheritance, we must consider that a method’s declaration and implemen-
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read MethodBinder =̂
binder readCall ? l : (l ∈ readLocs) ? c : (cs ∈ readCallers) ? callingThread−→
readCall . l . c . callingThread−→
readRet . l . c . callingThread ? ret−→
binder readRet . l . c . callingThread ! ret−→
read MethodBinder

Figure 4.8: The read MethodBinder Action
tation may be in different classes. Further, implementations may be overridden in subclasses.
From what we have already described, this causes problems for our modelling approach. We
describe our solution to this problem here.
As described in Sect. 4.2, our model usually captures method calls using a pair of channels
representing the call to and return from the method. This pair of channels is parametrised
by: the identifiers of the process representing the calling class and the process representing
the called class, any parameters the method may take, and its return value – if it has one.
However, the location of the method may not be the class on which the call is being made, so
the action representing it may not exist in the process representing the called class, causing
a spurious deadlock.
In our model of SCJ programs, we handle calls to inherited methods using a process named
the MethodCallBinder (MCB), which is placed in parallel with the Application model to bind
method calls to the method locations. The MCB also facilitates non-inherited method calls
made between application processes. The MCB process is constructed during the translation
for a particular SCJ program, as described in Chap. 5.
Since SCJ allows dynamic class loading, the MCB can resolve dynamic binding only once
the entire program is known. Dynamically loaded classes are handled in the same way as
any other potentially instantiated class, for example a mission choosing to instantiate only
one of two different schedules in its initialisation phase. The potential for that class to be
instantiated means that it will be included in the model.
The MCB process contains one binding action for each application-defined method in the
program. Each binding action has two associated sets, a Locs set and a Callers set. To ensure
uniqueness, the names of these sets are prepended by the name of the action they method
they are binding. The Locs set contains the identifiers of all the processes that contain the
method being bound, and the Callers set contains the identifiers of the processes that may
call the method being bound.
Each action is triggered by an event that has the same name as the event representing the
call to the method, but prepended with ‘binder ’. This event accepts communications with any
identifier form the Locs set and any identifier from the Callers set, these parameters ensure
that the other evens in the action are related to the same method call. When triggered, the
action engages in the call and return events of the method being bound. Finally the action
signals the return from the bound method with an event that has the same name as the
return channel, again prepended with ‘binder ’.
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deployLandingGear MethodBinder =̂
binder deployLandingGearCall ? l : (l ∈ deployLandingGearLocs)
? c : (c ∈ deployLandingGearCallers)
? callingThread−→
deployLandingGearCall . l . c . callingThread−→
deployLandingGearRet . l . c . callingThread−→
binder deployLandingGearRet . l . c . callingThread−→
deployLandingGear MethodBinder

Figure 4.9: deployLandingGear MethodBinder Action from the Model of the Aircraft Appli-
cation
As an example of the MCB facilitating non-inherited method calls, we revisit the buffer
application described in Sect. 2.1.2, in which a producer and consumer thread each share
access to a bounded buffer. The Buffer object controls access to the buffer with the methods
read() and write(). In our model, both of these methods are represented by actions in the
Buffer process. Because the read() method is called by the Producer thread and the write()
method is called by the Consumer thread, they also each have an action in the MCB . Here
we examine the read() method, which is controlled by the readCall and readRet events.
The MCB action that binds calls to the readCall and readRet events is shown in Fig. 4.8.
The action is triggered by the binder readCall event, which takes the same parameters as
the readCall event. The process passes these parameters to the readCall event, which hands
control over to the read action in the Buffer process. The readRet event signals that the
read action is finished and is handing back control. The return parameter from readRet is
passed to binder readRet , which signals the end of the method call and returns control to
the location of the call. The readLocs set contains the identifier of the Buffer process and
the readCallers set contains the identifier of the Consumer process. This example shows the
MCB providing a simple one-to-one binding; the method it is binding is only defined in one
location and is only called by one object.
As an example of the MCB handling an inherited method call, we use the aircraft ap-
plication described in Sect. 2.1.3, which is a simplified aircraft control system. The aircraft
application operates in three modes: take off, cruise, and land. Each mode is represented by
a mission that controls several mode-specific schedulables. Since both the take off and land
modes activate the aircraft’s landing gear, both modes contain a schedulable that controls
the landing gear by calling methods in the mission representing that mode. Each of the
missions implements the LandingGearUser interface, which defines the methods to operate
the landing gear. Here we examine the deployLandingGear() method, which is controlled
by the deployLandingGearCall and deployLandingGearRet events.
The MCB action binding calls to the deployLandingGearCall and deployLandingGearRet
events is shown in Fig. 4.9. This action is triggered by the binder deployLandingGearCall
event, and its completion is signalled by the binder deployLandingGearRet event, in the same
way as described above. The difference with this example is in the Locs and Callers sets.
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GetNextMission =̂
getNextMissionCall . sequencer−→
getNextMissionRet . sequencer ? next−→
currentMission := next ;
StartMission;
if terminating = FALSE −→
GetNextMission8 terminating = TRUE −→
Skip
Figure 4.10: The Original TopLevelMissionSequencerFW ’s GetNextMission Action
The deployLandingGearLocs set contains the identifiers of both the TakeOffMission and
LandMission processes, because the bound method is defined in both of these locations.
The deployLandingGearCallers set contains the identifiers of each of the schedulables that
control the landing gear. This allows events that represent either of the schedulables calling
the deployLandingGear() method defned in either of the two missions and issue the return
event to the caller. In this example, the two calls cannot occur at the same time (because
the two missions where the methods are defined are mutually exclusive) but it illustrates how
the MCB can handle simultaneous calls.
4.5 Simplifying the SCJ Termination Protocol
The current SCJ termination protocol restricts communication to components separated by
one layer in the program hierarchy. For example, a schedulable can only signal its controlling
mission to terminate, it cannot request the top-level mission sequencer to terminate. This is
the result of our proposal, presented in [56], for simplifying the original termination protocol.
The original SCJ termination protocol (from SCJ v0.94 [78] and earlier) included the
method MissionSequencer.requestSequenceTermination(), which allows a schedulable
to request the termination of a mission sequencer. During the termination of a mission
sequencer, it will terminate its current mission and any schedulables that mission is executing.
The concern with this facility was that it could be misused by a schedulable to terminate
an arbitrary mission sequencer. This complicates the semantics of the termination protocol
needed to support mission termination and breaks the encapsulation of missions.
This section presents our models of the original termination protocols and describes the
changes made to produce the current protocol. In Sect. 4.5.1 we describe a formal model of
the original termination protocol, as presented in the SCJ language specification v0.94 [78].
Section 4.5.2 presents the model of the current termination protocol. Finally, Sect. 4.5.3
provides a comparison of these two models and summarises the changes that produced the
current protocol.
We test the two protocols by model checking them and comparing the number of states
in each model, to show that the original termination protocol was more complicated than
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StartMission =̂
if currentMission 6= nullMissionId −→
start mission . currentMission−→
initializeRet . currentMission−→
RequestSequenceTerminationJ{terminating} | {| end termination |} | ∅K(
done mission . currentMission−→
end termination . sequencer −→ Skip
)


8 currentMission = nullMissionId −→
terminating := TRUE ; Skip
fi
Figure 4.11: The Original TopLevelMissionSequencerFW ’s StartMission Action
necessary (indicated by its model having far more states than the current protocol). Indeed,
it was the process of formally modelling SCJ Level 2 that first illuminated the complexities
of the mission sequencer termination protocol. These complications only became apparent at
Level 2 because of its capacity to nest mission sequencers arbitrarily deeply, which means that
mission sequencers could be terminated by schedulables both above and below themselves in
the program’s hierarchy at any point during the execution phase.
4.5.1 Model of the Original Termination Protocol
The original termination protocol required both the TopLevelMissionSequencerFW and the
SchedulableMissionSequencerFW to be very complex process because mission sequencers
could be terminated at an arbitrary point during their execution. In this section we de-
scribe our model of the original protocol and explain the source of its complexity. We present
the model of the top-level mission sequencer, the model of the schedulable mission sequencer,
the model of the requestSequenceTermination() method (from the original protocol), and
the model the mission’s cleanUp() method.
Top-Level Mission Sequencer
The TopLevelMissionSequencerFW process has one parameter, sequencer , which is the iden-
tifier of this mission sequencer process, and two variables: currentMission, which holds the
identifier of this mission sequencer’s current mission; and terminating , which is a boolean
value that records if this mission sequencer has been asked to terminate. The GetNextMission
action models the getNextMission() method and is shown in Fig. 4.10.
It communicates with the application model using the channels getNextMissionCall and
getNextMissionRet to get the identifier of the next mission that this mission sequencer should
execute. This identifier is stored in the variable currentMission. Then the StartMission action
(Fig. 4.11) is called; it uses the start mission channel to start the current mission.
Once the current mission enters its execution phase (indicated by the communication on
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if terminatingAbove = FALSE ∧ terminatingBelow = FALSE −→
GetNextMission8 terminatingAbove = TRUE ∨ terminatingBelow = TRUE −→
Skip
Figure 4.12: Part of the Original SchedulableMissionSequencerFW ’s GetNextMission Action
the initializeRet channel) the RequestSequenceTermination action is offered in parallel with a
communication on the done mission channel, which is used by the current mission to indicate
that it has terminated.
The parallelism here specifies that RequestSequenceTermination and the communica-
tions in the brackets below the parallel operator synchronise on end termination, that
RequestSequenceTermination alters the terminating variable, and the behaviours below the
parallel operator do not alter any variables.
Once a communication on done mission occurs, the StartMission action waits for the
RequestSequenceTermination action to be ready to engage in end termination; this ends
both sides of the parallelism and control returns to the GetNextMission action. Then, the
GetNextMission action checks the value of the variable terminating , which is set in the
RequestSequenceTermination action (shown in Fig. 4.15 and discussed below) to determine
whether it should recurse or exit.
Schedulable Mission Sequencer
The SchedulableMissionSequencerFW process represents a schedulable mission sequencer; it
is slightly more complicated than the TopLevelMissionSequencerFW . It has a parameter,
sequencer , and a variable, currentMission, like the top-level mission sequencer process. How-
ever, instead of the terminating variable it has two state components: terminatingAbove,
which indicates if this mission sequencer’s controlling mission has asked it to terminate, and
terminatingBelow , which indicates if this mission sequencer’s current mission (or one of its
schedulables) has asked it to terminate. Two variables are required because we have to treat
the requests for termination differently, depending on their source. With two variables, we
can model the different protocols separately.
The GetNextMission action models the getNextMission() method, and behaves the
same as that in the TopLevelMissionSequencerFW process (Fig. 4.10) with the addition of
the conditional statement shown in Fig. 4.12. This conditional checks both terminatingAbove
and terminatingBelow to handle the possibility of the schedulable mission sequencer being
asked to terminate from above or below itself in the program hierarchy.
The StartMission action shown in Fig. 4.13, contains a parallelism of three actions that
offer the choice of waiting for its controlling mission to signal its termination (handled by
the SignalTermination action), the RequestSequenceTermination action (which we discuss
below), and waiting for its current mission to communicate its termination on done mission.
The SignalTermination action in Fig. 4.14 handles the schedulable mission sequencer
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StartMission =̂
if currentMission 6= nullMissionId−→
start mission . currentMission−→
initializeRet . currentMission−→

SignalTerminationJ{terminatingAbove} | {| end terminations |} | terminatingBelowK
RequestSequenceTermination

J{terminatingAbove, terminatingBelow} | {| end terminations |} | ∅K(
done mission . currentMission−→
end terminations . sequencer −→ Skip
)


8currentMission = nullMissionId−→
terminating := TRUE
fi
Figure 4.13: Original SchedulableMissionSequencerFW ’s StartMission Action
SignalTermination =̂
(
end terminations . sequencer −→ Skip
)
@
signalTerminationCall . sequencer−→
terminatingAbove := TRUE ;
requestTermination . currentMission−→
signalTerminationRet . sequencer −→ Skip

; end terminations . sequencer −→ Skip

Figure 4.14: The Original SchedulableMissionSequencerFW ’s SignalTermination Action
being terminated from above and the done mission communication handles its current mis-
sion telling it to terminate from below. The RequestSequenceTermination action handles the
schedulable mission sequencer being told to terminate its sequence of missions by a managed
schedule. We discuss this action next.
Request Sequence Termination
The RequestSequenceTermination action, shown in Fig. 4.15, waits for a communication
on the requestSequenceTermination channel. After this, the value of terminating is set to
TRUE and the mission is queried to see if it is active and has not been asked to terminate
already – using the channels terminationPending and missionActive. If these conditions
are met, the action communicates on requestTermination, which tells the current mission to
begin terminating. Then, RequestSequenceTermination recurses, so that subsequent calls to
requestSequenceTermination() in the SCJ application can be handled, and so that the
action can be terminated using end termination.
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RequestSequenceTermination =̂

requestSequenceTermination . sequencer−→
terminating := TRUE ;
terminationPending . currentMission ? missionTerminating−→
missionActive . currentMission ? missionIsActive−→
if missionTerminating = FALSE ∧ missionIsActive = TRUE −→
requestTermination . currentMission−→
Skip8missionTerminating = TRUE ∨ missionIsActive = FALSE −→
Skip
fi

; RequestSequenceTermination

@(
end termination . sequencer −→ Skip
)

Figure 4.15: The Original RequestSequenceTermination Action
CleanupSchedulables =̂

9 s : schedulables •
cleanupSchedulableCall . s−→
cleanupSchedulableRet . s −→ Skip

Figure 4.16: sOriginal Mission’s CleanupSchedulables Action
In the SchedulableMissionSequencerFW process, the RequestSequenceTermination action
differs only in that, where terminating is set to TRUE , the variable terminatingBelow is
set instead. This is to handle the schedulable mission sequencer being terminated from a
schedulable that is above it in the program hierarchy using SignalTermination, or below it,
using RequestSequenceTermination. This can be seen in Fig. 4.15, where SignalTermination
sets terminatingAbove, and in the excerpt of GetNextMission in Fig. 4.12, which checks both
terminatingAbove and terminatingBelow .
Clean Up
Our model of a mission uses three actions to model its three phases of operation: ini-
tialisation, execution, and clean up. As soon as one phase ends, the mission transitions to
the next phase. Hence, the mission’s Cleanup action begins directly after its Execute action
has finished. First, the CleanupSchedulables action is called (Fig. 4.16), which iterates over
the set schedulables and triggers the cleanUp() action of each of the schedulables, calling the
cleanupSchedulableCall event followed by the cleanupSchedulableRet event. The interleave
operator (9) is used to interleave each schedulable’s clean up phase action.
Once the clean up of each of this mission’s registered schedulables has finished, the
Cleanup action executes the mission’s cleanup behaviour, using the cleanupMissionCall and
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Finish =̂
end mission app .mission−→
done mission .mission −→
Skip
Figure 4.17: Original Mission’s Finish Action
cleanupMissionRet events. Afterwards, the Finish action (Fig. 4.17) is executed; it informs
the mission’s application process to terminate (end mission app) and then informs the mis-
sion’s controlling mission sequencer that is has finished (done mission).
This model captures the original termination protocol. While the model is tractable, we
argue that the same functionality can be achieved with a simpler termination protocol. In
Sect. 4.5.2 we describe our model of the termination protocol including our proposed changes.
4.5.2 Model of Current Termination Protocol
This section describes our model of the current SCJ termination protocol, which incorporates
that changes that we proposed in [56]. In the current protocol there are two changes from
the protocol described in Sect. 4.5.1. First, the requestSequenceTermination() method
is removed, which prevents the arbitrary termination of mission sequencers. Second, the
Mission.cleanUp() method is altered so that it returns a boolean, which indicates if this
mission’s controlling mission sequencer should continue or terminate. This enforces a hierar-
chical termination of mission sequencers.
In adapting the original model to the current protocol, the state components of both
flavours of mission sequencer process were altered. In the TopLevelMissionSequencerFW
process (Appendix C.9), the variable terminating was replaced with continue; and in the
SchedulableMissionSequencerFW process (Appendix C.11), the variables terminatingAbove
and terminatingBelow were replaced with continueAbove and continueBelow . These variables
indicate to the sequencer that it should continue executing its sequence of missions (if they
are both TRUE ).
If continue is FALSE (or either continueAbove or continueBelow is FALSE in the case of
the SchedulableMissionSequencerFW ) then the mission sequencer does not execute any more
missions. In the SchedulableMissionSequencerFW process the variable continueBelow holds
the return value from the current mission that is communicated to the mission sequencer
at the end of the cleanup phase (on the done mission channel); this value is held in the
continue variable in the TopLevelMissionSequencerFW process. The continueAbove vari-
able, in the, SchedulableMissionSequencerFW , is only changed during the SignalTermination
action, which handles the mission sequencer’s controlling mission requesting it to terminate.
Removing the RequestSequenceTermination action is a clear simplification of the model;
the requestSequenceTermination channel is no longer needed and is removed from the model
entirely. Besides this, the actions (in the model of the original termination protocol) that
use the RequestSequenceTermination action are also simplified in the model of the current
protocol. We give more details of these simplifications in the following three sections. We
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StartMission =̂
if currentMission! = nullMissionId −→
start mission . currentMission−→
done mission . currentMission ? continueReturn−→
continue := continueReturn ; Skip

8 currentMission = nullMissionId −→
continue := FALSE
fi
Figure 4.18: Current TopLevelMissionSequencerFW ’s StartMission Action
present the models of the top-level mission sequencer, the schedulable mission sequencer, and
the mission’s cleanup method.
Top-Level Mission Sequencer
The StartMission action in the TopLevelMissionSequencerFW process is simpler than the
previous version (in Fig. 4.11), as can be seen from the excerpt presented in Fig. 4.18.
This action simply starts the current mission using the start mission channel and then
waits for it to terminate and communicate on the done mission channel. The parallelism
(executing RequestSequenceTermination) in the previous version of this action has been re-
moved.
Schedulable Mission Sequencer
The StartMission action in the SchedulableMissionSequencerFW process (which models a
schedulable mission sequencer) is shown in Fig. 4.19. It is needfully more complex than the
same action in the TopLevelMissionSequencerFW process, but it is still simpler than in the
model of the original protocol in Fig. 4.13.
After the mission has been initialised (indicated by the initializeRet channel) this action
proceeds to a parallelism that offers SignalTermination to handle this mission sequencer’s
controlling mission being terminated and a communication on done mission that indicates
that the mission sequencer’s current mission has terminated. This has eliminated one parallel
process (RequestSequenceTermination) that was presenting in the previous version of this
action.
Clean Up
To model Mission.cleanUp(), which now returns a boolean value, the MissionFW process’s
cleanupMissionRet channel takes a boolean parameter, continueSequencer , which is passed
to the Finish action. This can be seen in the Cleanup action, shown in Fig. 4.20.
The value of continueSequencer is communicated to the MissionSequencer process via the
done mission channel, shown in the Finish action in Fig. 4.21. This channel is the means
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StartMission =̂
if currentMission! = nullMissionId −→
start mission . currentMission−→
initializeRet . currentMission−→
SignalTerminationJ∅ | {| end terminations |} | {continueBelow}K
done mission . currentMission ? continueReturn−→
continueBelow := continueReturn;
end terminations −→ Skip



8 currentMission = nullMissionId −→
continueBelow := FALSE
fi
Figure 4.19: Current SchedulableMissionSequencerFW ’s StartMission Action
Cleanup =̂
CleanupSchedulables;
cleanupMissionCall .mission−→
cleanupMissionRet .mission ? continueSequencer−→
Finish(continueSequencer)
Figure 4.20: Current Cleanup Action
of communication that allows a mission to inform its controlling mission sequencer of its
completion, and, as revised, also communicates this continuation information.
When the MissionSequencer receives the boolean value from done mission, it stores it in
the variable continue, which is checked by the GetNextMission action after the StartMission
action finishes. This variable is used to decide whether the MissionSequencer should continue
its execution and get another mission, or terminate. This minor addition to the model
presents little extra complexity, while supporting our proposal to simplify the termination
protocol significantly. Section 4.5.3 compares the two termination protocols in more detail.
4.5.3 Comparison of Termination Protocols
The original termination protocol allowed any schedulable to call any mission sequencer’s
requestSequenceTermination() method, regardless of its place in the hierarchy. The Circus
action modelling this method is presented in Fig. 4.15. The mission sequencer that receives
this call informs its current mission to terminate. This is shown in Fig. 4.15 by the com-
munication on the requestTermination channel, which indicates to the mission that it should
terminate. The mission, once it is instructed to terminate, passes this on to its schedulables
– at least one of which may have called the requestSequenceTermination() method of the
mission sequencer in the first place. This created a needless cycle of termination requests.
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Finish =̂ val continueSequencer : B •
end mission app .mission−→
done mission .mission ! continueSequencer−→
Skip
Figure 4.21: Current Finish Action
In the current termination protocol, which we proposed in [56], the instigation of termi-
nation still begins in a schedulable object, but this request is only passed up one tier at a
time. For example, if a reason to terminate the application is detected by a schedulable,
this is passed to its controlling mission – by setting some flag in the mission, for example.
During the mission’s cleanup phase, it communicates this request for termination to its con-
trolling mission sequencer. This is captured in our models by the communication on the
done mission channel of the boolean parameter continueSequencer to the particular mission
sequencer process that controls the mission. In this way, the request for termination passes
up the program hierarchy, with each tier terminating before the next tier begins handling its
termination.
This prevents the situation in the original protocol in which a schedulable initiates the
termination of a sequence of missions that includes its controlling mission, and then waits
to be terminated itself when its controlling mission is terminated. The current approach
does create a small amount of programmer overhead, since the programmer must ensure
that schedulables can inform their controlling mission that it should return false from its
cleanUp() method. A simple way to remove this small overhead is for the default implemen-
tation of Mission.cleanUp() to return false. We note that even in the current termination
protocol, the schedulable that discovers the need for termination triggers the termination of
its controlling mission and is then asked to terminate itself. To avoid this, the schedulables
can be programmed to check for the termination of their controlling mission periodically and
begin to shut themselves down; this is in fact the only way to terminate a ManagedThread.
Another solution is to have the schedulable that discovers the need for termination terminate
itself after it has triggered the termination of its controlling mission.
Our proposal has a subtle effect on the termination order of the objects in the program. As
an example, we consider a program with two nested subsystems. With the original protocol,
a schedulable within one of them may call requestSequenceTermination() on the top-
level mission sequencer and begin a cascade of termination requests that leads to the nested
sub-systems terminating in parallel. In the same situation, using the current termination
protocol, the termination requests must pass up the hierarchy from the schedulable that
initiates termination to the top-level mission sequencer. This means that the subsystem that
contains the schedulable that requested termination has to terminate before the request for
termination passes to the top-level mission and the termination of the other subsystem – and
any schedulables started by the top-level mission – begins.
In summary, the requestSequenceTermination() method complicated the SCJ termi-
nation protocol by allowing arbitrary termination of mission sequencers. Our models, while
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tractable, were complex when modelling this feature of SCJ at Level 2. With our proposed
changes incorporated, our models became much simpler and easier to analyse. Our proposed
changes to the SCJ termination protocol represent a positive simplification of the language
while retaining the ability to terminate a mission sequencer from the application.
In order to show how far our proposed changes simplify the model of SCJ, we constructed
two specifications of a simple program similar to that presented in Sect. 2.1.2, which con-
tains a single mission, controlling two managed threads that share a one-place buffer in the
mission’s memory. One specification uses the model of the original framework and the other
specification uses the model of the current framework, which incorporates our proposal. Both
of these specifications were translated to CSPM , the machine-readable version of CSP, in or-
der to utilise FDR3 [33] to model check the specifications. Note that, because CSP does not
have a notion of state in the same way that Circus does, the CSP versions of our models use
state processes to control variables instead, which means that the CSP models have more
states than the Circus versions.
The results obtained are from running a check for divergence-freedom while hiding any
channels relating to the state processes. The model of the original framework shows 4,539,021
states, whereas the model of the current framework shows only 249,869 states. Our proposed
changes decreased the number of states in the model by 94.5% in comparison to the original.
We note that the number of states here is higher than the number of states often found in
models of full programs because these checks only use the framework model, which will often
exhibit more states when not driven by an application model. This decrease in the number
of states in our model shows a simplification that is useful for further modelling efforts and
for programmer understanding of the SCJ paradigm.
4.6 Summary
This chapter presents the first formal model of SCJ Level 2, written in the state-rich process
algebra Circus. The full model can be found in Appendix C. We follow the approach used to
model SCJ Level 1 [93]. Our model captures the state and behaviour of the Level 2 paradigm,
exceptions (where they indicate a misuse of the paradigm), inheritence and polymorphism,
and, finally, synchronisation and suspension.
We do not simply add Level 2 features to the Level 1 model; our model captures API
changes that occurred after the Level 1 model was constructed and some features of Level 1
that were omitted from the original model for brevity. For example, mutually exclusive
synchronised methods are available at Level 1, but they are not captured by the Level 1
model. Our Level 2 model captures this feature. Further, the Level 2 model captures the
release patterns of event handlers, so that this does not have to be captured during program
translation, and considers that deadlines can be overrun.
This model provides both top-down and bottom-up benefits. Top-down, it is a target
for the Circus refinement strategy [17] to develop SCJ Level 2 programs that are correct by
construction. Bottom-up, it can be used as a program verification tool via a translation of
the model to CSPM for analysis using FDR3.
The modelling process itself has also proved beneficial. During modelling we found that
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the original SCJ termination protocol was more complicated than needed and used our model
to show that a proposed protocol (which is the protocol currently used by SCJ programs)
was simpler, while allowing the same functionality.
In the next chapter, we describe the process of translating a given SCJ Level 2 program
into our model. The chapter shows a detailed, step-by-step process for translating programs;
describes a formalisation of the core elements of the translation, written in Z; and describes
a tool to automate the translation, called TightRope, which is written in Java.
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Chapter 5
SCJ Level 2 Translation
In this chapter we present a translation strategy that captures the application-specific infor-
mation from a SCJ Level 2 program and produces a model of this behaviour that is compatible
with the model of the SCJ API presented in Chap. 4. Section 5.1 presents this translation
strategy in a step-by-step manner. This is presented first to better inform the reader for the
discussion that follows. We use the Buffer example, in Sect. 2.1.2, to illustrate the transla-
tion. Section 5.2 presents a formalisation in Z of the core elements of the translation strategy.
Section 5.3 describes TightRope, a prototype tool that automatically translates SCJ Level 2
programs into our Circus model. Section 5.4 evaluates the translation work presented in
this chapter. Finally, Sect. 5.5, summarises the translation strategy, core formalisation, and
automatic translation tool presented in this chapter.
5.1 Translation Strategy
Our translation strategy captures the application-specific information in an SCJ Level 2
program and produces the application model of its behaviour. This comprises the models
of each object in the program and processes that control the network of those models. The
generic behaviour of SCJ programs is already captured by the framework model, described
in Chap. 4. Combining these two models forms the model of a program. This approach
simplifies the translation and the models that it produces.
Paradigm objects (the safelet, mission sequencers, missions, and schedulables) each have a
template that describes the structure required by each type of process. Non-paradigm objects
do not have framework models; they are, by definition, application specific. Therefore, they
all share a simpler template that captures the variables and methods of the class.
Where objects in the program contain non-reactive behaviour, for example methods that
only perform data operations, they are represented by an extra component. As an example of
this. we consider the Buffer class from the buffer example in Sect. 2.1.2. The Buffer class
is non-reactive, as it simply holds an integer variable and provides methods to access and
update it. This sort of non-reactive behaviour is represented by an OhCircus class. Objects
that contain a mixture of reactive and non-reactive behaviour are represented by both a
Circus process and OhCircus, which cooperate to model the object.
SCJ programs are arranged hierarchically. The safelet is at the top of the hierarchy
and controls the program. It loads a top-level mission sequencer, which loads a sequence of
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Analysis
Build
Generate
Preprocessing 
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Figure 5.1: Flow Diagram of the Translation Phases
missions. The safelet and top-level mission sequencer compose the Control Tier of a program.
Note that while a program will only have one top-level mission sequencer while it is running,
the getSequencer() method may return one of several mission sequencers. The rest of the
program is organised into Program Tiers. A program tier is a list of Clusters, which each
contain a mission and its registered schedulables.
The clusters containing the missions loaded by the top-level mission sequencer comprise
Tier0; all programs will have a Tier0. Subsequent program tiers indicate missions in Tier0
registering a schedulable mission sequencer. We characterise the structure of programs this
way to make it easier to construct the model of a program at the top level. The arrangement
of the tiers and clusters is captured by a specific template.
The translation occurs in three phases, shown in Fig. 5.1. In the next three sections we
describe each phase of the translation and illustrate the information that is produced. We use
the MainMission class from the Buffer example, shown in Fig. 5.2, as a running example.
First, the analysis phase (Sect. 5.1.1) identifies the program’s object types, methods and
their locations, and the callers of the methods. Second, the build phase (Sect. 5.1.2) extracts
information from the SCJ program and constructs an environment for each object and the
program as a whole. Third, the generate phase (Sect. 5.1.3) produces the model from the
data in the environments.
5.1.1 Analysis
The analysis phase produces three maps that contain information about the program, to help
the other two phases of the translation, and is achieved by two steps. The first step builds a
map of each object to the template it requires. Table 5.1 shows the marker that identifies each
type of object and the template that should be selected. There are eight application process
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1 public class MainMission extends Mission
2 {
3 private final Buffer buffer;
4
5 public PCMission (){
6 buffer = new Buffer ();
7 }
8
9 protected void initialize (){
10 StorageParameters storageParameters = new StorageParameters (150 * 1000,
11 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT , Const.IMMORTAL_MEM_DEFAULT ,
12 Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT - 100 * 1000);
13
14 new Producer(new PriorityParameters (10), storageParameters , this).register ();
15
16 new Consumer(new PriorityParameters (10), storageParameters , this).register ();
17 }
18
19 public Buffer getBuffer (){
20 return buffer;
21 }
22
23 public boolean cleanUp () {
24 return false;
25 }
26 }
Figure 5.2: The MainMission Class from the Buffer Example
template, one for each type of the paradigm objects and one for non-paradigm objects. These
templates define the structure of the application processes. The application model of each
paradigm object has an action for each of its overridden API methods. For example, the
application model of a mission has actions capturing the application-specific behaviour of the
initialize() and getNextMission() methods, respectively. These actions are triggered by
the framework model when it encounters application-specific behaviour. Additionally, the
application models capture a paradigm object’s application-defined variables and methods.
Since each paradigm object extends a different class (or implements an interface, in the
case of the safelet) and requires a different output template, it is simple to identify the
output template of each paradigm object. The only complication is that the template type
of a mission sequencer cannot be identified until the build phase (in Sect. 5.1.2). This is
because we model a mission sequencer that is started by a safelet differently to a mission
sequencer that is started by a mission, as described in Sect. 4.2.2. Since this cannot be
ascertained without checking the contents of a method, we defer this until the build phase.
Non-paradigm objects – any object of a class that is not a safelet, mission sequencer, mission,
or schedulable – share an output template, so this mapping is also simple to identify.
The second step produces two maps that are used in the generate phase to produce the
MethodCallBinder process. The first is the Class Method Map, which maps each class to
the names of its methods that are not defined in the SCJ API. The second is the Method
Callers Map, which maps each application-defined method in the program to the names of
the classes that call it. To deal with name clashes, two methods are considered to be the
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Object type Marker Template Type
Safelet implments Safelet SafeletApp
Mission Sequencer extends MissionSequencer TopLevelMissionSequencerApp or
SchedulableMissionSequencerApp
Mission extends Mission MissionApp
Periodic Event Handler extends PeriodicEventHandler PeridoicEventHandlerApp
Aperiodic Event Handler extends AperiodicEventHandler AperiodicEventHandlerApp
One-Shot Event Handler extends OneShotEventHandler OneShotEventHandlerApp
Managed Thread extends ManagedThread ManagedThreadApp
Non-Paradigm Object None of the above NonParadigmApp
Table 5.1: Object Types, their Markers and Templates
same if their names are the same and they are declared in the same class or classes related by
inheritance. If two methods share only the same name, but are not declared in classes related
by inheritance, then the method name is prefixed by the class name to produce unique action
and channel names.
As a example of the output from the analysis phase we consider the MainMission, shown
in Fig. 5.2, from the buffer example (described in Sect. 2.1.2). The first step of the analysis
phase identifies MainMission as a mission, because it extends the Mission class. Step two
analyses each of the methods in MainMission and finds that only getBuffer() is not defined
by the SCJ API. This means that the second step adds a mapping between MainMission
and a list containing getBuffer (MainMission 7→ [getBuffer]) to the Method Class Map.
As the MainMission does not call any application-defined methods, the second step does not
update the Method Callers Map.
5.1.2 Build
The build phase takes the SCJ program and the maps produced by the analysis phase
(Sect. 5.1.1), performs a translation of elements of the program, and outputs an environ-
ment for each object. For each type of object – safelet, mission sequencer, mission, one of
the schedulables, or non-paradigm object – this phase builds a different environment. The
environment representing a class contains its name, variables, and methods. Each variable
and method is also represented by an environment, which contains its translation.
The build phase also constructs an overall environment of the program. This environment
holds information about all of the objects in the program and about its structure. This is
passed on to the generate phase to produce the part of the model that controls the network
of processes.
In the rest of this section we present an overview of the build phase. This comprises a
description of the process that builds an environment (which is reused and extended when
building the environments for each type of object), and then, in order, the process of building:
non-paradigm objects, safelet, mission sequencers, missions, and schedulables.
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Figure 5.3: Flow Chart of the Processes in the Build Phase
Overview
Figure 5.3 illustrates the build phase. The non-paradigm objects are the first to be trans-
lated, because they are unrelated to the SCJ program’s structure. Then the paradigm objects
are translated. Because they form a hierarchy, the translation strategy uses the structure of
the program to inform the order of translation, and branches to ensure that every paradigm
object is translated. Each type of object in the program has a different process to build its en-
vironment. However, because the environments share a common definition of the information
of a class, they share a sub-process that builds the common elements of those environments.
The safelet identified by the analysis phase (Sect. 5.1.1), is the first paradigm object to
be translated because it is the component at the top of the program hierarchy. We build the
environment of the safelet and then retrieve the mission sequencers that may be returned by
its getSequencer() method. For each of these top-level mission sequencers, we build all of
the environments of the missions that can be returned by its getNextMission() method. For
each mission, we build the environments of its schedulables until there are none left. Once
the environments of all of the missions from a particular mission sequencer have been built,
we build the environment of the next mission sequencer. Because we build the tree of an
SCJ program depth-first, if there are no more top-level mission sequencers to build then we
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have explored the whole program and we can proceed to the generate phase, described in
Sect. 5.1.3.
Figure 5.4 shows an EBNF description of the environments produced by the build phase.
The NetworkEnv category defines the network environment, which holds information for
producing the network of processes that control the model at the top level. It contains
the ProgramEnv , which we describe next; the AppEnv , which contains a list of the names
and parameters of the application processes; and the LockingEnv containing the names and
priorities of the ThreadFW s and the names of the ObjectFW processes. The LockingEnv
may be empty if the program does not use synchronisation or suspension.
The ProgramEnv category defines the program environment, which contains the class
environments and characterises the structure of the program being translated. It comprises
the SafeletEnv , an optional list of MissionSequencerEnvs, a list of TierEnvs, and a number of
ClassEnvs. The TierEnv comprises a list of ClusterEnvs, which each contain a MissionEnv
and a list of SchedulableEnvs representing its schedulables. This structure mirrors that of
the network of processes that characterise the framework processes at the top level. Finally,
the list of ClassEnvs represents the non-paradigm objects in the program.
A ClassEnv contains information extracted from a class in the SCJ program. Each
of the environments that represent paradigm objects is defined as a ClassEnv , but three
of them contain an extra list that holds structural information used to guide the transla-
tion. The SafeletEnv holds a list of the names of the mission sequencers returned from
the safelet’s getSequencer() method. A MissionSequencerEnv holds a list of the names
of the missions returned from the mission sequencer’s getNextMission() method. Finally,
a MissionEnv environment holds a list of the names of the schedulables registered in the
mission’s initialize() method.
Building a Class Environment
As previously mentioned, the process of constructing a class’s environment is reused by each
build process in this phase. For each type of object, the build phase constructs a different
environment. However, each of these environments is defined as a ClassEnv (some with extra
information), so the process of extracting the information required by a ClassEnv is shared.
First, the name of the class is extracted and then translated (to ensure that it only
contains characters that are valid in Z). Then the variables of the class are extracted. Here
we are only concerned with the class variables (attributes), not variables declared in methods.
For each class variable we build a VarEnv (defined in Fig. 5.4) that stores the translation
of the name, type, and initialisation value of a variable. The VarEnv is added to the list of
variable environments in the ClassEnv .
Then the class’s methods are translated. For a class’s constructors, their parameters
(that are not strings or instances of the ReleaseParameters, SchedulingParameters, or
MemoryParameters family of classes) become the parameters to the process. These are
translated and stored in the ClassEnv The body of the constructor is analysed for variables
assignments, which are used to update the initialisation of variables in the ClassEnv .
For each of a class’s non-constructor methods we build a MethodEnv (Fig 5.4) and check
if it is synchronised or not. If a method is synchronised then the MethodEnv representing it
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NetworkEnv = ProgramEnv AppEnv LockingEnv
AppEnv = {Name Parameters}
Threads = {Name PriorityLevel}
Objects = {Name}
LockingEnv = [Threads] [Objects]
ProgramEnv =
SafeletEnv [MissionSequencerEnv ]
{TierEnv} {ClassEnv}
TierEnv = {ClusterEnv}
ClusterEnv = MissionEnv {SchedulableEnv}
PEHEnv = ClassEnv
APEHEnv = ClassEnv
OSEHEnv = ClassEnv
MTEnv = ClassEnv
SchedulableEnv =
MissionSequencerEnv
| PEHEnv
| APEHEnv
| OSEHEnv
| MTEnv
MissionEnv = ClassEnv Schedulables
Schedulables = {Name}
MissionSequencerEnv = ClassEnv Missions
Missions = {Name}
SafeletEnv = ClassEnv Sequencers
Sequencers = {Name}
ClassEnv =
Name [Parameters] [Variables]
[SyncMeths] [Meths] [ClassEnv ]
Meths = {MethodEnv}
SyncMeths = {MethodEnv}
Variables = {VarEnv}
Parameters = {NameType}
ReturnType = Type
MethodEnv =
Name Parameters
ReturnType [RetVal ] Body
VarEnv = Name Type Init
Figure 5.4: EBNF Description of the Environments Produced by the Build Phase
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Application Result Note
boolean B where B ::= True | False
byte byte where byte = −128 . . 127
short short where short = −215 . . 215 − 1
int int where int = −231 . . 231 − 1
long long where long = −263 . . 263 − 1
float float where float is a given type
double double where double is a given type
ClassName ClassNameClass where ClassName is the name of a class or other
reference type.
Table 5.2: Type Translation Rules
Application Result
CVarDecl ; CVarDecls
CVarInit(CVarDecl)
∧ CvarInit(CVarDecl(CVarDecls))
AccesMod Type Name ; Name(Name) = DefaultInit(Type)
AccesMod Type Name = Expr ; Name(Name) = Expr(Expr)
Table 5.3: Class Variable Translation Rules
is recorded in the ClassEnv ’s list of synchronised methods, if not, then it goes into the list
of the non-synchronised methods.
For each method, we extract its name, its return type and potential values, and its param-
eters. We then translate the body of the method, capturing its behaviour. To achieve this
we reuse translation rules from the Level 1 translation [93] because all three SCJ compliance
levels are similarly restricted in their use of the Java language (except for suspension, which
is only available at Level 2). Some alterations to these rules was required to accommodate
the differences between our modelling approach and that of [93].
There are six categories that the EBNF in Fig. 5.4 does not define. The PriorityLevel
category defines the range of priorities available to the program, which is defined in the SCJ
API as being at least 1. .28. The Name category describes the name of a class, method, or
variable, so it can only include valid Z identifiers. The Type category describes a type, so it is
a translation of a Java type into Circus, as defined in Table 5.2. The Init category describes
the variable initialisation (defined in Table 5.3), so it is the translation of a value (a literal
value, as described in Table 5.4 or the result of a statement, described in Table 5.5). The
ReturnValue category describes the return value of a method, so it is also the translation of
a value using the same rules as for Init . Finally, the Body category describes the body of a
method, so it is the translation of a list of statements in the method body, which we describe
in detail below.
To translate the body of a method we apply a translation rule to each statement. Each
type of statement (for example, assignment, conditional, or return) has a rule to translate
it into Circus. Table 5.5 describes the Stmts rule, which is used to translate most Java
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Application Result Note
0, 1, 2, ... 0, 1, 2, . . . Unsigned Numbers
0, -1, -2, ... 0,−1,−2, . . . Signed Numbers
true True Boolean value true
false False Boolean value false
null null Null reference for data objects
Table 5.4: Literal Value Translation Rules
Application Result
Stmts
(
Var = Expr ;
)
Name(Var) := Expr(Expr)
Stmts
(
Type Var ; Statements
)
var Name(Var) : Type(Type) •
Stmts(Statements)
Stmts
(
if (Expr) IfBranch
else ElseBranch
)
if( Expr(Expr) )−→ Stmts(IfBranch)8(¬ Expr(Expr) )−→ Stmts(ElseBranch)
Stmts

switch ( Expr ) {
case value : Stmts; break;
. . .
default : DefltStmts ; }

if Expr(Expr) = Value(Value) −→
Stmts(Stmts)8 . . .8(¬ Expr(Expr) = Value(Value) ∨ . . . )
−→ Stmts(DefltStmts)
Stmts
(
while ( Expr ) { Stmts }
) µX •
if Expr(Expr) −→ Stmts(Stmts) ; X8¬ Expr(Expr) −→Skip
fi

Stmts
(
assert Expr(Expr) ;
) if Expr(Expr) −→Skip8 ¬ Expr(Expr) −→ abort
fi
Stmts
(
;
)
Skip
Stmts
(
Stmts1 ; Stmts2 ;
)
Stmts(Stmts1) ; Stmts(Stmts2)
Stmts
(
for ( Stmts1 ; Expr ; Stmts2 )
ForBody
)

µX •

if Expr(Expr) −→
Stmts(ForBody) ;
Stmts(Stmts2) ; X8¬ Expr(Expr) −→Skip
fi


Table 5.5: Statement Translation Rules
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statements, except Java expressions, which are translated using the Expr rule in Table 5.6.
These translation rules must often make use of other rules to translate specific elements of
a statement or expression. The Name rule translates a name into a valid Z identifier. The
Type rule translates a Java type into a valid Z type. Finally, the Value rule translates a Java
value, literal or otherwise.
Translating method calls is more complex. The rules to translate method call statements
are described in Table 5.7. A simple method call (meth();) implicitly targets this class
(assuming that meth() does not belong to an imported class), whereas a more complex
method call (c.meth();) targets the class c. However, the method may be located in the
class that is that target of the call or inherited from a super class. We must also consider if
a method is synchronised or not.
Each of the rules in Table 5.7 applies for a different type of method and method call. If the
method is application-defined and is defined in the same class as the method invocation, or if
the method is API-defined, then rule Meth1 is used, producing event names that simply com-
bine the method name with Call and Ret , respectively. If the method is application-defined
and is defined in another class, then rule Meth2 is used. This produces event names that
combine ‘binder ’ and the methods name. Such methods make use of the MethodCallBinder
(MCB) process, described in Sect. 4.4, to bind the method invocation to its location.
Synchronised methods use rule Meth3, which includes an extra parameter to the call
and return events. This parameter is the identifier of the ThreadFW process associated
with the process making the method call. This uses the part of the framework model that
handles synchronisation and suspension, described in Sect. 4.3. For all types of method call,
method parameters are added as parameters to the Call event and return values are added
as parameters to the Ret event.
As previously mentioned, we use OhCircus classes to capture non-reactive behaviour,
for example methods that are purely data operations. The ClassEnv optionally holds a
CircClassEnv , not shown in Fig. 5.4, which represents an OhCircus class that is associ-
ated with this ClassEnv ; this models the situation where an object has both reactive and
non-reactive behaviour, and so it captured by both a Circus process and an OhCircus class.
CircClassEnv holds the same attributes as the ClassEnv , except for the CircClassEnv so as
to avoid a circular definition.
As an example of an environment that is produced by the build phase, we return to
the MainMission example shown in Fig. 5.2. The environment built for the MainMission
class is shown in Table 5.8, where the values are given in a JSON-style format. The name
is simply the name of the class: ‘MainMission’. The class declares one variable, Buffer
buffer, which declares no initialiser. MainMission has no synchronised methods, so the
synchronised methods list in its environment is empty. Finally, the class has four non-
synchronised methods. The class’s constructor declares no parameters, so the parameters list
in the environment is empty. The buffer variable is initialised in the constructor, so this
is added to the environment for the buffer variable. The names, return values and types,
and bodies of the initialize(), cleanUp(), and getBuffer() methods are extracted and
translated. The initialize() method calls register() on two schedulables, a Producer
and a Consumer. So the Schedulables list in the environment contains these two class names.
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Application Result Note
Expr(Value) Value(Value) Where Value is a literal
value
Expr(UniOp Expr) Expr(UniOp) Expr(Expr) Where UniOp is a unary
operator
Expr(Expr1 BinOp Expr2)
Expr(Expr1)
Expr(BinOp)
Expr(Expr2)
Where BinOp is a bi-
nary operator
Expr(+, -/ * ...) +, −, ∗. . .
Expr( & & , ||, !) ∧, ∨, ¬
Expr(Expr1?Expr2:Expr3)
if Expr(Expr1) = True−→
Expr(Expr2)8 Expr(Expr3)
fi
Expr(( Arg1, Arg2 )) ( Expr(Arg1), Expr(Arg2) ) Translating argument
tuples
Table 5.6: Expression Translation Rules
Rule  Application Result
Meth1 Obj.Meth(Args);
Name(Meth)Call . Id(Obj) ! Expr(Args) −→
Name(Meth)Ret . Id(Obj)−→Skip
Meth2 Obj.Meth(Args);
binder Name(Meth)Call . Id(Obj) ! Expr(Args) −→
binder Name(Meth)Ret . Id(Obj)−→Skip
Meth3 Obj.Meth(Args);
Name(Meth) Call . Id(Obj) . Id(this)
.TId(Obj) ! Expr(Args) −→
Name(Meth)Ret . Id(Obj) . Id(this) .TId(Obj)−→Skip
Table 5.7: Method Invocation Translation Rules
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Attribute Value
Name “MainMission”
Parameters [ ]
Variables [name:“buffer”, type:“Buffer”, initialisation:“new Buffer()”]
Synchronised
Methods
[ ]
Methods
[{name:“initialize”, parameters:null, returnType:void,
returnValue:null, body:“register !ProducerSID !MainMission−→
register !ConsumerSID !MainMission”},
{name:“cleanUp”, parameters:null, returnType:boolean,
returnValue:false, body:“”},
{name:“getBuffer”, parameters:null, returnType:“Buffer”,
returnValue:[“buffer”], body:“”}]
Circus Class {name:“MainMission”,parameters:[ ], variables:[name:“buffer”,
type:“Buffer”, initialisation:“new Buffer()”], methods:[ ], synchro-
nised methods:[ ]}
Schedulables [“Producer”,“Consumer”]
Table 5.8: Environment of the MainMission Class
This is is specialised for the environments of missions.
Build Non-Paradigm Objects
The process of constructing a ClassEnv is the same for each non-paradigm object. The
ClassEnvs for all of the non-paradigm objects in the program can be built at the beginning
of the build phase. This is because non-paradigm objects are not involved in a program’s
hierarchy, so the order in which they are built is unimportant. This process translates the
methods and variables of the object, using the rules described above to build its class envi-
ronment. The list of ClassEnvs is stored in the program’s ProgramEnv .
Build Safelet
The process of constructing a SafeletEnv for the safelet uses the rules described above to
build its class environment and captures some additional information, which we describe in
this section. To find the safelet, we consult the map constructed during step one of the
analysis phase, which indicates which class implements the Safelet interface.
This process specifically translates the safelet’s API methods initializeApplication()
and getSequencer(). The SafeletEnv records the names of the mission sequencers that are
returned by the getSequencer() method. These mission sequencers are the top-level mission
sequencers. The SafeletEnv built by this process is stored in the ProgramEnv .
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Build Mission Sequencer
The process to build a MissionSequencerEnv for a mission sequencers uses the rules described
above to build its class environment and captures some extra information, which we describe
in this section. This process is used for both top-level and schedulable mission sequencers. It
captures a mission sequencer’s getNextMission() method and application-defined variables
and methods. The missions returned by the getNextMission() method are recorded in the
MissionSequencerEnv . This list informs which missions are translated next.
The MissionSequencerEnv produced by this process is stored in the ProgramEnv . If the
MissionSequencerEnv represents a top-level mission sequencer, then it is stored directly in
the list in the ProgramEnv . If it is a schedulable mission sequencer, then it is stored in the
list of schedules in the ClusterEnv that holds its controlling mission.
Build Mission
The process to build a MissionEvn for a mission uses the rules described above to build its
class environment and captures some extra information, which we describe in this section.
It captures a mission’s initialise() and cleanUp() methods. This process also records
the schedulables that are registered to this mission in its initialise() method, in the
MissionEnv . This list informs the schedulables that are translated next. The environment
built by this process is stored in its own ClusterEnv , where its schedulables will also be
stored.
Build Schedulable
The process that builds a ClassEnv for a schedulable uses the rules described above to build
its class environment. The schedulable is checked against the map constructed in step one
of the analysis phase (Sect. 5.1.1 to find its type. If the schedulable is an event handler or
managed thread, then a ClassEnv is built. If the schedulable is a mission sequencer, then the
previously described process is used to build a MissionSequencerEnv . Any mission sequencers
translated by this process are schedulable mission sequencers.
For an event handler, this process captures its handleAsyncEvent() method. For a
managed thread, this process captures its run() method. A ClassEnv built by this process is
stored in the ClusterEnv that holds its controlling mission. The environments of the missions
and schedulables loaded by a schedulable mission sequencer are built before the process is
complete.
5.1.3 Generate
The generate phase takes the environments produced by the build phase (Sect. 5.1.2) and
outputs the Circus processes, OhCircus classes, and sets of channels that make up the appli-
cation model. Generating the components of our model involves combining an environment
with a template. This combination replaces tags in the template with the relevant informa-
tion from the environment. There is a different template for each type of paradigm object,
for non-paradigm objects, for OhCircus classes, and for channels.
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Stage 2. Generate Processes (for each 
paradigm or non-paradigm object)
Step 1.
Generate 
Process
Stage 1. Generate Network Processes
Step 1.
Generate 
Framework
Step 2.
Generate 
Bound_Application
Step 3.
Generate 
MethodCallBinder
Step 4.
Generate 
Locking
Step 2.
Generate 
Channels
Figure 5.5: Flow Diagram of the Generate Phase
Figure 5.5 the structure of this phase, which is split into two stages. Stage one produces
the top-level network of processes that control our model. Stage two produces the Circus
processes, OhCircus classes, and channels that model the objects in the SCJ program. Chan-
nels are generated for both the top-level processes generated in stage one and the processes
representing the objects in the program, generated in stage two.
Stage One
Stage one occurs in four steps, illustrated in the top box of Fig. 5.5. It uses the information
in the NetworkEnv environment, which records the ProgramEnv , AppEnv , and LockingEnv
environments. These are used to construct the network of processes that make up the whole
model: process Program =̂ (Framework JappSync KBound Application) J lockSync KLocking .
The Framework process controls all of the framework processes. The Bound Application
process contains the Application and MethodCallBinder processes; Application controls the
application processes and MethodCallBinder provides actions that bind method calls to their
locations. Finally, the Locking process controls the processes dealing with locking and suspen-
sion. The arrangement of the processes in the Framework process and the processes contained
in the Application and Locking processes are driven by the information in the environments.
The channel set appSync contains the channels needed to allow communication between
the Framework and Application processes. This set comprises all the channels that repre-
sent the framework handing control to the application. The lockSync channel set contains
the channels that allow the Framework and Application processes to communicate with the
Locking process. This set comprises the channels representing synchronisation, suspension,
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process ControlTier =̂
SafeletFWJControlTierSyncK
TopLevelMissionSequencerFW (Name)

Figure 5.6: Control Tier Template
and thread interruption. Both of these channel sets are fixed and require no information from
the SCJ program. Below, we describe the four steps in stage one of the generate phase, each
generating a different component of the network.
Step One: Framework Process
The first step generates the Framework process, which controls the framework processes in
the model. The framework processes are generic and reused for each translated program (as
described in Chap 4). However, the application being translated dictates which framework
processes are required and their structural arrangement.
Each process, except for the SafeletFW process, in instantiated with the identifier of
its application counterpart, and any parameters required by the process. As previously
mentioned, to make communication between the framework processes easier to specify, they
are split into the ControlTier and a number of program tiers. The ControlTier contains the
SafeletFW and TopLevelMissionSequencerFW processes in parallel. The template for the
ControlTier , shown in Fig. 5.6, is combined with the MissionSequencerEnv representing the
top-level mission sequencer to produce its model. In this simple example, that tag Name is
replaced by the name from the top-level mission sequencer’s environment.
A program tier contain one or more clusters, with each cluster containing a MissionFW
process and its schedulable framework processes. Fig: 5.7 shows the template for a program
tier. Each TierEnv is combined with this template to produce the model of one program
tier, by using the information in the environments recorded in the TierEnv . The i tag is the
index of the location of the tier being constructed in the list of TierEnvs, this produces a
simple unique name for the process. For example, the first tier in the list is named ‘Tier0’,
the second tier in the list is named ‘Tier1’, and so on.
For each ClusterEnv in the TierEnv , a cluster Circus process is generated, which consists
of the name of the mission (which replaces the MName tag) and the names and parame-
ter lists of the schedulables registered to that mission. For each schedulable we instantiate
the relevant framework process with its name and any API parameters. For example, a
periodic event handler produces PeriodicEventHandlerFW (PEHNameID ,Params), where the
PHEName tag is replaced by the name in the ClassEnv representing the handler, and the
Params tag is replaced by a list of the parameters to the periodic event handler constructor.
For example, translating a periodic event handler with the name Peh, no start time off-
set, a period of 50ms, no deadline, and no deadline miss handler, produces the instantiation
PeriodicEventHandlerFW (PehID ,NULL, time(50, 0),NULL,nullSID). The NULL values in-
dicate that no time has been specified, and the nullSID is a null identifier to indicate that
111
process Tier i =̂
MissionFW (MNameID)JMissionSyncK
PeriodicEventHandlerFW (PEHNameID ,Params)JSchedulablesSyncK
. . .
AperiodicEventHandlerFW (APEHNameID ,Params)JSchedulablesSyncK
. . .
OneShotEventHandlerFW (OSEHNameID ,Params)JSchedulablesSyncK
. . .
SchedulableMissionSequencerFW (SMSNameID)JSchedulablesSyncK
ManagedThreadFW (MTNameID)JSchedulablesSyncK
. . .


JClusterSyncK
. . .
Figure 5.7: Program Tier Template
there is no deadline miss handler.
The MissionSync, SchedulablesSync, and ClusterSync channel sets require no informa-
tion from the program, they are fixed. The MissionSync channel set allows the mission to
communicate with its schedulables. It contains the channels for signalling the activation, reg-
istration, and termination of schedulables; the termination of the mission, top-level mission
sequencer, and safelet; and, the channels modelling the schedulable’s cleanUp() method. The
SchedulablesSync channel set controls the communication between schedulables in the same
cluster. It contains the channels that activate the schedulables and signal the termination of
the safelet and top-level mission sequencer. Finally, the ClusterSync channel set controls the
communication between clusters. It contains the channels that signal the termination of the
safelet and top-level mission sequencer.
The Framework process uses the TierSync channel set to control the communication
between the ControlTier and the program tiers, shown in Fig. 5.8. The process also uses tier-
specific channel sets to control the communication between the program tiers (for example,
Tier0Sync in Fig. 5.8), which contain the channels signalling termination of the safelet and
top-level mission sequencer and some channels that are specific to each tier.
As previously mentioned, a program will always have a Tier0, containing the MissionFw
processes that can be returned by the top-level mission sequencer. If a mission in Tier0
registers a schedulable mission sequencer, then Tier1 will contain the MissionFW processes
that can be returned by that schedulable mission sequencer. A tier can contain MissionFW
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process Framework =̂
ControlTierJTierSyncK
Tier0JTier0SyncK
Tier1


Figure 5.8: Example of the Framework Process
process Application =̂
NameApp(Params)9
. . .

Figure 5.9: Application Process Template
processes that are not loaded by the same mission sequencer. For example, if a mission in
Tier0 registers two schedulable mission sequencers, then the missions of both of those mission
sequencers would be in Tier1. As an example, Fig. 5.8 shows the Framework process for a
program that has at lest one schedulable mission sequencer and hence has two tiers.
To generate the synchronisation set that controls communication between tiers, we use the
identifier from each MissionEnv in the tier below to restrict the channels controlling the start
and termination of missions with the identifier of the missions in this tier. If we are generating
a channel set for a program tier that is not Tier0, then we also use the identifiers from any
MissionSequencerEnv environments in the tier below to restrict the channel requesting mis-
sion termination with the identifiers of the missions and mission sequencers in this tier. For ex-
ample, generating the TierSync set in Fig. 5.8, where Tier0 contains the mission MainMission
produces the set {| done toplevel sequencer , done safeletFW , start mission.MainMissionID ,
done mission.MainMissionID , initializeRet .MainMissionID |}.
Step Two: Application Process
The second step generates the Application process, which is one half of the Bound Application
process. The Application process is simpler to generate than the Framework process, be-
cause it is an interleaving of all the application processes that represent the program being
modelled. The template for the Application process is shown in Fig. 5.9, and it is com-
bined with the information in the AppEnv environment, produced by the build phase. The
AppEnv lists pairs of process names and parameters. We combine each pair with the template
NameApp(Params), replacing the Name tag with the process name and the Params tag with
the list of application-defined parameters. For example, generating an application process
representing a managed thread Thread, which takes the identifier of the mission MainMission
as a parameter, produces the process ThreadApp(MainMissionID).
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process MethodCallBinder =̂ begin
Name MethodBinder =̂
binder NameCall
? loc : (loc ∈ NameLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ NameCallers)
?Params−→
NameCall . loc . caller !Params−→
NameRet . loc . caller ? ret−→
binder NameRet . loc . caller ! ret−→
Name MethodBinder

. . .
BinderActions =̂
Name MethodBinder9
. . .

• BinderActions 4 (done toplevel sequencer −→ Skip)
end
Figure 5.10: Template for the MethodCallBinder Process
Step Three: MethodCallBinder Process
The third step generates the MethodCallBinder (MCB) process, which is the second half
of the Bound Application, and its associated channels and sets. The MCB contains an
action for each of the application-defined methods in the program, as described in Sect. 4.4.
Figure 5.10 shows the template for the MethodCallBinder process. Each action in the process
is generated using the information in one MethodEnv . The Name and the Params tags in the
template are replaced by the name and parameter list from the MethodEnv , respectively. If
the MethodEnv represents a synchronised method, then the channels in the action generated
also take a thread identifier as a parameter, to ensure that the communication refers to the
correct ThreadFW process (as described in Sect. 4.3). This is achieved using the rules in
Table 5.7.
This step also produces the call and return channels and the ‘Locs’ and ‘Callers’ sets for
each of the MCB process’s actions. The purpose of the ‘Locs’ and ‘Callers’ sets is described
in full in Sect. 4.4 and recapped below. As shown in Fig. 5.10, the call and return channels
are generated using the name of the bound method. They both accept a loc and a caller
parameter. The call channel accepts the same parameters as the method’s call channel,
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and the return channel accepts a return parameter of the same type as the method’s return
channel. The Locs set contains the identifiers of the processes that contain the method, and
the Callers set contains the identifiers of the processes that call the method. These sets are
prefixed by the method name, to produce a unique name. The ‘binder ’ call event only accepts
communications when the loc and caller parameters are in its associated ‘Locs’ and ‘Callers’
sets, respectively.
The Locs set for a particular method contains the names of all of the classes in the Method
Class Map (constructed during step two of the analysis phase) that map to a list that contains
the method’s name. As previously mentioned, to deal with name clashes, two methods are
considered to be the same if their names are the same and they are declared in the same class
or classes related by inheritance. In such cases, those methods share call and return channels
and produce one ‘ MethodBinder ’ action. If two methods share only the same name, but are
not declared in classes related by inheritance, then the method name is prefixed by the class
name to produce unique action and channel names.
The Callers set for a particular method is the list of class names mapped to by that
method in the Method Callers Map (constructed during step two of the analysis phase).
During the building of the Method Callers Map, the same name clash precautions have been
taken as for building the Locs set, above.
Step Four: Locking Process
The fourth step generates the Locking process. It contains the Objects and Threads process
in parallel, synchronising on ThreadSync, which contains the channels that allow ObjectFW
processes to alter or query a ThreadFW ’s priority. This allows our model to capture Priority
Ceiling Emulation, as used by SCJ programs. However, we only check for priority exceptions
during suspension.
The LockingEnv environment is combined with the template for the Threads, Objects, and
Locking processes, shown in Fig. 5.11, to produce the processes. The TName and TPriority
tags are replaced with the names and priories of each of the ThreadFW processes. The
OName tags are replaced with the names of each of the ObjectFW processes.
Stage Two
In stage two, for each environment representing a paradigm or non-paradigm object, we take
two steps. Because the environments already contain the information required to produce
the model, this phase can approach the environments in any order. The first step generates
a process, and possibly an OhCircus class, from an environment. The second step generates
the channels required by the processes generated by the first step.
Step One: Processes
The first step takes each environment, identifies the required output template, and combines
them to produce a process (and possibly an OhCircus class). The required output template
can be determined by checking the type of the environment in Table 5.1.
Figure 5.12 shows the generic template for all application processes; it shows the structure
of the generic application process templates and is used to as the template non-paradigm
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process Threads =̂
ThreadFW (TNameID ,TPriority)9
. . .

process Objects =̂
ObjectFW (ONameID)9
. . .

process Locking =̂ Threads J ThreadSync KObjects
Figure 5.11: Threads, Objects, and Locking Process Teamples
objects. The processName tag is replaced by the name in the ClassEnv and the params tag
is replaced by the list of parameters. For each of the VarEnvs in the ClassEnv ’s variable list
we produce a variable in the process’s state and an entry in the init schema (if the variable is
initialised in the program). To do this, we replace the varName tags with the variable’s name,
the varType tags with the variable type, and varInit with the variable’s initialisation. Finally,
the processType is replaced by the type of process (the type of paradigm object it models
except for non-paradigm objects, which use ‘safelet’ so that they are terminated along with
the safelet process) and the processID tag is replaced by the identifier of the process.
Similarly, for a class’s methods, we produce one action per MethodEnv in the ClassEnv ’s
Meth or SyncMeth list – which contain the environments of the class’s method and synchro-
nised methods, respectively. To do this, we replace the methName tags with the name of the
method, the returnType tag with the method’s return type, and the methBody tags with the
body of the method. Note that if the method has no return type, then the return variable
(var returnType : ret) is omitted from the action definition.
Each type of object requires its own template. These specific templates are based on
the generic template in Fig. 5.12, extended with local actions for its specific API-defined
methods. We describe these specific templates below.
To generate the safelet application process, we combine a SafeletEnv with the template in
Fig. 5.13. In addition to the tags present in the generic template, when using this template
we replace the initBody tag with the body of the safelet’s initializeApplication() method
and the SchedulableID tag with the identifier of the top-level mission sequencer that is returned
by the safelet’s getSequencer() method. The information required by both of these tags is
found in the MethodEnv representing the relevant method in the SafeletEnv .
To generate a mission sequencer application process we combine a MissionSequenecerEnv
with the template in Fig. 5.14. This template adds an action to model the getNextMission()
method, but contains no tags that are not present in the generic template. The state of a
mission sequencer application process contains an OhCircus class, which defines the variables
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process processNameApp =̂ paramsbegin
State
varName : varType
. . .
Init
State ′
varName′ = varInit
. . .
methName =̂
var returnType : ret •
(
methBody
)
. . .
Methods =̂
methName@
. . .
 ; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end processType app . processID−→ Skip)
Figure 5.12: Generic Application Process Template
and non-reactive behaviour of the mission sequencer object. An example of this can be
seen in the GetNextMission action in Fig. 5.14, which calls the getNextMission() OhCircus
method in the class referenced by the variable this. The method contains a translation of
the mission sequencer object’s getNextMission() method, because it does not interact with
other processes.
To generate a mission application process we combine a MissionEnv with the template
shown in Fig. 5.15. In addition to the generic template, the mission template adds two extra
actions. The InitializePhase action represents the initialize() method. In this action, for
each schedulable in the Schedulables list in the source MissionEnv , we generate a register
event, where the SID tag is replaced with the identifier of the schedulable.
The CleanupPhase action represents the cleanUp() method, which returns a boolean,
so the action defines a boolean ret variable that is output on the return channel. The
cleanupBody tag is replaced with the body of the cleanUp() method. It is expected that the
ret variable will be set in the method body, but if it is not then ret := True; is added before
the return channel.
As an example of the output of the generate phase, we return to the MainMission from the
buffer application, shown in Fig. 5.2. To produce the model for the MainMisison class, the
generate phase combines the template in Fig. 5.15 with the information from the environment
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process processNameApp =̂ paramsbegin
State
varName : varType
. . .
Init
State ′
varName′ = varInit
. . .
InitializeApplication =̂
initializeApplicationCall−→
initBody
initializeApplicationRet−→
Skip

GetSequencer =̂
getSequencerCall−→
getSequencerRet ! SchedulableID−→
Skip

methName =̂
var returnType : ret •
(
methBody
)
. . .
Methods =̂
GetSequencer@
InitializeApplication@
methName@
. . .

; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end safelet app −→ Skip)
Figure 5.13: Template for Safelet Application Processes
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process processNameApp =̂ paramsbegin
State
this : ref processNameClass
varName : varType
. . .
Init
State ′
this = new processNameClass()
varName′ = varInit
. . .
GetNextMission =̂ var ret : MissionID •
getNextMissionCall . processNameID−→
ret := this . getNextMission();
getNextMissionRet . processNameID ! ret−→
Skip

methName =̂
var returnType : ret •
(
methBody
)
. . .
Methods =̂
GetNextMission@
methName@
. . .

; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end sequencer app .ProcessNameID −→ Skip)
Figure 5.14: Template for Mission Sequencer Application Process
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process processNameApp =̂ paramsbegin
State
varName : varType
. . .
Init
State ′
varName′ = varInit
. . .
InitializePhase =̂
initializeCall .ProcessNameID−→
register !SchedulableID !ProcessNameID−→
. . .
initializeRet .ProcessNameID−→
Skip

CleanupPhase =̂
varB : ret •
cleanupMissionCall .ProcessNameID−→
cleanupBodycleanupMissionRet .ProcessNameID ! ret−→
Skip

methName =̂
var returnType : ret •
(
methBody
)
. . .
Methods =̂

InitializePhase@
CleanupPhase@
methName@
. . .

; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end mission app .ProcessNameID −→ Skip)
Figure 5.15: Template for Mission Application Processes
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described in Table. 5.8. The result of this combination generates the model MainMissionApp
shown in Fig. 5.16.
To generate a process for an event handler we combine a ClassEnv representing the event
handler with the template shown in Fig. 5.17. This template is used to translate all three
types of event handler. This is possible because the specifics of their release patterns are
captured by the framework model. In addition to the generic template, the event handler
template adds an action to model the handler’s handleAsyncEvent() method, in which we
replace the HandleAsyncBody tag with the body of the method. The method body is taken
from the MethodEnv that represents the handleAsyncEvent() method in the ClassEnv for
this handler. Finally, the HandlerType tag is replaced with name of the type of handler
(periodic, aperiodic, or oneshot) to complete the name of the channel that terminates it.
To generate a process for a managed thread we combine a ClassEnv that represents a
managed thread object with the template shown in Fig 5.18. In addition to the generic
template, the managed thread template adds an action to model the run() method, in which
we replace the RunBody tag with the body of the action (found in the MethodEnv representing
that method in the ClassEnv).
Step Two: Channels
The second step generates the channels required by the processes produced in the first step.
These channels represent the call to and return from the actions in each application process.
Figure 5.19 shows the template for generating the pair of channels for non-synchronised
methods and 5.20 shows the templates for generating the pair of channels for synchronised
methods. We combine one of these templates with the information in a MethodEnv , replacing
each tag with the relevant information.
The ChanName tag is replaced with the name of the channel (which is the name of the
method is representing). The LocType tag is replaced with the type of the identifier used by
the location of the method and the CallerType tag with the type of the identifier used by the
callers of the method. If the method is only called inside the class it’s defined in, then the
‘×CallerType’ is omitted. The identifier type will be either appID , for non-paradigm objects;
MissionID , for missions; or SchedulableID , for schedulables. The CallerType and LocType
are used to handle inheritance and polymorphism, as described in Sect. 4.4. For the call
channel, we replace the Params tag with any parameters of the method it represents. Finally,
for the return channel, we replace the ReturnType tag with the return type of the method it
is representing.
5.2 Core Formalisation
In this section we present a formalisation in Z of the core elements of the translation strategy
described in Sect. 5.1. Z provides a useful logical framework with which to formalise our
translation. At the top-level, we define a function, TransSCJProg that accepts an SCJ
Level 2 program and outputs its Circus model. To give us the facility to describe SCJ and
Circus programs, we encode a BNF description of both SCJ and Circus into Z. This encoding
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process MainMissionApp =̂ begin
State
this : ref MainMissionClass
Init
State ′
this ′ = new MainMissionClass()
InitializePhase =̂
initializeCall .MainMissionMID−→
register ! ProducerSID ! MainMissionMID−→
register ! ConsumerSID ! MainMissionMID−→
initializeRet .MainMissionMID−→
Skip

CleanupPhase =̂
var ret : B •
cleanUpCall .MainMissionMID−→
ret := this . cleanUp();
cleanUpRet .MainMissionMID ! ret−→
Skip

getBufferMeth =̂ var ret : Buffer •
getBufferCall .MainMissionMID−→
ret := this . getBuffer();
getBufferRet .MainMissionMID ! ret−→
Skip

Methods =̂

InitializePhase@
CleanupPhase@
getBufferMeth

; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end mission app .MainMissionMID −→ Skip)
Figure 5.16: Example of MainMissionApp Processes Generated by the Translation Strategy
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process processNameApp =̂ paramsbegin
State
varName : varType
. . .
Init
State ′
varName′ = varInit
. . .
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall . processNameID−→
HandleAsyncBody;
handleAsyncEventRet . processNameID−→
Skip

methName =̂
var returnType : ret •
(
methBody
)
. . .
Methods =̂
handleAsyncEvent@
methName@
. . .

; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end HandlerType app . processNameID −→ Skip)
Figure 5.17: Template for an Event Handler Application Process
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process processNameApp =̂ paramsbegin
State
varName : varType
. . .
S Init
State ′
varName′ = varInit
. . .
Run =̂
runCall . processNameID−→
RunBody;
runRet . processNameID−→
Skip

methName =̂
var returnType : ret •
(
methBody
)
. . .
Methods =̂
Run@
. . .
 ; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end managedThread app . processNameID −→ Skip)
Figure 5.18: Template for a Managed Thread Application Process
channelChanNameCall : LocType× CallerTypeParams
channelChanNameRet : LocType× CallerType× ReturnType
Figure 5.19: Template for Non-Synchronised Method’s Call and Return Channels
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channelChanNameCall : LocType× CallerType× ThreadIDParams
channelChanNameRet : LocType× CallerType× ThreadID × ReturnType
Figure 5.20: Template for Synchronised Method’s Call and Return Channels
uses the BNF presented in Fig. 2.5 as its base, and is presented in Appendix. D.
Figure 5.21 shows the SCJ BNF encoded in Z. As previously mentioned, we consider that
the paradigm of SCJ is separate from its implementation in Java. Therefore, the SCJ BNF
encoding shows only the syntactic categories specific to SCJ programs. The definition of Java
syntactic categories remains the same as in the Java Language Specification (JLS) [34].
In the Z encoding of the SCJ BNF, the SCJProgram type models an SCJ program as
a Safelet , a TopLevelMissionSequencer , and a sequence of Tier values. The Safelet type
defines the safelet as an Identifier and a SafeletClassBody . An Identifier has the same
definition as in the JLS [34]. The SafeletClassBody defines the body of a safelet class as
an InitializeApplication, GetSequencer , and ImmortalMemorySize, which represent the API
methods defined by the Safelet interface, and a sequence of ClassBodyDeclaration values.
Each of these is defined as a MethodBody , which has the same definition as in the JLS [34].
The sequence of ClassBodyDeclaration values represents the application-specific contents of
the class, where a ClassBodyDeclaration has the same definition as in the JLS [34]. Each of
the paradigm classes is encoded using this pattern, where each is defined as an identifier and
the body of the relevant class.
TopLevelMissionSequencer defines the top-level mission sequencer as either NoSequencer
(because a safelet may return null from its getSequencer() method) or a mission sequencer
value defined by the constructor tlms〈〈MissionSequencer〉〉. For simplicity, this assumes that
there is only one top-level mission sequencer, unlike the environments presented in Fig. 5.4. A
MissionSequencer is defined with the same pattern as the Safelet category: it is an Identifier
and a MissionSequencerClassBody , which contains values to represent the getNextMission()
method and a sequence of ClassBodyDeclaration values.
As described at the start of Sect. 5.1.2, SCJ programs are organised into a control tier
and several program tiers. Each program tier comprises several clusters, which each con-
tain a mission and its registered schedulables. In the SCJ BNF encoding the Safelet and
TopLevelMissionSequencer objects compose the control tier and the Tier object represents a
program tier. A Tier is defined as a sequence of Cluster values, which comprises a Mission
and a sequence of SchedulableObjects.
A Mission value defines a mission, using the same pattern as the previously described
paradigm objects. A SchedulableObject constructs one of the schedulable object types: either
an event handler (handler〈〈EventHandler〉〉), a managed thread (mt〈〈ManagedThread〉〉), or a
mission sequencer (nms〈〈NestedMissionSequencer〉〉). An EventHandler is defined as one of
the three types representing an event handler (periodic, aperiodic, or one-shot). Each of the
handler categories, the ManagedThread , and the NestedMissionSequencer are defined with
the same patternas the other paradigm objects we describe above. The MethodDeclaration,
Long , and ClassDeclaration types have the same definition as in the JLS [34].
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SCJProgram == Safelet × TopLevelMissionSequencer × seq Tier
Safelet == Identifier × SafeletClassBody
SafeletClassBody ==
InitializeApplication ×GetSequencer ×
ImmortalMemorySize × seq ClassBodyDeclaration
GetSequencer == MethodBody
InitializeApplication == MethodBody
ImmortalMemorySize == MethodDeclaration
TopLevelMissionSequencer ::= NoSequencer | tlms〈〈MissionSequencer〉〉
Tier == seq Cluster
Cluster == Mission × seq SchedulableObject
Mission == Identifier ×MissionClassBody
MissionClassBody == Initialize × Cleanup × seq ClassBodyDeclaration
Initialize == MethodBody
Cleanup == MethodBody
SchedulableObject ::= handler〈〈EventHandler〉〉 | mt〈〈ManagedThread〉〉 |
nms〈〈NestedMissionSequencer〉〉
NestedMissionSequencer == MissionSequencer
MissionSequencer == Identifier ×MissionSequencerClassBody
MissionSequencerClassBody == GetNextMission × seq ClassBodyDeclaration
GetNextMission == MethodBody
EventHandler ::=
pehDecl〈〈PeriodicEventHandler〉〉 |
apehDecl〈〈AperiodicEventHandler〉〉 |
osehDecl〈〈OneShotEventHandler〉〉
PeriodicEventHandler == Identifier × EventHandlerClassBody
AperiodicEventHandler ::=
apehType〈〈Identifier × EventHandlerClassBody〉〉 |
aplehType〈〈Identifier×LongEventHandlerClassBody〉〉
LongEventHandlerClassBody == HandleAsyncLongEvent × seq ClassBodyDeclaration
OneShotEventHandler == Identifier × EventHandlerClassBody
EventHandlerClassBody == HandleAsyncEvent × seq ClassBodyDeclaration
HandleAsyncLongEvent == Long ×MethodBody
HandleAsyncEvent == MethodBody
ManagedThread == Identifier ×ManagedThreadClassBody
ManagedThreadClassBody == Run × seq ClassBodyDeclaration
Run == MethodBody
[MethodBody ,ClassBodyDeclaration, Identifier ,MethodDeclaration,Long ,ClassDeclaration]
Figure 5.21: SCJ BNF Translated to Z
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Model Component Build Function Generate Function
Framework Processes BuildFWEnv GenerateFWProcs
Application Process BuildAppProcEnv GenerateAppProc
MethodCallBinder Process BuildMCBEnv GenerateMCBProc
Locking Processes BuildLockEnv GenerateLockProc
Table 5.9: Functions used by the TransSCJProg Function
The formalisation captures the same three phases as the translation strategy in Sect. 5.1.
The functions defining the analysis phase extract information from the program. The func-
tions defining the build phase construct an environment for each of the objects in the program.
Finally, the functions defining the generate phase construct the Circus models from the in-
formation in the environments. The build and generate functions use various other auxiliary
functions to perform the translation. Some of these implement the analysis phase.
Figure 5.22 shows the main translation function TransSCJProg , which accepts an SCJ
program and an Identifier , which is the SCJ program’s name. This function calls a number
of others, which build and generate specific parts of the model. Table 5.9 shows the functions
used by TransSCJProg , the phase to which they belong, and the component they produce.
Each build function produces an environment that holds the information needed to generate
the model of that particular component. For example, the BuildFWEnv function produces
a FWEnv , which is used by the GenerateFWProcs function to generate the framework pro-
cesses. In addition to the functions in Table 5.9, the TransClasses function translates the
application classes. The definitions of the functions omitted here can be found in Appendix E.
The Program process is defined inside the TransSCJProg function (Fig. 5.22) and takes the
form process Program =̂ (Framework JappSync KBound Application) J lockSync KLocking , as
explained in the previous section. The framework type is defined, outside of TransSCJProg ,
as a sequence of all the framework processes. The result of TransSCJProg is defined as
the concatenation of the framework type, the translated application processes app, the
MethodCallBinder processes mcbModel , the Locking processes lockModel , the Program pro-
cess, and two processes that are constructed during the result’s definition. The first process
is 〈procDef (pd(FWName, head fwProcs))〉, which defines the Framework process in our z
BNF encoding of Circus. The second is 〈procDef (pd(AppName, appProc))〉, which defines
the Bound Application process. This sequence of processes corresponds to the processes
described in Sect. 5.1 combined with the framework model in Chap. 4.
To illustrate how components of the model are translated by TransSCJProg using other
functions, we examine the translations of the framework processes. Figure 5.23 shows the
build phase function BuildFWEnv , which takes an SCJProgram and extracts the information
required to generate the framework processes. It produces an FWEnv (defined in Fig. 5.24),
which holds the information extracted from the program. The FWEnv type is a schema,
which records the identifier of the top-level mission sequencer and a non-empty sequence of
TierEnvs. Note that an FWEnv does not need to hold any information about the safelet
because its framework process does not take any parameters.
The BuildFWEnv function extracts the top-level mission sequencer from the SCJ program
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TransSCJProg : Identifier × SCJProgram 7→ CircusProgram
dom TransSCJProg = Identifier × TranslatablePrograms
∀name : Identifier ; scjProg : SCJProgram
• ∃ app : CircusProgram; program : CircusProgram;
fwProcs : seq Process; appProc : Process; lockModel : seq CircusParagraph;
mcbModel : seq CircusParagraph; fwEnv : FWEnv ;
appEnv : AppProcEnv ; mcbEnvs : MCBEnv ; lockEnv : LockingEnv |
fwEnv = BuildFWEnv(scjProg)
appEnv = BuildAppProcEnv(scjProg)
mcbEnvs = BuildMCBEnvs(scjProg)
lockEnv = BuildLockEnv(scjProg)
app = TransClasses(scjProg)
∧ fwProcs = GenerateFWProcs(fwEnv)
∧ appProc = GenerateAppProc(appEnv)
∧ mcbModel = GenerateMCBModel(mcbEnvs)
∧ lockModel = GenerateLockModel(lockEnv)
∧ program = 〈procDef (pd(ProgName(name),
procHide(procPar(
procHide(
procPar(
procName(FWName),
appComms,
procHide(
procPar(procName(AppName),
mcbComms,
procName(MCBName)),
mcbComms)),
appComms),
lockComms,
procName(LockName)),
lockComms)))〉 •
TransSCJProg(name, scjProg) =
framework a 〈procDef (pd(FWName, head fwProcs))〉
aapp a 〈procDef (pd(AppName, appProc))〉
amcbModel a lockModel a program
Figure 5.22: The Top-Level Translation Rule TransSCJProg
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BuildFWEnv : SCJProgram 7→ FWEnv
dom BuildFWEnv = TranslatablePrograms
∀ scjProg : dom BuildFWEnv
• ∃ tlmsID : Identifier ; tlmsBody : MissionSequencerClassBody ;
tiers : seq Tier |
ProgTLMS (scjProg) 6= NoSequencer
⇒ ProgTLMS (scjProg) = tlms(tlmsID , tlmsBody)
• BuildFWEnv(scjProg) =
〈|TopLevelMS == tlmsID ,Tiers == BuildTierEnvs(ProgTiers(scjProg))|〉
Figure 5.23: The BuildFWEnv Function
FWEnv
TopLevelMS : Identifier
Tiers : seq TierEnv
Tiers 6= 〈〉
TierEnv
Clusters : seq ClusterEnv
Clusters 6= 〈〉
ClusterEnv
Mission : Identifier
NestedMissionSequencers : P Identifier
ManagedThreads : P Identifier
PeriodicEventHandlers : P Identifier
AperiodicEventHandlers : P Identifier
OneShotEventHandlers : P Identifier
disjoint〈NestedMissionSequencers,ManagedThreads,PeriodicEventHandlers,
AperiodicEventHandlers,OneShotEventHandlers〉⋃{NestedMissionSequencers,ManagedThreads,PeriodicEventHandlers,
AperiodicEventHandlers,OneShotEventHandlers} 6= ∅
Figure 5.24: The Environments for the Framework processes
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Function Parameters Result
BuildTierEnvs seq Tier seq TierEnv
BuildTierEnvs Tier TierEnv
BuildClusterEnvs seq Cluster seq ClusterEnv
BuildClusterEnv Cluster ClusterEnv
BuildSOEnvs FSchedulableObject
F Identifier× F Identifier ×
F Identifier× F Identifier×
F Identifier
GetIdentifiers FSchedulableObject F Identifier
Table 5.10: Functions Used by BuildFWEnv to Build Ttier Environments
Function Parameters Result
TierSync TierEnv CSExpression
GenerateTierFWProcs FWEnv seq Process
GenerateTierFWProc ClusterEnv Process
GetParams Identifier seq Expression
Table 5.11: Functions Used by the GenerateFWProcs Function
using the ProgTLMS function. BuildFWEnv only extracts the top-level mission sequencer if
it is not equal to NoSequencer , which is the value that represents the safelet returning null
from its getSequencer() method. The ProgTLMS function extracts a value of top-level
mission sequencer type, where its identifier (tlmsID) is the identifier of the top-level mission
sequencer.
BuildFWEnv uses a chain of functions, summarised in Table 5.10, to build the environ-
ments for the tiers. First, the BuildTierEnvs function, which takes a sequence of program
tiers and produces a sequence of TierEnvs. We use ProgTiers to extract the sequence of tiers
from the SCJ program. The BuildTierEnvs function uses the BuildTierEnv function to build
the environment of each tier, which in turn uses BuildClusterEnvs to build the environments
for each cluster. The BuildClusterEnvs function calls BuildClusterEnv to build the environ-
ment for each cluster, which in turn calls BuildSOEnvs to build the environments for the
schedulable objects in that cluster. Finally, BuildSOEnvs uses the GetIdentifiers function to
extract the identifiers from the sequence of schedulables objects in that cluster.
Figure 5.25 shows the GenerateFWProcs function, which generates the processes that
compose the Framework process. This implements the first step of stage one in the generate
phase (described Sect. 5.1.3). The function takes an FWEnv environment and produces a
sequence of Process values, each of which defines a Circus process.
Table 5.11 shows the functions used by the GenerateFWProcs function. The TierSync
function takes two tier environments and from these generates a channel set that allows the
two tiers to communicate. The order of the TierEnv parameters must be the same as the
order of the tiers that they represent. For example, the environments representing the highest
tier in a program’s hierarchy and the next tier down, Tier0 and Tier1 respectively, should
be passed in that order so that TierSync can produce a channel set that allows them to
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GenerateFWProcs : FWEnv → seq Process
∀ env : FWEnv
• ∃ fwProc : Process; controlTierProc : Process; tierProcs : seq Process
| fwProc = procPar(
procName(ControlTier),
TierSync(head env .Tiers),
GenerateTierFWProc(env .Tiers)
)
∧ controlTierProc = procPar(
procName(SafeletFWName),
ControlTierSync,
procInstP(procName(TopLevelMissionSequencerFWName),
GetParams(env .TopLevelMS ))
)
∧ tierProcs = GenerateTierFWProcs(env .Tiers)
• GenerateFWProcs(env) = 〈fwProc〉a 〈controlTierProc〉a tierProcs
Figure 5.25: The GenerateFWProcs Function
communicate.
To produce the channel set we extract the mission identifiers (and possibly mission se-
quencer identifiers) from the second TierEnv parameter, which represents the lower of the
two tiers. These identifiers are used to restrict some of the channels in the set, so that the syn-
chronisation only occurs for the events intended to communicate with processes in these two
tiers. The GenerateTierFWProcs function generates a sequence of tier processes using the
GenerateTierFWProc function to generate each individual process. Finally, the GetParams
function extracts from an environment the API-parameters to the object it represents, which
become parameters to the process. This captures, for example, the parameter classes passed
to schedulables to specify their deadline, deadline miss handler, and so on.
This approach is reused to produce the application process, method call binder, and the
locking model. Each of the components shown in Table 5.9 is translated by a a generate func-
tion, which constructs the component based on the information in an environment produced
by a build function. These functions also make use of various auxiliary functions to help the
translation.
The full listing of the translation functions, including those presented in this section,
is presented in Appendix E. It covers 43 functions and several other schemas, types, and
other definitions. It has been parsed and type checked using the Community Z Tools [65].
The structure of this formalisation mirrors that of the translation strategy (presented in
Sect. 5.1), and is mirrored by the automatic translation tool TightRope presented in Sect. 5.3,
below. Figure 5.4 shows the environments that are produced by the build phase. These
environments are implemented in the automatic translation tool, which is described in the
131
next section.
5.3 Automatic Translation
In this section we present TightRope, a Linux Java prototype tool for automatic translation
of SCJ Level 2 programs into Circus. It, like our modelling approach, is based on the Level 1
translation tool, TransCircus, in [93]. It reuses the structure and method body translation
technique found in TransCircus, but in all other aspects TightRope is vastly re-engineered.
TransCircus comprises 122 classes over approximately 9100 lines of code. In contrast,
TightRope comprises 48 classes and has approximately 12500 lines of code. Once the location of
the input program has been identified the translation and output is fully automatic. TightRope
reuses some classes from TransCircus, as described in Sect. 5.3.1. However, it only reuses one
class from the package that captures application specific information from Level 1 programs
(tool.modelgen) because our new model requires new classes to capture Level 2 programs.
TransCircus requires its input programs to be annotated with information including the
class’s identifier and if it requires a process to model it or just an OhCircus class. By contrast,
TightRope extracts all the required information from the program, without annotations.
5.3.1 Overview
The translation performed by TightRope implements the same three phases as described in
Sect. 5.1. First, the analysis phase compiles the input program to produce a list of Abstract
Syntax Trees (AST), then extracts information useful for the translation from the ASTs
during a pre-processing step. The build phase constructs environment objects from the input
ASTs, using the information extracted by the analysis phase. Finally, the generate phase
uses the information in the environments to produce the output model files. This is achieved
by combining each environment with a template, which dictates the shape of the process,
replacing tags in the template with the relevant information from the environment.
TightRope can translate all the unique features of SCJ Level 2. It requires that the SCJ
program compiles and is structured with one paradigm class per file. It also requires that
programs conform to an input pattern, which simplifies statements without altering their
semantics. Complex Java statements must be rewritten: chains of method calls in one state-
ment become several separate method calls, and if a method parameter is an new object,
then any parameters the object takes must be literal values. Finally, the condition for a
while loop must not be a variable, the entire condition should be contained within the while
loop statement. Note that these are restrictions of the current version of the tool, not of the
technique as a whole.
Figure 5.26 shows a package diagram of TightRope. There are five tools.tightrope
packages (in bold), which compose the core of the application, and six smaller tools packages,
which are reused from TransCircus [93]. The tools.application package contains the main
classes of both TransCircus and TightRope. The tools.application.TightRope class is the
entry point of the application and controls the program flow.
The tools.analysis and tools.compiler packages are reused from TransCircus by the
analysis phase to compile the SCJ program (Sect. 5.3.2). As previously mentioned, the
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tools.tightrope.builders tools.tightrope.environmentstools.tightrope.generators
tools.tightrope.utils
tools.tightrope.visitors
tools.application
tools.compilertools.utils tools.analysis tools.config tools.modelgen
Figure 5.26: Package Diagram of TightRope
tools.modelgen package provides the classes that perform the translation in TransCircus.
TightRope reuses one class form this package, which represents a parsed SCJ program. The
build phase (Sect. 5.3.3) uses the classes in three packages, tools.tightrope.builders,
tools.tightrope.environments, and tools.tightrope.visitors to translate the SCJ
program and store the translation in environments. The tools.tightrope.generators
package is used by the generate phase, described in Sect. 5.3.4, to produce the model from the
information in the environments. The tools.tightrope.utils and tool.utils packages
provide utility classes that support the translation. Finally, TightRope uses one class from the
tools.config package to provide access to the properties in the tool’s configuration file.
5.3.2 Analysis Phase
The analysis phase occurs in three steps. In the first step, we take the input program
and compile it into a list of ASTs representing the program’s classes, which facilitates the
translation. The program is compiled using the Java Compiler Tree API1 against the Icecap
SCJ implementation [46], but any valid Level 2 implementation can be used.
In the second step, we iterate through the list of ASTs produced by the first step and pre-
process them to build two of the maps described in Sect. 5.1.1. The first map, classTypeMap,
maps each class in the SCJ program to a list of the names of its supertypes. For each AST,
we extract the interfaces it implements and the class it extends. A list of these components
and the name of the class represented by the AST are added to the classTypeMap. The
generate phase uses the classTypeMap to identify the output template for each class, using
the rules described in Table 5.1.
The second map, classMethodsMap, maps each class to a list of the names of its methods
that are not defined in the SCJ API. For each AST, we iterate through its methods. For each
method, if it is not defined in the SCJ API, then we add it’s name to a temporary list. Once
all the methods have been checked, if the temporary list is not empty, we add the name of
the class that the AST represents and the temporary list to the map. The classMethodsMap
is used to help construct the MethodCallBinder process. The analysis phase (in Sect. 5.1.1)
1docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/jdk/api/javac/tree/
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Class Environment
ProgramEnv NetworkEnv , Threads, Objects
StructureEnv ProgramEnv , TierEnv , ClusterEnv , SchedulableEnv
PeriodicEventHandlerEnv PEHEnv
AperiodicEventHandlerEnv APEHEnv
OneShotEventHandlerEnv OSEHEnv
ManagedThreadEnv MTEnv
MissionEnv MissionEnv
MissionSequencerEnv MissionSequencerEnv
SafeletEnv SafeletEnv
ClassEnv ClassEnv
MethodEnv MethodEnv
VariableEnv VarEnv
Table 5.12: Table Mapping the Builder Classes to the Environments they Implement
produces a third map, which maps method names to the names of classes that call that
method. In TightRope this map is constructed during the build phase, which we describe in
Sect 5.3.3.
Finally, the third step produces a list of all relevant non-paradigm objects in the program.
This list includes any object that does not implement the Safelet interface or extend the
MissionSequencer, Mission, or one of the schedulable classes. The Icecap implementation
includes a Launcher class to act as the entry point to the SCJ program. Since this is not in
the API or part of the program, it is also excluded from this list.
5.3.3 Build Phase
The build phase takes the ASTs and maps from the analysis phase and constructs environ-
ment objects (contained in the tools.tightrope.environments package) that capture the
information in the system using classes in the tool.tightrope.builder package. The en-
vironment classes, shown in Fig. 5.27, are the implementation of the environments shown in
Fig. 5.4. The builder classes, shown in Fig. 5.28, are the implementation of the processes
used to build each type of environment, described in Sect. 5.1.2. Table 5.12 shows which
functions and types are implemented by these classes.
Each type of object has its own specialised environment that holds the information needed
by the generate phase to produce its model. The environments for each paradigm object –
the safelet, mission sequencers, missions, and schedulables – extend the ParadigmEnv class.
Non-paradigm objects, those that do not extend any of the paradigm objects, are represented
by the NonParadigmEnv environment. Both the NonParadigmEnv and ParadigmEnv classes
extend the ObjectEnv class, which is the superclass that characterises all the environments.
The ProgramEnv environment records information such as the identifiers in the program, the
non-paradigm objects, and the program’s structure. The StructureEnv class records the
structure of the program and the environments for each of the paradigm objects.
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NonParadigmEnv ParadigmEnv
SafeletEnv MissionSequencerEnv
TopLevel
MissionSequencerEnv
Schedulable
MissionSeuqnecer
Env
MissionEnv
ManagedThreadEnv
EventHandlerEnv
Periodic
EventHandlerEnv
Aperiodic
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EventHandlerEnv
StructureEnv
variableEnv
MethodEnv
ClassEnv
ProgramEnv
Figure 5.27: Class Diagram of the tools.tightrope.environments Package
ParadigmBuilder
SafeletBuilderEnvironmentBuilder MissionSequencerBuilder MissionBuilder
SchedulableBuilder
Figure 5.28: Class Diagram of the tools.tightrope.builders Package
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This phase operates in the same way as illustrated in Fig. 5.3. First, the environments of
the non-paradigm objects are built, because they do not affect the structure of the program.
The preprocessing that occurs in the analysis phase identifies the safelet, and it is the first
paradigm object to be translated because it is at the top of the program’s hierarchy. The
mission sequencer returned by the safelet’s getSequencer() method is the top-level mission
sequencer, and its environment is built next. After the top-level mission sequencer, we build
the environment of each mission returned by its getNextMission() method. For each of
these missions, we build the schedulable objects registered to it, and then move on to the
next mission. If a mission registers a schedulable mission sequencer, then we build the
environments of each of that mission sequencer’s mission and their registered schedulables
before moving on to the next schedulable. Once there are no more missions to translate
that are controlled by the top-level mission sequencer, we move on to the generate phase.
Note that, for simplicity, TightRope assumes that there will only be one top-level mission
sequencer, whereas the translation strategy described in Sect. 5.1 accepts the possibility of
multiple top-level mission sequencers.
The environment of each type of object is built by a specific builder class, each of which
extends a generic builder class ParadigmBuilder that contains methods reused by all the
builder classes. For example, the SafeletBuilder class, which extends ParadigmBuilder,
builds the environment of the program’s safelet.
Each builder class has a build() method, which traverses the AST of an object and
extracts its variables and methods. Because this functionality is required for any builder class,
it is encapsulated in the classes in the visitors package. These visitor classes implement
the process of building an environment, which is described in Sect. 5.1.2. In addition to the
generic behaviour, the build() method of each builder class is specialised to extract the
contents of the overridden API methods.
Each visitor traverses the tree of a particular component to retrieve the information
required for its environment. The visitor classes do not have as obvious a correspondence
to the functions in the core formalisation of the translation. This is stylistic; each visitor
is specialised to the SCJ component from which it is extracting information (methods or
method bodies, for example) as opposed to the model component for which it is producing
the information.
The MethodVisitor class traverses a tree representing a method and translates its name
and parameters, and uses other visitors to extract the return type and value, and body. It
produces a MethodEnv containing this information. The ReturnVisitor class traverses a tree
representing a method and extracts a list of the names that are returned by that method. The
RegistersVisitor class traverses a tree representing the Mission.initialize() method
and extracts the name of the schedulables on which register() is called.
The MethodBodyVisitor class traverses a tree representing a method and translates its
body using the rules described in Sect. 5.1.2. The VariableVisitor class traverses a tree
representing a member of a class and extracts any variables that tree might contain. This class
corresponds to the translation rules presented in Table 5.3. Finally, the ParametersVisitor
class is used to translate method and class parameters. It traverses a tree representing an
expression and extracts the name, type, and value of the parameter.
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The SafeletBuilder.build() method builds the environment of a safelet object. In
addition to the object’s variables and methods, it specifically captures two extra compo-
nents. First, it translates the safelet’s initializeApplication() method and stores it in
the SafeletEnv. Then, it translates the names of the mission sequencers returned by the
getSequencer() method. This is achieved by the ReturnVisitor, as described above. The
mission sequencer identified here is the top-level mission sequencer and identifies the next
component to be built.
The MissionSequencerBuilder class builds the environment of a mission sequencer ob-
ject. It is used to build the environments of both top-level and schedulable mission sequencers.
In addition to the object’s variables and methods, its build() method specifically captures
the missions returned by the getNextMission() method. Again, this is achieved by the
ReturnVistor class, as described above. These missions are stored in the MissionEnv and
identifies the next components to be built.
The MissionBuilder class builds the environment of a mission object. In addition to the
objects variables and methods, its build() method specifically captures two extra compo-
nents. First, it translates the cleanUp() method. Then, it translates the schedulables that
are registered during its initialize() method. This is achieved by the RegistersVisitor,
which finds a call to the register method of a schedulable object and returns the name of
that schedulable. The schedulables identified are stored in the MissionEnv and identifies the
next components to be built.
The SchedulableBuilder class builds the environment of any schedulable object. It is
used to build the environments of any of the event handler classes and the managed thread
class. In addition to the object’s variables and methods, its build() method translates the
handleAsyncEvent() method of an event handler or the run() method of a managed thread.
These methods are translated by the MethodVisitor, as described above. The build()
method also checks if an aperiodic event handler’s handleAsyncEvent() method takes a
long parameters or not, and records it in the environment. This information is required
because we model the behaviour of these two types of aperiodic event handler differently.
5.3.4 Generate Phase
The generate phase produces the models of the program by combining a template with an
environment, which has been produced by the build phase. There are different templates for
processes, OhCircus classes, and channel sets. The combination process replaces the tags in
the template with the relevant application-specific information from the environment. For
example, each process template uses the name of the class to generate the name of the process.
So the combination of a process template with an environment replaces the tag for the process
name with the actual name of the class in the environment.
The CircusGenerator class controls the generate phase, using its generate() method,
which performs the combination of templates and environments using the Freemarker tem-
plate engine. The templates used in this phase are implementations of the templates, pre-
sented in Sect. 5.1, for Freemarker.
This phase implements the two stages of the generate phase described in Sect. 5.1.3. As
previously mentioned, stage one produces the top-level network of processes that control
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our model. It is implemented by the generateNetwork() method. Stage two produces the
Circus processes, OhCircus classes, and channels modelling the objects in the program. The
processes and channels for each type of object are generated by a different generate method.
The generateNetwork() method uses the information in the ProgramEnv to generate the
Framework , Bound Application, MethodCallBinder , and Locking processes. It also generates
the channels that these processes require. The order in which these steps occur is unimpor-
tant, because the structure of the program has already been captured by the build phase.
Each of these components is generated from the information in the ProgramEnv, but uses a
different template. These templates are the same as described in stage one of the generate
phase in Sect. 5.1.3, but implemented for Freemarker.
The other generate methods compose stage two. They generate the non-paradigm objects
and then the safelet, the top-level mission sequencer, missions, and schedulables. Again, the
order in which these components are generated is unimportant because the program structure
has been captured during the build phase. Each of these generate methods takes the infor-
mation from a particular type of environment and combines it with a particular template.
For example, the generateSafelet() method takes the information in a SafeletEnv and
combines it with the safelet template to produce the SafeletApp process.
In addition to generating the model, the generate() method performs some tasks that
are specific to TightRope. It writes the files of the model to an output folder. It also generates a
report of the translated program that contains all the application-specific processes, OhCircus
classes, and channels. The report is written in LATEX, and T
ightRope compiles the report after
the generate phase has completed.
5.4 Translation Examples
Our translation strategy, presented in Sect. 5.1, captures the application-specific behaviour
of SCJ Level 2 programs. In particular, we model managed threads, schedulable mission
sequencers, and suspension, as these are unique features of Level 2. We used the example ap-
plications2 summarised in Table 5.13 to test the translation strategy during its development.
These examples exhibit a range of features available in SCJ Level 2 programs, including: sin-
gle and sequential missions, nested mission sequencers, all of the types of schedulable object,
and programs with several tiers to test the termination protocol on more complex program
structures. The final two applications are the running examples that we have previously
described, Buffer in Sect. 2.1.2 and Aircraft in Sect. 2.1.3.
During the development of the translation strategy, the example applications have high-
lighted particular problems with our model and allowed us to fix them. For example, the
Mission2 example illuminated that a managed thread terminating before it is requested to
(by its run() method returning) produced a spurious deadlock. This occurred when the
controlling mission attempted to request the managed thread to terminate, but the managed
thread was no longer offering the termination request event. Managed threads are the only
schedulable capable of terminating without being requested to, and the Mission2 example
2The example SCJ programs and their translations are available at http://www.cs.york.ac.uk/circus/
hijac/case.html
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Name Description  Classes Translation Time (s)
Mission1 A single mission with periodic
event handler that releases an
aperiodic event handler
5 ∼1.53
Mission2 A single mission with a man-
aged thread and a one-shot
event handler
5 ∼1.27
ThreeOneShots A single mission with three
one-shot event handlers
6 ∼1.28
ThreeThreads A single mission with three
managed threads
6 ∼1.21
SequentialMissions Two sequential missions, each
with two managed threads
8 ∼1.28
NestedSequencer1 A single mission with a single
nested mission sequencer
7 ∼1.21
NestedSequencer2 A mission, with three nested
mission sequencers. Each has
one mission controlling a peri-
odic event handler
14 ∼1.34
NestedSequencer3 A mission, with a nested
mission sequencer that has
two sequential nested mis-
sions, each with a managed
thread.
8 ∼1.30
NestedSequencer4 A complicated example using
two levels of nesting. It con-
tains 4 missions and 3 man-
aged threads
12 ∼1.18
NestedSequencer5 Extends NestedSequencer4,
combines complex nesting,
all schedulable types, and
sequential missions
12 ∼1.28
Buffer Small program using managed
threads and synchronisation
6 ∼1.23
Aircraft A multiple-mode program us-
ing a schedulable mission se-
quencer to represent phases of
aircraft flight
23 ∼2.57
Table 5.13: Summary of SCJ Translated Example Applications
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Name  Classes States
Assertion Time (s)
Compilation Checking Total
Mission1 5 549 0.25 0.39 0.64
Mission2 5 138 0.42 0.10 0.52
ThreeOneShots 6 1,460 0.20 0.41 0.61
ThreeThreads 6 213 0.18 0.33 0.51
SequentialMissions 8 343 0.27 0.40 0.67
NestedSequencer1 7 147 0.64 0.12 0.76
NestedSequencer2 14 898,584 4.57 3.65 8.22
NestedSequencer3 8 311 0.98 0.13 1.11
NestedSequencer4 12 6,417 4.13 0.24 4.37
NestedSequencer5 12 36,219 6.76 0.64 7.40
Buffer 6 310 0.41 1.02 1.43
Aircraft 23 ∼ 46,647 ∼ 20.75 ∼ 59.41 ∼ 80.16
Table 5.14: Summary of Model States
helped us to model this behaviour correctly.
The NestedSequencer2 example exposed a problem with the periodic event handler frame-
work process when it requests its controlling mission to terminate. The resulting attempt by
the mission to terminate the periodic event handler caused the deadlock, which this example
helped us to resolve. Further, the NestedSequencer4 and NestedSequencer5 examples are
particularly useful illustrations of the complex structures that nested mission sequencers in
Level 2 programs allow. These two examples also provided a test bed for modelling the new
termination protocol that we proposed in [56], as applied to a program with several tiers.
This shows the termination request ‘bubbling’ up the program hierarchy.
TightRope, described in Sect. 5.3, implements the translation strategy (Sect. 5.1) and pro-
vides automatic translation of SCJ programs to Circus. It has been used to translate all of
the example applications summarised in Table 5.13, where the reported translation times are
from running TightRope on a Lenovo W540 with an Intel Core i7-4700MQ CPU. All of the
example programs were translated in less than 3 seconds. The Buffer and Aircraft are the
most complex applications translated, each exhibiting a unique feature of SCJ Level 2. Buffer
contains six classes, two of which are managed threads that use synchronisation and suspen-
sion to share access to a bounded buffer held by their controlling mission. This application
was translated in ∼1.23 seconds. Buffer was the test bed application for the ObjectFW and
ThreadFW processes (which control the synchronisation behaviour) and how they interact
with the rest of the model. Aircraft contains 23 classes in a more complex hierarchy than
the Buffer application. Aircraft uses a schedulable mission sequencer and both aperiodic and
periodic event handlers. The Aircraft example was translated in ∼2.57 seconds. While this
is a small sample of examples, they lend us confidence that our automatic translation can
deal with structurally complex programs and will scale well.
The Circus models of the programs in Table 5.13 have been validated by translating them
to CSPM , which is the machine-readable version of CSP. The framework model was also
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translated to CSPM . The CSP version of the models have been analysed using the Failures
Divergences Refinement tool (FDR3) [33]. This analysis includes animating the framework
model to compare its behaviour to that described in the SCJ Language Specification, and
both animating and model checking the models of full programs to check their behaviour
against running programs and to check for deadlock and divergence freedom.
Table 5.14 summarises, for the CSPM version of each of the modelled programs, the
number of states and the time taken (in seconds) to check a deadlock freedom assertion in
FDR3. The assertion times shown are split into the compilation and checking phases of the
FDR3 assertion check, and their sum. The use of particular processes and combinations
of processes increases the number of states. For example, the large number of states in
ThreeOneShots application is due to the possibility that a OneShotEventHandler may be
descheduled and rescheduled.
The model of the NestedSequencer5 application has the third highest number of states
because the program has three tiers and one of each type of schedulable, which produces
more states because of the termination-related events. As Table 5.14 shows, the model takes
longer to compile (6.76s) than it does to perform the deadlock check (0.64s). This is because
of the large number of events in the model, because of the communication between the tiers,
which increases the compilation time. The model of the NestedSequencer2 application has
the highest number of states because it contains two tiers and three PeriodicEventHandler
processes. In general, models containing PeriodicEventHandler processes have more states
because of the possibility of period overruns.
Despite using synchronisation and suspension, the model of the Buffer application contains
only 310 states. The processes controlling synchronisation and suspension in the Circus version
of the model contain a lot of variables, so extra attention was paid when they were translated
to CSPM . This has resulted in a version of the synchronisation and suspension modal that
does not unnecessarily inflate the state space of the model and is better suited to analysis
in FDR. The compilation time of the model (0.41s) is faster than its checking time (1.02s)
because it has a large number of states, due to the model’s complexity as opposed to large
number of events
The translation from Circus to CSPM is relatively straightforward, because CSP is part of
Circus. We translate each Circus process and its actions into a CSP process comprising pro-
cesses representing the Circus actions. This provides a CSP model that mirrors the structure
of the Circus process, but which lacks the encapsulation provided by Circus.
Because CSP lacks variables, the state component of a Circus process is translated into
a CSP process that is parametrised by values representing the Circus variables. This ‘state
process’ provides channels to ‘read‘ and ‘write’ to the parameters it controls, before recurring
(possibly with an updated value) to offer the ‘read’ and ‘write’ channels again.
The translation of state from Circus to CSPM occasionally produced models that FDR3
could not analyse, because of state explosion. Firstly, each Circus variable requires (usually at
least two) extra channels in the CSP model. Secondly, and more importantly, state processes
can yield a large number of model states. This is especially true when one of its parameters
is a set or a sequence. The CSPM version of the framework model has been refactored
to improve the tractability of analysis in FDR3, by reducing the number of states while
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maintaining the same behaviour3.
For example, the previously mentioned synchronisation and suspension processes were
a particular focus for refactoring, as the original translation from Circus proved intractable
because of the large number of variables. We reduced the use of variables and reorganised
the processes to ensure a smaller state space for the synchronisation and suspension system.
Other refactorings ranged from simple restrictions, such as defining a sequential order for the
termination of a mission’s schedulables instead of allowing them to interleave, to defining a
process to capture a complicated data structure. An example of the latter is the priority
queue (Fig. 4.6), used to ensure the highest priority thread that has also been waiting the
longest gains a lock, which is a function in the Circus version of the model. The FDR-friendly
translation to CSPM defines this as an parallelism of small processes, which each control one
element of the queue. These processes toggle a cell between being empty and being full, and
specify the events available in each of these two states. This proves a much more tractable
approach for checking in FDR.
The model of the Aircraft application is the biggest that we have checked, having 23
classes arranged over two tiers. It is also relatively complex because the schedulables in
both tiers access variables held in the main mission (in Tier 0), which generates a lot of
communication between the tiers. Because of this complexity, the Aircraft model required
modifications that reduced the state space to allow it to be checked – hence the results in
Table 5.14 being approximations. This model seems to be at the limit of what our verification
technique can handle, with the current CSPM version of our model. We not that this is not
a limitation of the modelling approach as a whole. Further work on improving the efficiency
of our CSPM models, especially when translated from Circus, will improve the scalability of
the verification technique.
5.5 Summary
This chapter presents a detailed description of our strategy for translating SCJ Level 2 pro-
grams into Circus. This strategy captures the application-specific behaviour of SCJ programs
and produces Circus models that are compatible with the model of the SCJ API described in
Chap. 4. The combination of these two models is also captured by the translation strategy,
and this chapter presents the information and rules required to perform this combination.
This chapter also presents two implementations of the translation strategy. The first is
a formalisation in Z of the core elements of our translation, which paves the way for a full
formalisation that could be used to prove the soundness of our technique. The second is the
implementation of TightRope, a tool for automatic translation.
To test the translation strategy, we have translated 12 SCJ example applications. These
programs cover the full-range of Level 2 features, including managed threads, suspension, and
schedulable mission sequencers. These example applications include the Buffer in Sect. 2.1.2
and Aircraft in Sect. 2.1.3. These examples have been translated by hand and by our trans-
lation tool, TightRope. However, the tool places some limitations on the input programs it
can accept. It is important to note that these are simplifications required by the tool only,
3This work was done with the help of Tom Gibson-Robinson, University of Oxford, UK
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and that they are not limitations of the technique as a whole. These limitations add a
small programmer overhead, as they require some program rewriting, but do not restrict the
functionality of the programs TightRope can handle.
To validate the translated Circus models, they have been translated to CSPM and anal-
ysed using FDR3. The analysis involved comparing the behaviour of the models with that
described in the SCJ Language Specification, and with running programs. This has been
used to ensure that the models produced by the translation are valid, with respect to the
SCJ API. Work has been done to optimise the CSPM model to enable tractable analysis in
FDR3. It also presents an interesting avenue of future work for model checking Circus.
In the next, and final, chapter, we evaluate the work presented in this thesis, present our
conclusions, and discuss future work.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis. Section 6.1 summarises the contributions that have been
presented. Section 6.2 discusses the validity and utility of the presented work. Finally,
Sect. 6.3 describes extensions to our approach that could be completed as future work.
6.1 Summary
Safety-Critical Java (SCJ) is a new programming language, which embeds a novel program-
ming paradigm for safety-critical programs. To aid certification, SCJ is organised into three
compliance levels, which increase in complexity from Level 0 to Level 2. Level 0 is for se-
quential programs that adopt a cyclic executive, where a set of computations are executed
periodically. Level 1 introduces concurrency and provides both periodic and aperiodic tasks.
Level 2 is the least restricted compliance level. Level 2 programs are highly concurrent,
potentially multi-processor, and allow suspension and a variety of release patterns.
We aim our work at Level 2, because it has received little attention in comparison to
Levels 0 and 1. For example, at the beginning of the thesis work there was no Level 2
implementation, little assessment of its features in the literature, and sparse Level 2 tool
support. Even now, few tools or verification techniques are specifically aimed at Level 2.
We perform the first assessment of the features of Level 2, illuminating programming
patterns for which the features are uniquely (in SCJ) useful. The assessment also provides
guidelines for areas where Level 2’s features could be improved to bolster it’s support.
We model the programming paradigm of SCJ Level 2 as described in the SCJ language
specification (v0.100). We view this paradigm as being separate to its realisation in Java.
Therefore, we capture the paradigm, abstracting away from the details of its implementation
in Java. The model specifies the generic behaviour that is shared by all SCJ programs.
Our model is written in the state-rich process algebra Circus, which captures the state and
behaviour of the paradigm. The model also uses elements from other languages in the Circus
family. We use operators from CircusTime to capture delays and budgets, and we use OhCircus
classes to capture non-reactive behaviour.
Finally, we provide a translation strategy that captures the application-specific behaviour
of SCJ Level 2 programs and generates models representing this behaviour. These models
are combined with those of the paradigm to provide a model that captures the behaviour
of the whole program. We provide a formalisation of the core elements of the translation
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strategy, in Z. We have also developed a tool, TightRope to automatically generate models of
SCJ programs.
6.2 Discussion
Our model of the SCJ API is the first to tackle the unique features of SCJ Level 2. It is
built to have close correspondence with the SCJ API, and is based on a previous model of
SCJ Level 1 [93]. However, the complexity of SCJ Level 2’s unique features has meant that
significant re-engineering of the model has been required. Our model also captures elements
of SCJ that are not covered by the Level 1 model.
Our modelling effort has had a positive effect on SCJ, as the modelling process has
illuminated some problems with its specification. Two of our suggestions for improvements
have already been accepted into the language specification. The first is a simplification of
the SCJ termination protocol. We used the model of the API to compare the original and
simplified termination protocol, by translating the models of each from Circus to CSPM . We
found that our proposed simplified protocol had 94.5% fewer states than the original protocol.
The second improvement is the rationalisation of the termination of waiting schedulables.
In older versions of the language specification, waiting schedulables were not automatically
woken and the only support for this was a method called only on each managed thread
during termination of its controlling mission. One of our suggestions to solve this potential
problem was partially adopted: the SCJ API calls the new signalTermination() method
on each schedulable during termination. This provides a uniform way of dealing with all
application-specific termination behaviour, including schedulables that may be waiting.
The framework model, which captures the SCJ API, has been constructed from the SCJ
(natural) Language Specification, because it was the only description of the language that ex-
isted at the beginning of the thesis work. Subsequently, SCJ implementations have emerged,
including a Level 2 implementation [46]. The fact that our model is the first of SCJ Level 2
means that it could be used as the specification for further implementations or models in
other notations.
Our translation strategy has been tested by manually translating 12 example programs,
which are constructed to cover the features of SCJ. They range from simple tests of SCJ’s
features, such as different release patterns or synchronisation and suspension, to more complex
programs that use nested mission sequencers to provide concurrent missions. Further, we
have developed a tool to automatically generate the Circus application models of a given SCJ
application, called TightRope. These techniques produce models of full programs that are
valid, with respect to SCJ Language Specification.
TightRope provides automatic translation of valid SCJ Level 2 programs (that is programs
that compile against an SCJ implementation) into Circus models written using our approach.
The only input required from the user is the location of the SCJ program. The translation
is then performed without the need for program annotations, in contrast to the tool for
translating Level 1 programs [93]. However, the tool requires that each paradigm class is in
a separate file. Further, complex Java statements must be rewritten: chains of method calls
in one statement become several separate method calls, and if a method parameter is a new
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object then the object’s parameters must be literal values. However, this rewriting does not
affect the program’s behaviour and it should be noted that these are restrictions of TightRope,
not of the technique as a whole.
We have translated both the model of the API and the models of full programs to CSPM
for analysis using FDR3. We have animated and model checked the CSPM version of the
models. Animation was used to compare the behaviour of the models to that specified in
the SCJ Language Specification and to running programs. Model checking was used to
prove deadlock and divergence freedom. This technique allows program analysis and gives us
confidence that our model is valid, with respect to the SCJ Language Specification.
Using Circus as the language in which we write our models and CSPM as the language in
which we analyse them provides us with several benefits. Firstly, Circus is a combined notation
so we get the benefits of Z, CSP, and refinement. This is useful, for example, in the ObjectFW
process, which requires complex data operations to control waiting threads. Also, since
Circusis written in LATEXits models are more human-readable than CSPM . Secondly, using
the two different notations decouples the Circus model from the analysis. This is illustrated by
the optimisations made to the CSPM models to allow tractable analysis. These optimisations
were not incorporated into the Circus models, which are concerned with modelling the SCJ
paradigm. It also insulates the Circus models from any changes in FDR3 that require the
CSPM version to change.
The thesis work has shown us that Circus is a useful modelling language that provides
adequate features for capturing the behaviour of programming languages such as SCJ. The
thesis work also shows us that our modelling approach, separating the unchanging from the
application-specific behaviour, is beneficial when capturing programs because it reduces the
burden on translation. Further, we found it useful to have as close a correspondence between
our model and SCJ as possible, as this aids traceability. For example, each of the paradigm
objects in the SCJ API is represented by one process in our model – expect for the mission
sequencer, which we model with two processes because of the two contexts in which mission
sequencers can operate (as described in Sect. 4.2.2).
At a lower level, our modelling efforts show that care can be required when combining
parallel actions that both access the same variables. The Circus parallel operator (introduced
in Sect. 2.4) takes two name sets, each specifying the variables that one of the parallel actions
can update. If two parallel actions need to update the same variable, then a third process is
required to control variable access. An example of this pattern can be seen in the MissionFW
process in Appendix. C.10, where the Methods action runs the RequestTerminationMeth
action in parallel with the TerminationPendingMeth action, and each requires update access
to the missionTerminating variable. To resolve this conflict, we delegate control of the
variable to a third action MissionTerminatingController .
Overall, our work provides benefits for both the safety-critical systems and formal methods
communities. Our analysis of SCJ has illuminated the utility of the unique features provided
by Level 2 and helped to improve features of the language that have an impact on all three
compliance levels. Our formal model of SCJ Level 2 is its first formal semantics, and enables
links to a strategy that can provide refinement from abstract specifications of behaviour to
concrete models of SCJ programs. Our translation, which captures SCJ Level 2 programs,
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validates our model and enables (via a translation to CSP) a technique for checking properties
of SCJ Level 2 programs. The various threads of future work that use our contributions as a
base are discussed in the next section.
6.3 Future Work
The main focus for future work is the translation. First, a full formalisation of the translation
strategy in Z enables verification of the translation. This can be used to show that each func-
tion only produces a valid translation and, therefore, improve confidence in the translation.
Second, improving TightRope by removing the restrictions on the SCJ programs that it can
accept will improve its applicability. Further, TightRope is currently a terminal program, but
it can be incorporated into a plugin for Eclipse. There are other popular development envi-
ronments for Java, but the Icecap tool [46] (which currently provides the only implementation
of SCJ Level 2) is provided as an Eclipse plugin. Such an extension for TightRope can help to
integrate it into the emerging development process for SCJ programs.
As previously mentioned, our model abstracts away from scheduling and resources. This
means that it does not capture SCJ’s scheduling behaviour or region-based memory man-
agement, including the global multiprocessor scheduling that is available at Level 2. These
features could be added to our modelling approach to capture more concrete program infor-
mation, by adding another parallel system to the Program process for each feature. However,
both of these features require alterations to the application model and translation.
SCJ scheduling and global multiprocessor scheduling can be captured by a Scheduling
process that stores the number of processors and the identifiers of the thread executing on
each of these processors. This process should contain actions that record changes in a thread’s
status between running, eligible to run, blocked, or waiting. Our model already captures,
as events, waiting, notification, acquiring and releasing a lock. These events can be used to
synchronise with the Scheduling process to track a thread’s status.
To implement the fixed-priority scheduler, the ThreadFW process must be instantiated
for all threads in the program, not just those engaging in synchronisation and suspension
behaviour, as in our current model. Further, ThreadFW needs to store the thread’s affinity set
(the set of processors on which it can execute), which means that the translation strategy must
capture this information from the program. Control signals must be added to the framework
model to allow the scheduling process to start and stop the threads within the model. The
addition of another process to our model, and adding more channels, will complicate the
model and possibly increase model checking times. However, it would remove the potential
false negatives that our verification technique can generate, due to abstracting away from
SCJ’s scheduling behaviour.
SCJ’s region-based memory management can be captured as a Memory subsystem that
instantiates a MemoryArea process for each memory area in the SCJ program. The Memory
subsystem should implement the abstract specification of the SCJ memory model that is
described in [16]. The MemoryArea process must hold the names of the variables stored in
the memory area, their types, and their values. Additionally, storing the nesting level of the
memory area allows this information to be used for checking SCJ’s memory safety rules. This
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could combine with extending the memory safety checking technique in [58].
In addition to the Memory subsystem, the application model and translation strategy
must capture extra information from an SCJ program about its memory usage. For example,
variable assignments and calls to enterPrivateMemory() must be captured. This enables
the subsystem to replicate the memory behaviour of the SCJ program.
As described in Sect. 4.2, our model captures the potential for an event handler to overrun
its period or deadline. Implementing checks for these potential overruns is left as future
work. In our model a deadline overrun is signalled by a release event with the identifier of a
deadline miss handler, so constructing a CSP check for this event in the model will reveal a
deadline overrun. Period overrun is signalled by a release event occurring between the events
that signal the beginning and end of the event handler’s handleAsyncEvent() method, so
checking for this will reveal a period overrun. It should be noted that this technique only
works if the model terminates. Checks for other behaviours that our model captures but are
undesirable can be constructed in a similar way.
The tool support for verification of SCJ Level 2 programs is lacking. Section 2.5 identi-
fies tools for verification of Worst-Case Execution Time, Worst-Case Memory Consumption,
Memory Safety, Schedulability, and Functional Correctness. A line of future work is the
analysis of these verification tools to see where they fail for SCJ Level 2 programs and then
extending them to cater to Level 2 programs. These extended tools and TightRope can be
combined in a suite of tools that verify a range of properties of SCJ Level 2 programs.
An alternative translation approach to that in Chap. 5 is using meta-models of both
SCJ and Circus to enable the transformation of SCJ programs into Circus models. This has
been achieved for similar target formal languages; for example in [83], which takes two UML
models (a class diagram and a state machine that describe the same system) and transforms
them into a CSP
f
B model. An advantage of this approach is that the meta-models could
be reused for other translations involving SCJ and Circus. For example, [50] provides a meta-
model translation of a Domain Specific Language into a formal model, but it agnostic of the
formal language used. The authors present an example translation into CSP
f
B . The Z
formalisation in Sect. 5.2 could be seen as a meta-model, as it defines and abstract syntax
for both SCJ programs and our Circus model.
Model checking the Circus specifications of SCJ programs is a useful technique for verifying
program properties, for example, deadlock and divergence freedom. Strategies exist for model
checking Circus specifications [61, 6, 91], and these can be incorporated into TightRope to
improve the workflow of model checking SCJ programs.
Our approach to animating and model checking our Circus models has been to translate
them into CSPM and use FDR3. Initially, this translation occasionally resulted in intractable
CSPM models due to the translation of the Z elements of Circus causing state explosion.
Subsequently, the CSPM models have been improved to allow tractable analysis using FDR3.
However, further work is required to improve the scalability of the CSPM model and the
translation from Circus application models. This would allow our verification technique to
cope with models of programs that are more complex.
Another line of future work is to generalise this Circus-to-CSPM translation by providing a
library of Z data structures captured in CSPM in a way that is amenable to analysis in FDR.
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This can provide reusable models of elements of Circus that allow tractable analysis. The
library can be combined with the automatic translation of Circus models to CSPM provided
by [6], which we think can produce CSPM models with the same state explosion problem as
our original translation.
Adding a GUI and incorporating a Circus-to-CSPM translation into T
ightRope would pro-
vide a tool that could automatically translate SCJ Level 2 programs into Circus, translate the
Circus models into CSPM , and then send them directly to FDR3. The API of FDR3 allows
model checking where the results are returned as a JSON string. This can be interpreted by
TightRope to feedback the results of the analysis directly to the GUI.
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Appendix A
Buffer Example Application
This appendix presents the buffer application, described in Sect. 2.1.2. It has one mission
and two managed threads, which communicate using a one-place buffer in the mission in the
familiar Readers-Writers style. This program uses the Object.wait() and Object.notify()
methods, which are only available at SCJ Level 2, to control access to the buffer.
The producer schedulable suspends if the buffer is full; if not, then it writes and notifies the
consumer. The consumer suspends if the buffer is empty; if not, then it removes a value from
the buffer and notifies the producer. Suspension is achieved with a call to Buffer.wait().
Notification is achieved by a call to Buffer.notify(). After reading from the buffer 5 times,
the consumer requests that the mission terminates. When both the managed threads have
terminated, the program terminates.
A.1 BSafeletLauncher
This section presents the safelet launcher for the buffer application, which is the program
entry point in the Icecap SCJ implementation. We present it here for completeness, but since
it is not part of the SCJ API it is not included in out models.
1 public class BSafeletLauncher
2 {
3 public static void main(String [] args)
4 {
5 new LaunchLevel2(new PCSafelet ());
6 }
7 }
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A.2 BSafelet
This section presents the buffer application’s safelet class, which controls the application.
1 public class BSafelet implements Safelet <Mission >
2 {
3 public MissionSequencer <Mission > getSequencer ()
4 {
5 StorageParameters storageParameters = new StorageParameters(
6 Const.OVERALL_BACKING_STORE_DEFAULT - 2000000 ,
7 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT , 10000 * 2, Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT);
8
9 return new MainMissionSequencer(new PriorityParameters (5), storageParameters);
10 }
11
12 @Override
13 public void initializeApplication () {}
14
15 @Override
16 public long immortalMemorySize ()
17 {
18 return Const.IMMORTAL_MEM_DEFAULT;
19 }
20
21 public Level getLevel ()
22 {
23 return Level.LEVEL_2;
24 }
25 }
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A.3 MainMissionSequencer
This section presents the top-level mission sequencer of the aircraft application, which loads
the main mission.
1 public class MainMissionSequencer extends MissionSequencer <Mission >
2 {
3 private boolean returnedMission;
4
5 public MainMissionSequencer(PriorityParameters priorityParameters ,
6 StorageParameters storageParameters)
7 {
8 super(priorityParameters , storageParameters , null);
9 returnedMission = false;
10 }
11
12 protected Mission getNextMission ()
13 {
14 if (! returnedMission)
15 {
16 returnedMission = true;
17 return new MainMission ();
18 }
19 else
20 {
21 return null;
22 }
23 }
24 }
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A.4 MainMission
This section presents the main mission of the buffer application, which holds the buffer object
and registers two schedulables.
1 public class MainMission extends Mission
2 {
3 private final Buffer buffer;
4
5 public MainMission ()
6 {
7 Services.setCeiling(this , 20);
8 buffer = new Buffer ();
9 }
10
11 protected void initialize ()
12 {
13 StorageParameters storageParameters = new StorageParameters (150 * 1000,
14 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT , Const.IMMORTAL_MEM_DEFAULT ,
15 Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT - 100 * 1000);
16
17 new Producer(new PriorityParameters (10), storageParameters , this).register ();
18 new Consumer(new PriorityParameters (10), storageParameters , this).register ();
19 }
20
21 public Buffer getBuffer ()
22 {
23 return buffer;
24 }
25
26 public boolean cleanUp ()
27 {
28 return false;
29 }
30
31 public long missionMemorySize ()
32 {
33 return 1048576;
34 }
35 }
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A.5 Buffer
This section presents the Buffer class, which controls access to a one-place buffer using
suspension.
1 public class Buffer
2 {
3 private volatile int theBuffer;
4
5 public Buffer ()
6 {
7 theBuffer = 0;
8 Services.setCeiling(this , 20);
9 }
10
11 public boolean bufferEmpty(String name)
12 {
13 return theBuffer == 0;
14 }
15
16 public synchronized void write(int update) throws InterruptedException
17 {
18 while (! bufferEmpty("Producer"))
19 {
20 this.wait();
21 }
22
23 theBuffer = update;
24 this.notify ();
25 }
26
27 public synchronized int read() throws InterruptedException
28 {
29 while (bufferEmpty("Consumer"))
30 {
31 this.wait();
32 }
33
34 int out = theBuffer;
35 theBuffer = 0;
36 this.notify ();
37
38 return out;
39 }
40 }
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A.6 Producer
This section presents the Producer managed thread, which writes data to the shared buffer.
1 public class Producer extends ManagedThread
2 {
3 private final MainMission mainMission;
4 private final Buffer buffer;
5
6 public Producer(PriorityParameters priority , StorageParameters storage ,
7 MainMission mainMission)
8 {
9 super(priority , storage , null);
10
11 this.mainMission = mainMission;
12 buffer = mainMission.getBuffer ();
13 }
14
15 public void run()
16 {
17 int i = 1;
18
19 while (! mainMission.terminationPending ())
20 {
21 try
22 {
23 buffer.write(i);
24 }
25 catch (InterruptedException e)
26 {
27 e.printStackTrace ();
28 }
29
30 i++;
31
32 if ( i >= 5)
33 {
34 pcMission.requestTermination ();
35 }
36 }
37 }
38 }
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A.7 Consumer
This section presents the Consumer managed thread, which reads data from the shared buffer.
1 public class Consumer extends ManagedThread
2 {
3 private final MainMission mainMission;
4 private final Buffer buffer;
5
6 public Consumer(PriorityParameters priority , StorageParameters storage ,
7 MainMission mainMission)
8 {
9 super(priority , storage , null);
10
11 this.mainMission = mainMission;
12 buffer = mainMission.getBuffer ();
13 }
14
15 public void run()
16 {
17 while (! mainMission.terminationPending ())
18 {
19 int result = 999;
20 try
21 {
22 result = buffer.read();
23 }
24 catch (InterruptedException e)
25 {
26 e.printStackTrace ();
27 }
28 }
29 }
30 }
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Appendix B
Aircraft Example Application
This appendix presents the aircraft example application, described in Sect. 2.1.3, which con-
trols a simplified aircraft. It has several persistent schedulable objects, which represent things
about the aircraft that always need monitoring or handling; and three missions: TakeOff,
Cruise, and Land, that represent the aircraft’s phases of flight. These mission representing
modes of operation are controlled by the mode changer, which is a mission sequencer. As this
is an abstract example application these persistent handlers simplify what in reality would be
more complex systems. Each of these schedulable objects could be implemented as multiple
schedulable objects, possibly in their own nested mission – for structuring purposes.
Upon termination of the Land mission, or in the event of a failure causing the termination
of the TakeOff mission, the application terminates. As this is an abstract example any
remedial actions taken in the event of failures or any cleanup actions at the end of a successful
landing are omitted.
B.1 ACSafeletLauncher
This section presents the safelet launcher for the aircraft application, which is the program
entry point in the Icecap SCJ implementation. We present it here for completeness, but since
it is not part of the SCJ API it is not included in out models.
1 public class ACSafeletLauncher
2 {
3 public static void main(String [] args)
4 {
5 ACSafelet GERTI = new ACSafelet ();
6 new LaunchLevel2(GERTI);
7 }
8 }
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B.2 ACSafelet
This section presents the safelet that controls the aircraft application.
1 public class ACSafelet implements Safelet <Mission >
2 {
3 @Override
4 public MissionSequencer <Mission > getSequencer ()
5 {
6 StorageParameters storageParameters = new StorageParameters (150 * 1000,
7 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT - 25 * 1000,
8 Const.IMMORTAL_MEM_DEFAULT - 50 * 1000,
9 Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT - 100 * 1000);
10
11 return new MainMissionSequencer(new PriorityParameters (5),
12 storageParameters);
13 }
14
15 @Override
16 public void initializeApplication () {}
17
18 @Override
19 public long immortalMemorySize ()
20 {
21 return Const.IMMORTAL_MEM_DEFAULT;
22 }
23 }
B.3 MainMissionSequencer
This section presents the aircraft top-level mission sequencer, which loads the main mission.
1 public class MainMissionSequencer extends MissionSequencer <Mission >
2 {
3 private boolean returnedMission;
4
5 public MainMissionSequencer(PriorityParameters priority ,
6 StorageParameters storage)
7 {
8 super(priority , storage , null);
9 returnedMission = false;
10 }
11
12 @Override
13 protected Mission getNextMission ()
14 {
15 if (! returnedMission)
16 {
17 returnedMission = true;
18 return new MainMission ();
19 } else
20 {
21 return null;
22 }
23 }
24 }
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B.4 MainMission
This section presents the MainMission class, which registers the aircraft’s four persistent
schedulables and the nested mission sequencer that controls the three modes that the aircraft’s
software can be in.
1 public class MainMission extends Mission
2 {
3 private double cabinPressure;
4 private double emergencyOxygen;
5 private double fuelRemaining;
6
7 private double altitude;
8 private double airSpeed;
9 private double heading;
10
11 @Override
12 protected void initialize ()
13 {
14 StorageParameters storageParameters = new StorageParameters (150 * 1000,
15 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT - 25 * 1000,
16 Const.IMMORTAL_MEM_DEFAULT - 50 * 1000,
17 Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT - 100 * 1000);
18
19 StorageParameters storageParametersSchedulable = new StorageParameters(
20 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT - 30 * 1000,
21 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT - 30 * 1000,
22 Const.IMMORTAL_MEM_DEFAULT - 50 * 1000,
23 Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT - 100 * 1000);
24
25 ACModeChanger2 aCModeChanger = new ACModeChanger2(new PriorityParameters(
26 5), storageParameters , this);
27
28 aCModeChanger.register ();
29
30 EnvironmentMonitor environmentMonitor = new EnvironmentMonitor(
31 new PriorityParameters (5), new PeriodicParameters(
32 new RelativeTime (10, 0), null),
33 storageParametersSchedulable , "Environment Monitor", this);
34
35 environmentMonitor.register ();
36
37 ControlHandler controlHandler = new ControlHandler(
38 new PriorityParameters (5), new AperiodicParameters(new RelativeTime (10, 0),
null),
39 storageParametersSchedulable , "Control Handler");
40
41 controlHandler.register ();
42
43 FlightSensorsMonitor flightSensMon = new FlightSensorsMonitor(
44 new PriorityParameters (5), new PeriodicParameters(
45 new RelativeTime (10, 0), null),
46 storageParametersSchedulable , "Flight Sensors Monitor", this);
47
48 flightSensMon.register ();
49
50 CommunicationsHandler commsHandler = new CommunicationsHandler(
51 new PriorityParameters (5), new AperiodicParameters (),
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52 storageParametersSchedulable , "Communications Handler");
53
54 commsHandler.register ();
55
56 }
57
58 @Override
59 public long missionMemorySize ()
60 {
61 return Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT;
62 }
63
64 public double getAirSpeed ()
65 {
66 return airSpeed;
67 }
68
69 public double getAltitude ()
70 {
71 return altitude;
72 }
73
74 public double getCabinPressure ()
75 {
76 return cabinPressure;
77 }
78
79 public double getEmergencyOxygen ()
80 {
81 return emergencyOxygen;
82 }
83
84 public double getFuelRemaining ()
85 {
86 return fuelRemaining;
87 }
88
89 public double getHeading ()
90 {
91 return heading;
92 }
93
94 public void setAirSpeed(double newAirSpeed)
95 {
96 this.airSpeed = newAirSpeed;
97 }
98
99 public void setAltitude(double newAltitude)
100 {
101 this.altitude = newAltitude;
102 }
103
104 public void setCabinPressure(double newCabinPressure)
105 {
106 this.cabinPressure = newCabinPressure;
107 }
108
109 public void setEmergencyOxygen(double newEmergencyOxygen)
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110 {
111 this.emergencyOxygen = newEmergencyOxygen;
112 }
113
114 public void setFuelRemaining(double newFuelRemaining)
115 {
116 this.fuelRemaining = newFuelRemaining;
117 }
118
119 public void setHeading(double newHeading)
120 {
121 this.heading = newHeading;
122 }
123 }
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B.5 ControlHandler
This section present the ControlHandler, a persistent schedulable that handles the aircraft’s
controls.
1 public class ControlHandler extends AperiodicEventHandler
2 {
3 public ControlHandler(PriorityParameters priority ,
4 AperiodicParameters release , StorageParameters storage , String name)
5 {
6 super(priority , release , storage , null);
7 }
8
9 @Override
10 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
11 {
12 // Handle Control Signals
13 }
14 }
B.6 FlightSensorsMonitor
This section present the FlightSensorsMonitor, a persistent schedulable that monitors the
aircraft’s flight sensors.
1 public class FlightSensorsMonitor extends PeriodicEventHandler
2 {
3 private MainMission controllingMission;
4
5 public FlightSensorsMonitor(PriorityParameters priority ,
6 PeriodicParameters periodic , StorageParameters storage ,
7 String name , MainMission controllingMission)
8 {
9 super(priority , periodic , storage , null);
10 this.controllingMission = controllingMission;
11 }
12
13 @Override
14 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
15 {
16 // read air speed
17 controllingMission.setAirSpeed (0);
18 // read altitude
19 controllingMission.setAltitude (0);
20 // read heading
21 controllingMission.setHeading (0);
22 }
23 }
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B.7 EnvironmentMonitor
This section present the EnvironmentMonitor, a persistent schedulable that monitors the
aircraft’s environment.
1 public class EnvironmentMonitor extends PeriodicEventHandler
2 {
3 private MainMission controllingMission;
4
5 public EnvironmentMonitor(PriorityParameters priority ,
6 PeriodicParameters periodic ,
7 StorageParameters storage ,
8 String name ,
9 MainMission controllingMission)
10 {
11 super(priority , periodic , storage , null);
12 this.controllingMission = controllingMission;
13 }
14
15 @Override
16 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
17 {
18 // read cabin pressure from sensors
19 controllingMission.setCabinPressure (0);
20
21 // read emergency Oxygen Levels
22 controllingMission.setEmergencyOxygen (0);
23
24 // read remaining fuel
25 controllingMission.setFuelRemaining (0);
26 }
27 }
B.8 CommunicationsHandler
This section present the CommunicationsHandler, a persistent schedulable that monitors the
aircraft’s communication systems.
1 public class CommunicationsHandler extends AperiodicEventHandler
2 {
3 public CommunicationsHandler(PriorityParameters priority ,
4 AperiodicParameters release , StorageParameters storage , String name)
5 {
6 super(priority , release , storage , null);
7 }
8
9 @Override
10 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
11 {
12 // Handle Communication Signal
13 }
14 }
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B.9 ACModeChanger
This section presents the nested mission sequencer that controls the three modes of the
aircraft system: taking off, cruising, and landing. Each mode is represented by a mission
that is loaded by this mission sequencer.
1 public class ACModeChanger extends MissionSequencer <Mission >
2 {
3 private MainMission controllingMission;
4
5 public ACModeChanger(PriorityParameters priority ,
6 StorageParameters storage , MainMission controllingMission)
7 {
8 super(priority , storage , null);
9 this.controllingMission = controllingMission;
10 }
11
12 private int modesLeft = 3;
13
14 public ACModeChanger(PriorityParameters priority , StorageParameters storage)
15 {
16 super(priority , storage , null);
17 }
18
19 @Override
20 protected Mission getNextMission ()
21 {
22 if (modesLeft == 3)
23 {
24 modesLeft --;
25 return new TakeOffMission(controllingMission);
26 } else if (modesLeft == 2)
27 {
28 modesLeft --;
29 return new CruiseMission(controllingMission);
30 } else if (modesLeft == 1)
31 {
32 modesLeft --;
33 return new LandMission(controllingMission);
34 } else
35 {
36 return null;
37 }
38 }
39 }
B.10 TakeOffMission
This section presents the TakeOffMission, which registers the schedulables that are specific
to the take off mode. It implements the LandingGearUser interface because it uses the
landing gear.
1 public class TakeOffMission extends Mission
2 {
3 private final double SAFE_AIRSPEED_THRESHOLD = 10.00;
4 private final double TAKEOFF_ALTITUDE = 10.00;
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5 private MainMission controllingMission;
6 private boolean abort = false;
7 private boolean landingGearDeployed;
8
9 public TakeOffMission(MainMission controllingMission)
10 {
11 this.controllingMission = controllingMission;
12 }
13
14 @Override
15 protected void initialize ()
16 {
17 StorageParameters storageParametersSchedulable = new StorageParameters(
18 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT - 30 * 1000,
19 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT - 30 * 1000,
20 Const.IMMORTAL_MEM_DEFAULT - 50 * 1000,
21 Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT - 100 * 1000);
22
23 LandingGearHandler landingGearHandler = new LandingGearHandler(
24 new PriorityParameters (5), new AperiodicParameters (),
25 storageParametersSchedulable , "Landing Gear Handler", this);
26
27 landingGearHandler.register ();
28
29 TakeOffMonitor takeOffMonitor = new TakeOffMonitor(
30 new PriorityParameters (5), new PeriodicParameters(
31 new RelativeTime (0, 0), new RelativeTime (500, 0)),
32 storageParametersSchedulable , controllingMission , this , TAKEOFF_ALTITUDE ,
33 landingGearHandler);
34
35 takeOffMonitor.register ();
36
37 TakeOffFailureHandler takeOffFailureHandler = new TakeOffFailureHandler(
38 new PriorityParameters (5), new AperiodicParameters (),
39 storageParametersSchedulable , "Take Off Handler", controllingMission , this ,
40 SAFE_AIRSPEED_THRESHOLD);
41
42 takeOffFailureHandler.register ();
43 }
44
45 @Override
46 public long missionMemorySize ()
47 {
48 return Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT;
49 }
50
51 @Override
52 public boolean cleanUp ()
53 {
54 return !abort;
55 }
56
57 public void takeOffAbort ()
58 {
59 abort = true;
60 }
61
62 public void deployLandingGear ()
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63 {
64 landingGearDeployed = true;
65 }
66
67 public void stowLandingGear ()
68 {
69 landingGearDeployed = false;
70 }
71
72 public boolean isLandingGearDeployed ()
73 {
74 return landingGearDeployed;
75 }
76 }
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B.11 LandingGearHandlerTakeOff
This section presents the LandingGearHandlerTakeOff, which stows the aircraft’s landing
gear when it reaches a certain altitude.
1 public class LandingGearHandlerTakeOff extends AperiodicEventHandler
2 {
3 private final TakeOffMission mission;
4
5 public LandingGearHandler(PriorityParameters priority ,
6 AperiodicParameters release , StorageParameters storage ,
7 String name , TakeOffMission mission)
8 {
9 super(priority , release , storage , null);
10 this.mission = mission;
11 }
12
13 @Override
14 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
15 {
16 boolean landingGearIsDeployed = mission.isLandingGearDeployed ();
17
18 if (landingGearIsDeployed)
19 {
20 mission.stowLandingGear ();
21 } else
22 {
23 mission.deployLandingGear ();
24 }
25 }
26 }
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B.12 TakeOffMonitor
This section presents the TakeOffMonitor, which monitors the aircraft’s altitude during take
off and triggers the termination of the TakeOffMission when a certain altitude is reached.
1 public class TakeOffMonitor extends PeriodicEventHandler
2 {
3 private final MainMission mainMission ;
4 private final TakeOffMission takeOffMission;
5 private double takeOffAltitude;
6 private AperiodicEventHandler landingGearHandler;
7
8 public TakeOffMonitor(PriorityParameters priority ,
9 PeriodicParameters periodic , StorageParameters storage ,
10 MainMission mainMission , TakeOffMission takeOffMission , double takeOffAltitude ,
11 AperiodicEventHandler landingGearHandler)
12 {
13 super(priority , periodic , storage , null);
14 this.mainMission = mainMission;
15 this.takeOffMission = takeOffMission;
16 this.takeOffAltitude = takeOffAltitude;
17 this.landingGearHandler = landingGearHandler;
18
19 }
20
21 @Override
22 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
23 {
24 double altitude = mainMission.getAltitude ();
25
26 if (altitude > takeOffAltitude)
27 {
28 landingGearHandler.release ();
29 takeOffMission.requestTermination ();
30 }
31 }
32 }
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B.13 TakeOffFailureHandler
This section presents the TakeOffFailureHandler, which aborts the take off and terminates
the main mission (and, therefore, the application) if the correct take off speed is not reached
when the handler is released.
1 public class TakeOffFailureHandler extends AperiodicEventHandler
2 {
3 private final MainMission mainMission;
4 private final TakeOffMission takeoffMission;
5 private double threshold;
6
7 public TakeOffFailureHandler(PriorityParameters priority ,
8 AperiodicParameters release , StorageParameters storage ,
9 String name , MainMission mainMission , TakeOffMission takeoffMission , Double
threshold)
10 {
11 super(priority , release , storage , null);
12 this.takeoffMission = takeoffMission;
13 this.mainMission = mainMission;
14 this.threshold = threshold;
15 }
16
17 @Override
18 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
19 {
20 double currentSpeed = mainMission.getAirSpeed ();
21
22 if (currentSpeed < threshold)
23 {
24 // Failure Abort
25 takeoffMission.takeOffAbort ();
26 takeoffMission.requestTermination ();
27 } else
28 {
29 // Failure: Continue and Land
30 }
31 }
32
33 }
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B.14 CruiseMission
This section presents CruiseMission, which registers the schedulables that are specific to
the cruise mode.
1 public class CruiseMission extends Mission
2 {
3 private final MainMission controllingMission;
4
5 public CruiseMission(MainMission controllingMission)
6 {
7 this.controllingMission = controllingMission;
8 }
9
10 @Override
11 protected void initialize ()
12 {
13 StorageParameters storageParametersSchedulable = new StorageParameters(
14 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT - 30 * 1000,
15 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT - 30 * 1000,
16 Const.IMMORTAL_MEM_DEFAULT - 50 * 1000,
17 Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT - 100 * 1000);
18
19 BeginLandingHandler beginLandingHandler = new BeginLandingHandler(
20 new PriorityParameters (5), new AperiodicParameters (),
21 storageParametersSchedulable , "Begin Landing Handler", controllingMission);
22 beginLandingHandler.register ();
23
24 int maxP = PriorityScheduler.instance ().getMaxPriority ();
25
26 NavigationMonitor navigationMonitor = new NavigationMonitor(
27 new PriorityParameters (5), new PeriodicParameters(
28 new RelativeTime (0, 0), new RelativeTime (10, 0)),
29 storageParametersSchedulable , "Cruise Controller", controllingMission);
30 navigationMonitor.register ();
31 }
32
33 @Override
34 public long missionMemorySize ()
35 {
36 return Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT;
37 }
38 }
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B.15 BeginLandingHandler
This section presents the BeginLandingHandler, which triggers the termination of the mis-
sion CruiseMission, so that the landing mode can begin.
1 public class BeginLandingHandler extends AperiodicEventHandler
2 {
3 private Mission controllingMission;
4
5 public BeginLandingHandler(PriorityParameters priority ,
6 AperiodicParameters release , StorageParameters storage ,
7 String name , Mission controllingMission)
8 {
9 super(priority , release , storage , null);
10 this.controllingMission = controllingMission;
11 }
12
13 @Override
14 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
15 {
16 controllingMission.requestTermination ();
17 }
18 }
B.16 NavigationMonitor
This section presents the NavigationMonitor, which provides the navigation services re-
quired during normal flight.
1 public class NavigationMonitor extends PeriodicEventHandler
2 {
3 private final MainMission mainMission;
4
5 public NavigationMonitor(PriorityParameters priority ,
6 PeriodicParameters periodic , StorageParameters storage ,
7 String name , MainMission mainMission)
8 {
9 super(priority , periodic , storage , null);
10 this.mainMission = mainMission;
11 }
12
13 @Override
14 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
15 {
16 // Read and check these variables
17 double heading = mainMission.getHeading ();
18 double airSpeed = mainMission.getAirSpeed ();
19 double altitude = mainMission.getAltitude ();
20
21 // Check the variables again expected values
22 }
23 }
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B.17 LandMission
This section presents the LandMission, which registers the schedulables that are specific to
the land mode. It implements the LandingGearUser interface because it uses the landing
gear.
1 public class LandMission extends Mission
2 {
3 private final MainMission controllingMission;
4
5 final double SAFE_LANDING_ALTITUDE = 10.00;
6 final double ALTITUDE_READING_ON_GROUND = 0.0;
7
8 private boolean abort = false;
9
10 public LandMission(MainMission controllingMission)
11 {
12 this.controllingMission = controllingMission;
13 }
14
15 private boolean landingGearDeployed;
16
17 @Override
18 protected void initialize ()
19 {
20
21 StorageParameters storageParametersSchedulable = new StorageParameters(
22 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT - 30 * 1000,
23 Const.PRIVATE_MEM_DEFAULT - 30 * 1000,
24 Const.IMMORTAL_MEM_DEFAULT - 50 * 1000,
25 Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT - 100 * 1000);
26
27 GroundDistanceMonitor groundDistanceMonitor = new GroundDistanceMonitor(
28 new PriorityParameters (5), new PeriodicParameters(
29 new RelativeTime (0, 0), new RelativeTime (10, 0)),
30 storageParametersSchedulable , controllingMission , ALTITUDE_READING_ON_GROUND);
31 groundDistanceMonitor.register ();
32
33 LandingGearHandlerLand landingHandler = new LandingGearHandlerLand(
34 new PriorityParameters (5), new AperiodicParameters (),
35 storageParametersSchedulable , "Landing Handler", this);
36
37 landingHandler.register ();
38
39 InstrumentLandingSystemMonitor ilsMonitor = new InstrumentLandingSystemMonitor(
40 new PriorityParameters (5), new PeriodicParameters(
41 new RelativeTime (0, 0), new RelativeTime (10, 0)),
42 storageParametersSchedulable , "ILS Monitor", this);
43 ilsMonitor.register ();
44
45 SafeLandingHandler safeLandingHandler = new SafeLandingHandler(
46 new PriorityParameters (5), new AperiodicParameters (),
47 storageParametersSchedulable , "Safe Landing Handler", controllingMission ,
48 SAFE_LANDING_ALTITUDE);
49
50 safeLandingHandler.register ();
51 }
52
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53 @Override
54 public long missionMemorySize ()
55 {
56 return Const.MISSION_MEM_DEFAULT;
57 }
58
59 public void deployLandingGear ()
60 {
61 landingGearDeployed = true;
62 }
63
64 public void stowLandingGear ()
65 {
66 landingGearDeployed = false;
67 }
68
69 public boolean isLandingGearDeployed ()
70 {
71 return landingGearDeployed;
72 }
73
74 @Override
75 public boolean cleanUp ()
76 {
77 return false;
78 }
79 }
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B.18 GroundDistanceMonitor
This section presents the GroundDistanceMonitor, which monitors the aircraft’s distance
from the ground and terminates the MainMission when the aircraft has landed.
1 public class GroundDistanceMonitor extends PeriodicEventHandler
2 {
3 private final MainMission mainMission;
4 private final double readingOnGround;
5
6 public GroundDistanceMonitor(PriorityParameters priority ,
7 PeriodicParameters periodic , StorageParameters storage ,
8 MainMission mainMission , double readingOnGround)
9 {
10 super(priority , periodic , storage , null);
11
12 this.mainMission = mainMission;
13 this.readingOnGround = readingOnGround;
14 }
15
16 @Override
17 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
18 {
19 // Read this value from sensors
20 double distance = mainMission.getAltitude ();
21
22 if (distance == readingOnGround)
23 {
24 mainMission.requestTermination ();
25 }
26 }
27 }
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B.19 LandingGearHandlerLand
This section presents the LandingGearHandlerLand, which deploys the aircraft’s landing gear
at a certain altitude.
1 public class LandingGearHandlerLand extends AperiodicEventHandler
2 {
3 private final LandMission mission;
4
5 public LandingGearHandlerLand(PriorityParameters priority ,
6 AperiodicParameters release , StorageParameters storage ,
7 String name , LandMission mission)
8 {
9 super(priority , release , storage , null);
10 this.mission = mission;
11 }
12
13 @Override
14 public void handleAsyncEvent ()
15 {
16 boolean landingGearIsDeployed = mission.isLandingGearDeployed ();
17
18 if (landingGearIsDeployed)
19 {
20 mission.stowLandingGear ();
21 } else
22 {
23 mission.deployLandingGear ();
24 }
25 }
26 }
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Appendix C
Framework Model
This appendix presents our entire model of the SCJ API (the framework model) written in
Circus. It captures the unchanging behaviour of SCJ Level 2 programs.
C.1 GlobalTypes
section GlobalTypes parents scj prelude,SchedulableId
[ThreadID ]
[ObjectID ]
[NonParadigmID ]
[totalThreads]
SafeletTId : ThreadID
nullThreadId : ThreadID
ThreadMap == ThreadID 7→ N1
ExceptionType ::= interruptedException | illegalMonitorStateException |
illegalArgumentException | illegalThreadStateException |
illegalStateException | ceilingViolationException
maxNanos == 999999
AperiodicType ::= aperiodic | aperiodicLong
R : PA
Z ⊂ R
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C.2 Priority
section Priority parents scj prelude
MinPriority : N1
MaxPriority : N1
MaxPriority −MinPriority ≥ 2
PriorityLevel == MinPriority . . MaxPriority
C.3 Priority Queue
section PriorityQueue parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes,Priority
PriorityQueue == PriorityLevel → (iseq ThreadID)
∀ pq : PriorityQueue • nullThreadId 6∈ ran(⋃(ran pq))
IsEmpty : PriorityQueue→ B
∀ pq : PriorityQueue | (⋃(pq L PriorityLevel M)) = ∅ •
IsEmpty(pq) = True
AddToPriorityQueue : PriorityQueue × ThreadID × PriorityLevel → PriorityQueue
∀ pq : PriorityQueue; t : ThreadID ; p : PriorityLevel |
t 6= nullThreadId ∧
t 6∈ ran(⋃(ran(pq))) •
AddToPriorityQueue(pq , t , p) = (pq ⊕ {p 7→ pq(p)a 〈t〉})
RemoveFromPriorityQueue : PriorityQueue 7→ PriorityQueue × ThreadID
(∀ pq : PriorityQueue •
(∃ t : ThreadID ; p : PriorityLevel |
p = max {pl : PriorityLevel | pq(pl) 6= 〈〉} ∧
t = head pq(p)
• RemoveFromPriorityQueue(pq) = (pq ⊕ {p 7→ tail pq(p)}, t)))
RemoveThreadFromPriorityQueue : PriorityQueue × ThreadID × PriorityLevel
→PriorityQueue
∀ pq : PriorityQueue; t : ThreadID ; p : PriorityLevel |
pq(p)  {t} 6= 〈〉 •
RemoveThreadFromPriorityQueue(pq , t , p) = pq ⊕ {p 7→ squash (pq(p)−B {t})}
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ElementsOf : PriorityQueue→ PThreadID
∀ pq : PriorityQueue | pq 6= ∅ •
(∃ elems : PThreadID |
elems =
⋃
(ran L ran pq M)
• ElementsOf (pq) = elems)
C.4 Ids
C.4.1 MissionId
section MissionId
[MissionID ]
nullMissionId : MissionID
C.4.2 SchedulableId
section SchedulableId
[SchedulableID ]
TopLevelSequencerId : SchedulableID
nullSequencerId : SchedulableID
nullSchedulableId : SchedulableID
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C.5 Channels
C.5.1 FrameworkChan
section FrameworkChan parents GlobalTypes
channel throw : ExceptionType
channel done toplevel sequencer
C.5.2 ServicesChan
section ServicesChan parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes,MissionId ,Priority ,PriorityQueue
channel setCeilingPriority : MissionID ×ObjectID × PriorityLevel
C.5.3 ObjectChan
section ObjectChan parents ObjectFWChan,ObjectMethChan,ServicesChan
channelset MonitorSync == {| fully unlock , relock , relock this |}
channelset MLCSync == {| relock this, lock request , lockAcquired , get lockedBy ,
reset lockedBy , fully unlock |}
channelset CPCSync == {| setCeilingPriority , get ceilingPriority |}
channelset WaitSync == {| cancel wait timer ,waitRet ,waitForObjectRet |}
channelset WQSync == {| add to wait , remove from wait , remove most eligible from wait |}
channelset InterruptSync == {| remove from wait , get waitQueue |}
C.5.4 ObjectFWChan
section ObjectFWChan parents GlobalTypes,Priority ,PriorityQueue, JTime
WaitType ::= wait | waitForObject
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channel unlock Monitor : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel relock : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel relock this : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel startSyncMeth : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel lockAcquired : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel endSyncMeth : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel cancel wait timer : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel start timer : ObjectID × ThreadID × PriorityLevel × JTime
channel lock request : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel assignLock : ObjectID
channel add to wait : ObjectID × ThreadID × PriorityLevel ×WaitType
channel remove from wait : ObjectID × ThreadID × PriorityLevel
channel remove most eligible from wait : ObjectID
channel removed thread : ObjectID × ThreadID ×WaitType
channel get lockedBy : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel get waitQueue : ObjectID × PriorityQueue
channel reset lockedBy : ObjectID
channel fully unlock : ObjectID
channel increment locks : ObjectID
channel decrement locks : ObjectID × Z
channel get ceilingPriority : ObjectID × PriorityLevel
channel start waitForObject timer : ObjectID × ThreadID × PriorityLevel × JTime
channel get waitForObjectThreads : ObjectID × PThreadID
C.5.5 ObjectMethChan
section ObjectMethChan parents GlobalTypes,Priority , JTime
channel waitCall : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel timedWaitCall : ObjectID × ThreadID × JTime
channel waitRet : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel waitForObjectCall : ObjectID × ThreadID × JTime
channel waitForObjectRet : ObjectID × ThreadID × B
channel notify : ObjectID × ThreadID
channel notifyAll : ObjectID × ThreadID
C.5.6 ThreadChan
section ThreadChan parents ThreadFWChan,ThreadMethChan
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C.5.7 ThreadFWChan
section ThreadFWChan parents GlobalTypes,Priority
channel get priorityLevel : ThreadID ×ObjectID × PriorityLevel
channel raise thread priority : ThreadID × PriorityLevel
channel lower thread priority : ThreadID
channel set interrupted : ThreadID × B
channel get interrupted : ThreadID × B
C.5.8 ThreadMethChan
section ThreadMethChan parents GlobalTypes
channel interrupt : ThreadID
channel isInterruptedCall : ThreadID
channel isInterruptedRet : ThreadID × B
channel interruptedCall : ThreadID
channel interruptedRet : ThreadID × B
C.5.9 SafeletChan
section SafeletChan parents SafeletFWChan,SafeletMethChan
channelset SafeletAppSync == {| getSequencerCall ,
getSequencerRet , initializeApplicationCall , initializeApplicationRet ,
end safelet app |}
C.5.10 SafeletFWChan
section SafeletFWChan parents scj prelude
channel end safelet app
channel done safeletFW
C.5.11 SafeletMethChan
section SafeletMethChan parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,MissionId
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channel initializeApplicationCall
channel initializeApplicationRet
channel getSequencerCall
channel getSequencerRet : SchedulableID
channel checkSchedulable : MissionID × B
channel deregister : FSchedulableID
C.5.12 MissionSequencerChan
section MissionSequencerChan parents scj prelude,
MissionId ,SchedulableId ,MissionSequencerMethChan,
MissionSequencerFWChan
channelset MissionSequencerAppSync == {| getNextMissionCall , getNextMissionRet ,
end sequencer app |}
C.5.13 MissionSequencerFWChan
section MissionSequencerFWChan parents scj prelude,MissionId ,SchedulableId
channel get continue : SchedulableID × B
channel end sequencer app : SchedulableID
channel end methods : SchedulableID
channel end terminations : SchedulableID
C.5.14 MissionSequencerMethChan
section MissionSequencerMethChan parents scj prelude,MissionId ,SchedulableId
channel getNextMissionCall : SchedulableID
channel getNextMissionRet : (SchedulableID ×MissionID)
channel requestSequenceTermination : (SchedulableID × B)
channel sequenceTerminationPendingCall : SchedulableID
channel sequenceTerminationPendingRet : (SchedulableID × B)
C.5.15 TopLevelMissionSequencerChan
section TopLevelMissionSequencerChan parents TopLevelMissionSequencerFWChan,
MissionSequencerChan
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C.5.16 TopLevelMissionSequencerFWChan
section TopLevelMissionSequencerFWChan parents scj prelude,MissionSequencerFWChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds
channel start toplevel sequencer : SchedulableID
channel set continue : SchedulableID × B
channelset CCSync == {| get continue, set continue |}
channelset TopLevelMissionSequencerFWChan ==
{| start toplevel sequencer , end sequencer app, end methods,
get continue, set continue |}
C.5.17 MissionChan
section MissionChan parents MissionFWChan,MissionMethChan,SchedulableMethChan
channelset MissionAppSync == {| initializeCall , initializeRet , register ,
cleanupMissionCall , cleanupMissionRet , end mission app |}
C.5.18 MissionFWChan
section MissionFWChan parents scj prelude,MissionId ,SchedulableId
channel start mission : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel done mission : MissionID × B
channel done schedulables : MissionID
channel stop schedulables : MissionID
channel get activeSchedulables : MissionID × (FSchedulableID)
channel schedulables stopped : MissionID
channel schedulables terminated : MissionID
channel end mission terminations : MissionID
channel end mission fw : MissionID
channel end mission app : MissionID
channel get missionTerminating : MissionID × B
channel set missionTerminating : MissionID × B
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channelset TerminateSync == {| schedulables terminated ,
schedulables stopped , get activeSchedulables |}
channelset MTCSync == {| get missionTerminating ,
set missionTerminating , end mission terminations |}
C.5.19 MissionMethChan
section MissionMethChan parents scj prelude,MissionId ,SchedulableId
channel initializeCall : MissionID
channel initializeRet : MissionID
channel cleanupMissionCall : MissionID
channel cleanupMissionRet : MissionID × B
channel requestTerminationCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel requestTerminationRet : MissionID × SchedulableID × B
channel terminationPendingCall : MissionID
channel terminationPendingRet : MissionID × B
channel missionactive : MissionID × B
channelset MissionMethChan ==
{| initializeCall , initializeRet , cleanupMissionCall , cleanupMissionRet ,
requestTerminationCall , requestTerminationRet ,
terminationPendingCall , terminationPendingRet |}
C.5.20 SchedulableChan
section SchedulableChan parents MissionId ,SchedulableId ,
SchedulableFWChan,SchedulableMethChan
C.5.21 SchedulableMethChan
section SchedulableMethChan parents MissionId ,SchedulableId
channel register : SchedulableID ×MissionID
channel signalTerminationCall : SchedulableID
channel signalTerminationRet : SchedulableID
channel cleanupSchedulableCall : SchedulableID
channel cleanupSchedulableRet : SchedulableID
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C.5.22 SchedulableFWChan
section SchedulableFWChan parents MissionId ,SchedulableId
channel activate schedulables : MissionID
channel done schedulable : SchedulableID
C.5.23 SchedulableMissionSequencerChan
section SchedulableMissionSequencerChan parents
SchedulableMissionSequencerFWChan,MissionSequencerChan
C.5.24 SchedulableMissionSequencerFWChan
section SchedulableMissionSequencerFWChan parents scj prelude,
MissionSequencerFWChan,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds
channel set continueBelow : SchedulableID × B
channel set continueAbove : SchedulableID × B
channelset CCSync == {| get continue, set continueBelow , set continueAbove |}
channelset SchedulableMissionSequencerFWChan ==
{| end sequencer app, end methods, end terminations, get continue |}
C.5.25 HandlerChan
section HandlerChan parents HandlerFWChan,HandlerMethChan,
MissionFWChan, JTime
C.5.26 HandlerFWChan
section HandlerFWChan parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,GlobalTypes, JTime
channel deschedule handler : SchedulableID
channel end releases : SchedulableID
channel release complete : SchedulableID
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C.5.27 HandlerMethChan
section HandlerMethChan parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,GlobalTypes
channel handleAsyncEventCall : SchedulableID
channel handleAsyncEventRet : SchedulableID
channel release : SchedulableID
C.5.28 AperiodicEventHandlerChan
section AperiodicEventHandlerChan parents HandlerChan,
HandlerMethChan,AperiodicLongEventHandlerMethChan,SchedulableId
channel end aperiodic app : SchedulableID
channelset APEHSync == {| handleAsyncEventCall , handleAsyncEventRet ,
end aperiodicEventHandler app |}
channelset DeadlineClockSync == {| end releases, release complete |}
C.5.29 AperiodicLongEventHandlerMethChan
section AperiodicLongEventHandlerMethChan parents HandlerChan,
HandlerMethChan,MissionFWChan, JTime
channel releaseLong : SchedulableID × Z
channel handleAsyncLongEventCall : SchedulableID × Z
channel handleAsyncLongEventRet : SchedulableID
C.5.30 OneShotEventHandlerChan
section OneShotEventHandlerChan parents HandlerChan,HandlerMethChan,
OneShotEventHandlerFWChan,OneShotEventHandlerMethChan
channelset STCSync == {| get startTime, set startTime |}
channelset MethodsSync == {| end releases, reschedule handler , deschedule handler |}
channelset ReleaseSync == {| handleAsyncEventCall , reschedule handler , end releases,
stop release, release |}
channelset DeadlineSync == {| handleAsyncEventCall , end releases,
deschedule handler , release complete |}
channelset OSEHAppSync == {| descheduleCall , descheduleRet , scheduleNextRelease,
getNextReleaseTimeCall , getNextReleaseTimeRet , end oneShot app |}
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C.5.31 OneShotEventHandlerFWChan
section OneShotEventHandlerFWChan parents HandlerChan,
HandlerMethChan, JTime
channel wait for start time : SchedulableID
channel end schedule : SchedulableID
channel reschedule handler : SchedulableID × JTime
channel stop release : SchedulableID
channel end oneShot app : SchedulableID
channel get fireCount : SchedulableID × Z
channel increment fireCount : SchedulableID
channel decrement fireCount : SchedulableID
channel get startTime : SchedulableID × JTime
channel set startTime : SchedulableID × JTime
C.5.32 OneShotEventHandlerMethChan
section OneShotEventHandlerMethChan parents SchedulableId , JTime
channel getNextReleaseTimeCall : SchedulableID
channel getNextReleaseTimeRet : SchedulableID × JTime
channel scheduleNextRelease : SchedulableID × JTime
channel descheduleCall : SchedulableID
channel descheduleRet : SchedulableID × B
C.5.33 PeriodicEventHandlerChan
section PeriodicEventHandlerChan parents HandlerChan,
HandlerMethChan,PeriodicEventHandlerFWChan
channel end periodic app : SchedulableID
channelset PEHSync ==
{| handleAsyncEventCall , handleAsyncEventRet , end periodic app |}
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C.5.34 PeriodicEventHandlerFWChan
section PeriodicEventHandlerFWChan parents HandlerChan,HandlerMethChan,
MissionFWChan, JTime
channel get missedReleases : SchedulableID × Z
channel increment missedReleases : SchedulableID
channel decrement missedReleases : SchedulableID
channel stop period : SchedulableID
channel periodic release complete : SchedulableID × Z
channel end periodic app : SchedulableID
channel get periodicTerminating : SchedulableID × B
channel set periodicTerminating : SchedulableID × B
channelset MRCSync == {| get missedReleases, increment missedReleases,
decrement missedReleases |}
channelset ReleaseSync == {| release, stop period |}
channelset PTCSYnc == {| get periodicTerminating , set periodicTerminating |}
C.5.35 ManagedThreadChan
section ManagedThreadChan parents ManagedThreadFWChan,
ManagedThreadMethChan,SchedulableChan
channelset MTAppSync == {| runCall , runRet , end managedThread app |}
C.5.36 ManagedThreadFWChan
section ManagedThreadFWChan parents SchedulableId
channel end managedThread app : SchedulableID
C.5.37 ManagedThreadMethChan
section ManagedThreadMethChan parents SchedulableId
channel runCall : SchedulableID
channel runRet : SchedulableID
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C.6 Thread
section ThreadFW parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes,ThreadChan,
ObjectFWChan,FrameworkChan,Priority
process ThreadFW =̂ thread : ThreadID ; basePriority : PriorityLevel • begin
state State
priorityStack : seq1 PriorityLevel
activePriority : PriorityLevel
interrupted : B
activePriority = last priorityStack
state State
Init
∆State
priorityStack ′ = 〈basePriority〉
interrupted ′ = False
Execute =̂


Priority
||[{basePriority} | {interrupted}]||
Interrupts

9
GetPriorityLevel


4
(
done toplevel sequencer−→
Skip
)
Priority =̂
if priorityStack = 〈basePriority〉−→
IncreasePriority 8 priorityStack 6= 〈basePriority〉−→(
IncreasePriority@DecreasePriority
)
fi
IncreasePriority =̂
raise thread priority . thread ? ceilingPriority−→
activePriority := ceilingPriority;
IncreasePriority
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DecreasePriority =̂
lower thread priority . thread−→
activePriority := basePriority;
DecreasePriority
Interrupts =̂


Interrupt
||[∅ | ∅]||
IsInterrupted

||[∅ | ∅]||
Interrupted

J∅ | {| set interrupted , get interrupted |} | ∅K
InterruptedController

Interrupt =̂
interrupt . thread−→
set interrupted . thread ! True −→ Skip
IsInterrupted =̂
isInterruptedCall . thread−→
get interrupted . thread ? interrupted−→
isInterruptedRet . thread ! interrupted −→ Skip
Interrupted =̂
interruptedCall . thread−→
get interrupted . thread ? interrupted−→
interruptedRet . thread ! interrupted−→
set interrupted . thread ! False −→ Skip
InterruptedController =̂(
get interrupted . thread ! interrupted−→
InterruptedController
)
@
set interrupted . thread ? newInterrupted−→
interrupted := newInterrupted ;
InterruptedController

GetPriorityLevel =̂
get priorityLevel . thread ? object ! activePriority−→
GetPriorityLevel
• (Init ; Execute)4 (done toplevel sequencer −→ Skip)
end
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C.7 Object
section Object parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes,ObjectChan,MissionChan,SchedulableChan,
SchedulableId ,MissionId ,MissionIds,TopLevelMissionSequencerChan,
HandlerChan,SafeletMethChan,FrameworkChan,PriorityQueue,Priority ,ThreadChan
process ObjectFW =̂ object : ObjectID • begin
state State
waitQueue : PriorityQueue
lockedBy : ThreadID
locks : N
previousLocks : ThreadMap
queueForLock : PriorityQueue
ceilingPriority : PriorityLevel
waitForObjectThreads : PThreadID
locks > 0⇔ lockedBy 6= nullThreadId
lockedBy 6∈ dom previousLocks
lockedBy 6∈ ElementsOf (waitQueue)
lockedBy 6∈ ElementsOf (queueForLock)
waitForObjectThreads ⊆ ElementsOf (waitQueue)
state State
Init
State ′
IsEmpty(queueForLock ′) = True
IsEmpty(waitQueue ′) = True
locks ′ = 0
previousLocks ′ = ∅
ceilingPriority ′ = MaxPriority
waitForObjectThreads ′ = ∅
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FullyUnlock
∆State
lockedBy? : ThreadID
locks? : N1
previousLocks ′ = previousLocks ⊕ {lockedBy? 7→ locks?}
lockedBy ′ = nullThreadId
locks ′ = 0
waitQueue ′ = waitQueue
queueForLock ′ = queueForLock
ceilingPriority ′ = ceilingPriority
waitForObjectThreads ′ = waitForObjectThreads
AddToQueueForLock
∆State
someThread? : ThreadID
priorityLevel? : PriorityLevel
someThread? 6= nullThreadId
someThread? 6∈ ElementsOf (queueForLock)
queueForLock ′ = AddToPriorityQueue(queueForLock , someThread?, priorityLevel?)
lockedBy ′ = lockedBy
locks ′ = locks
previousLocks ′ = previousLocks
waitQueue ′ = waitQueue
ceilingPriority ′ = ceilingPriority
waitForObjectThreads ′ = waitForObjectThreads
AssignEligible
∆State
(queueForLock ′, lockedBy ′) = RemoveFromPriorityQueue(queueForLock)
lockedBy ′ ∈ dom previousLocks ⇒ locks ′ = previousLocks(lockedBy ′)
lockedBy ′ 6∈ dom previousLocks ⇒ locks ′ = 1
previousLocks ′ = {lockedBy} −C previousLocks
waitQueue ′ = waitQueue
ceilingPriority ′ = ceilingPriority
waitForObjectThreads ′ = waitForObjectThreads
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AddToWaitQueue
∆State
someThread? : ThreadID
priorityLevel? : PriorityLevel
waitType? : WaitType
someThread? 6= nullThreadId
someThread? 6∈ ElementsOf (waitQueue)
waitQueue ′ = AddToPriorityQueue(waitQueue, someThread?, priorityLevel?)
lockedBy ′ = lockedBy
locks ′ = locks
previousLocks ′ = previousLocks
queueForLock ′ = queueForLock
ceilingPriority ′ = ceilingPriority
waitType? = waitForObject ⇒
waitForObjectThreads ′ = waitForObjectThreads ∪ {someThread?}
waitType? = wait ⇒ waitForObjectThreads ′ = waitForObjectThreads
RemoveThreadFromWaitQueue
∆State
waitingThread? : ThreadID
priorityLevel? : PriorityLevel
waitingThread? ∈ ran(waitQueue(priorityLevel?))
waitQueue ′ = RemoveThreadFromPriorityQueue(waitQueue,waitingThread?, priorityLevel?)
lockedBy ′ = lockedBy
locks ′ = locks
previousLocks ′ = previousLocks
ceilingPriority ′ = ceilingPriority
waitForObjectThreads ′ = waitForObjectThreads \ {waitingThread?}
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RemoveMostEligigbleFromWaitQueue
∆State
notified ! : ThreadID
waitType! : WaitType
(waitQueue ′,notified !) = RemoveFromPriorityQueue(waitQueue)
lockedBy ′ = lockedBy
locks ′ = locks
previousLocks ′ = previousLocks
queueForLock ′ = queueForLock
ceilingPriority ′ = ceilingPriority
notified ! ∈ waitForObjectThreads ⇒ waitType! = waitForObject
notified ! 6∈ waitForObjectThreads ⇒ waitType! = wait
waitForObjectThreads ′ = waitForObjectThreads \ {notified !}
Execute =̂
var interruptedThreads : PThreadID •


MonitorJ∅ |
MonitorSync |
{waitQueue,waitForObjectThreads}K
Synchronisation

J{waitQueue,waitForObjectThreads} |
MLCSync |
{queueForLock , previousLocks, locks, lockedBy}K
MonitorLockController(interruptedThreads)

J{waitQueue,waitForObjectThreads,
queueForLock , previousLocks, locks, lockedBy} |
CPCSync |
{ceilingPriority}K
CeilingPriorityController

Monitor =̂
MonitorUnlocked
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MonitorUnlocked =̂
startSyncMeth . object ? someThread−→
lock request . object ! someThread−→
MonitorUnlocked

@
lockAcquired . object ? lockingThread−→
get ceilingPriority . object ? ceilPri−→

get priorityLevel . lockingThread . object ? pri : (pri ≤ ceilPri)−→
raise thread priority . lockingThread ! ceilPri−→
MonitorLocked(lockingThread)

@
get priorityLevel . lockingThread . object ? pri : (pri > ceilPri)−→
throw .ceilingViolationException−→
Chaos



MonitorLocked =̂ val lockedBy : ThreadID •
startSyncMeth . object . lockedBy−→
increment locks . object−→
MonitorLocked(lockedBy)

@
startSyncMeth . object ? someThread : (someThread 6= lockedBy)−→
lock request . object ! someThread−→
MonitorLocked(lockedBy)

@
endSyncMeth . object . lockedBy−→

decrement locks . object . 0−→
lower thread priority . lockedBy−→
MonitorUnlocked

@(
decrement locks . object ? l : (l 6= 0)−→
MonitorLocked(lockedBy)
)


@
unlock Monitor . object ? unlockingThread−→
fully unlock . object−→
lower thread priority . unlockingThread−→
MonitorUnlocked

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Synchronisation =̂


WaitActionsJ∅ |WaitSync | ∅K
NotifyActions

J∅ |
WQSync |
{waitQueue,waitForObjectThreads}K
WaitQueueController

J{waitQueue,waitForObjectThreads} | InterruptSync | ∅K
Interrupt

WaitActions =̂
(Wait 9 TimedWait) 9WaitForObject
NotifyActions =̂
Notify 9NotifyAll
Wait =̂
waitCall . object ? someThread−→

isInterruptedCall . someThread−→
isInterruptedRet . someThread .False−→

get lockedBy . object . someThread−→
get priorityLevel . someThread . object ? priorityLevel−→
add to wait . object ! someThread ! priorityLevel ! wait−→
unlock Monitor . object ! someThread−→
Wait

@
get lockedBy . object ? lockedBy : (lockedBy 6= someThread)−→
throw . illegalMonitorStateException−→
Chaos



@
isInterruptedCall . someThread−→
isInterruptedRet . someThread .True−→
throw .interruptedException−→
Chaos


TimedWait =̂
TimedWaitHandlerJ∅ | {| start timer |} | ∅K
(9 t : ThreadID • TimedWaitTimer(t))
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TimedWaitHandler =̂
timedWaitCall . object ? someThread ? waitTime−→

get lockedBy . object . someThread−→
if((timeMillis(waitTime) < 0) ∨ (timeNanos(waitTime) < 0
∧ timeNanos(waitTime) > maxNanos))−→(
throw . illegalArgumentException−→
Chaos
)
8((timeMillis(waitTime) > 0) ∧ (timeNanos(waitTime) > 0)
∧ (timeNanos(waitTime) ≤ maxNanos))−→
get priorityLevel . someThread . object ? priorityLevel−→
add to wait . object ! someThread ! priorityLevel ! wait−→
start timer . object ! someThread ! priorityLevel ! waitTime−→
unlock Monitor . object ! someThread−→
TimedWaitHandler

fi

@
get lockedBy . object ? lockedBy : (lockedBy 6= someThread)−→
throw . illegalMonitorStateException−→
Chaos


TimedWaitTimer =̂ val waitingThread : ThreadID •
start timer . object .waitingThread ? priorityLevel ? waitTime−→


wait valueOf (waitTime);
remove from wait . object ! waitingThread ! priorityLevel−→
waitRet . object ! waitingThread−→
Skip

@(
cancel wait timer . object .waitingThread−→
Skip
)

;
relock this . object ! waitingThread−→
TimedWaitTimer(waitingThread)


@(
cancel wait timer . object .waitingThread−→
TimedWaitTimer(waitingThread)
)
@
(waitRet . object .waitingThread −→ TimedWaitTimer(waitingThread))@
(waitForObjectRet . object .waitingThread ? w −→ TimedWaitTimer(waitingThread))

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WaitForObject =̂
WaitForObjectHandlerJ∅ | {| start waitForObject timer |} | ∅K
(9 t : ThreadID •WaitForObjectTimer(t))
WaitForObjectHandler =̂
waitForObjectCall . object ? someThread ? waitTime−→

get lockedBy . object . someThread−→
if((timeMillis(waitTime) < 0) ∨ (timeNanos(waitTime) < 0))−→(
throw . illegalArgumentException−→
Chaos
)
8((timeMillis(waitTime) ≥ 0) ∧ (timeNanos(waitTime) ≥ 0))−→
get priorityLevel . someThread . object ? priorityLevel−→
add to wait . object ? someThread ? priorityLevel ! waitForObject−→
start waitForObject timer . object ! someThread
! priorityLevel ! waitTime−→
unlock Monitor . object ! someThread−→
WaitForObjectHandler

fi

@
get lockedBy . object ? lockedBy : (lockedBy 6= someThread)−→
throw . illegalMonitorStateException−→
Chaos


WaitForObjectTimer =̂ val waitingThread : ThreadID •
start waitForObject timer . object ? waitingThread ? priorityLevel ? waitTime−→


remove from wait . object ! waitingThread ! priorityLevel−→
waitForObjectRet . object ! waitingThread ! False−→
Skip

@(
cancel wait timer . object .waitingThread−→
Skip
)

;
relock this . object ! waitingThread−→
WaitForObjectTimer(waitingThread)


@(
cancel wait timer . object .waitingThread−→
WaitForObjectTimer(waitingThread)
)
@
(waitRet . object ? n −→WaitForObjectTimer(waitingThread))@
(waitForObjectRet . object ? n ? w −→WaitForObjectTimer(waitingThread))

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Notify =̂
notify . object ? someThread−→

get lockedBy . object . someThread−→
if IsEmpty(waitQueue) = False−→(
ResumeThread ; Notify
)
8 IsEmpty(waitQueue) = True−→
Notify
fi


@(
get lockedBy . object ? lockedBy : (lockedBy 6= someThread)−→
throw . illegalMonitorStateException −→Chaos
)


@
(waitRet . object ? n −→Notify)@
(waitForObjectRet . object ? n ? w −→Notify)

ResumeThread =̂
removed thread . object ? notified .wait−→
cancel wait timer . object ! notified−→
relock this . object ! notified−→
waitRet . object ! notified −→ Skip

@
removed thread . object ? notified .waitForObject−→
cancel wait timer . object ! notified−→
relock this . object ! notified−→
waitForObjectRet . object ! notified ! True−→ Skip

NotifyAll =̂
notifyAll . object ? someThread−→
(
get lockedBy . object . someThread−→
NotifyAllHandler ; NotifyAll
)
@(
get lockedBy . object ? lockedBy : (lockedBy 6= someThread)−→
throw . illegalMonitorStateException −→Chaos
)


@
(waitRet . object ? n −→NotifyAll)@
(waitForObjectRet . object ? n ? w −→NotifyAll)

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NotifyAllHandler =̂ var notified : ThreadID •
if IsEmpty(waitQueue) = False −→
(
ResumeThread ;
NotifyAllHandler
)
8 IsEmpty(waitQueue) = True −→ Skip
fi
WaitQueueController =̂
add to wait . object ? someThread ? priorityLevel ? waitType−→
AddToWaitQueue;
WaitQueueController

@
remove from wait . object ? waitingThread ? priorityLevel−→
RemoveThreadFromWaitQueue;
WaitQueueController

@
IsEmpty(waitQueue) = FalseN
var notified : ThreadID ; waitType : WaitType •
RemoveMostEligigbleFromWaitQueue;
removed thread . object ! notified ! waitType−→
WaitQueueController

@(
get waitQueue . object ! waitQueue −→WaitQueueController
)
@(
get waitForObjectThreads . object ! waitForObjectThreads −→WaitQueueController
)
Interrupt =̂
interrupt ? waitingThread−→

get waitQueue . object ? gotWait : (waitingThread ∈ ElementsOf (gotWait))−→
cancel wait timer . object ! waitingThread−→
get priorityLevel .waitingThread . object ? priorityLevel−→
remove from wait . object ! waitingThread ! priorityLevel−→
relock this . object ! waitingThread−→
(
get waitForObjectThreads . object ? wfot : (waitingThread 6∈ wfot)−→
waitRet . object ! waitingThread −→ Skip
)
@(
get waitForObjectThreads . object ? wfot : (waitingThread ∈ wfot)−→
waitForObjectRet . object ! waitingThread ! True−→ Skip
)

;
Interrupt

@(
get waitQueue . object ? gotWait : (waitingThread 6∈ ElementsOf (gotWait))−→
Interrupt
)

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MonitorLockController =̂ val interruptedThreads : PThreadID •
lock request . object ? someThread−→
get priorityLevel . someThread . object ? priorityLevel−→
AddToQueueForLock ;
MonitorLockController(interruptedThreads)

@
relock this . object ? someThread−→
get priorityLevel . someThread . object ? priorityLevel−→
AddToQueueForLock ;

isInterruptedCall . someThread−→
isInterruptedRet . someThread .False−→
MonitorLockController(interruptedThreads)

@
isInterruptedCall . someThread−→
isInterruptedRet . someThread .True−→
interruptedThreads := interruptedThreads ∪ {someThread};
MonitorLockController(interruptedThreads)




@
IsEmpty(queueForLock) = False ∧ lockedBy = nullThreadIdN
AssignEligible;
lockAcquired . object . lockedBy−→
if lockedBy ∈ interruptedThreads −→
(
throw .interruptedException−→
Chaos
)
8lockedBy 6∈ interruptedThreads −→ (MonitorLockController(interruptedThreads))
fi


@(
get lockedBy . object ! lockedBy−→
MonitorLockController(interruptedThreads)
)
@
increment locks . object−→
locks := locks + 1;
MonitorLockController(interruptedThreads)

@
decrement locks . object ! (locks − 1)−→
locks := locks − 1;
if locks = 0−→
(
lockedBy := nullThreadId ;
MonitorLockController(interruptedThreads)
)
8locks 6= 0−→ MonitorLockController(interruptedThreads)
fi



@
fully unlock . object−→
FullyUnlock ;
MonitorLockController(interruptedThreads)

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CeilingPriorityController =̂
setCeilingPriority ? mission ! object ? priority−→
ceilingPriority := priority;
µX • (get ceilingPriority . object ! ceilingPriority −→X )

@(
get ceilingPriority . object ! ceilingPriority−→
CeilingPriorityController
)
• (Init ; Execute)4 (done toplevel sequencer −→ Skip)
end
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C.8 SafeletFW
section SafeletFW parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,SafeletChan,
TopLevelMissionSequencerChan,FrameworkChan,SchedulableChan
process SafeletFW =̂ begin
state S State
globallyRegistered : FSchedulableID
topLevelSequencer : SchedulableID
S Init
S State ′
globallyRegistered ′ = ∅
topLevelSequencer ′ = nullSequencerId
state S State
InitializeApplication =̂
initializeApplicationCall−→
initializeApplicationRet−→
Skip
Execute =̂
GetSequencerMeth;
if topLevelSequencer 6= nullSequencerId−→(
start toplevel sequencer . topLevelSequencer−→
Methods
)
8topLevelSequencer = nullSequencerId−→
Skip
fi
GetSequencerMeth =̂
getSequencerCall−→
getSequencerRet ? sequencer−→
topLevelSequencer := sequencer
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Methods =̂
(
Register ;
Methods
)
@(
Deregister ;
Methods
)
@(
done toplevel sequencer−→
Skip
)

Register =̂
register ? schedulable : (schedulable 6∈ globallyRegistered) ? mission−→
globallyRegistered := globallyRegistered ∪ {schedulable};
checkSchedulable .mission ! True−→
Skip


@
register ? schedulable : (schedulable ∈ globallyRegistered) ? mission−→
checkSchedulable .mission ! False−→
Skip

Deregister =̂
deregister ? schedulables−→
globallyRegistered := (globallyRegistered \ schedulables);
Skip
•
(
S Init ; InitializeApplication ; Execute
)
end
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C.9 TopLevelMissionSequencerFW
section TopLevelMissionSequencerFW parents TopLevelMissionSequencerChan,
MissionId ,MissionMethChan,SchedulableId ,MissionFWChan,FrameworkChan
process TopLevelMissionSequencerFW =̂ sequencer : SchedulableID • begin
state TLMS State
currentMission : MissionID
continue : B
state TLMS State
TLMS Init
TLMS State ′
continue ′ = True
currentMission ′ = nullMissionId
Start =̂
start toplevel sequencer . sequencer−→
Skip
Execute =̂


RunMission;
end methods . sequencer−→
Skip

J{currentMission} | {| end methods |} | ∅K
Methods

J∅ | CCSync | {continue}K
ContinueController

RunMission =̂
GetNextMission;
StartMission;
Continue
GetNextMission =̂
getNextMissionCall . sequencer−→
getNextMissionRet . sequencer ? next−→
currentMission := next
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StartMission =̂
if currentMission 6= nullMissionId−→
start mission . currentMission . sequencer−→
done mission . currentMission ? returnedcontinue−→
set continue . sequencer ! returnedcontinue−→
Skip

8currentMission = nullMissionId−→(
set continue . sequencer ! False−→
Skip
)
fi
Continue =̂(
get continue . sequencer ? continue : (continue = True)−→
RunMission
)
@(
get continue . sequencer ? continue : (continue = False)−→
Skip
)
Methods =̂(
SequenceTerminationPending;
Methods
)
@(
end methods . sequencer−→
Skip
)
SequenceTerminationPending =̂
sequenceTerminationPendingCall . sequencer−→
get continue . sequencer ? continue−→
sequenceTerminationPendingRet . sequencer ! continue−→
Skip
ContinueController =̂(
get continue . sequencer ! continue−→
ContinueController
)
@
set continue . sequencer ? newContinue−→
continue := newContinue;
ContinueController

@(
end methods . sequencer−→
Skip
)
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Finish =̂
done toplevel sequencer−→
end sequencer app . sequencer−→
Skip

• TLMS Init ; Start ; Execute ; Finish
end
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C.10 MissionFW
section MissionFW parents scj prelude,SafeletMethChan,MissionId ,
SchedulableId ,MissionChan,SchedulableChan,FrameworkChan,ServicesChan
process MissionFW =̂ mission : MissionID • begin
state M State
registeredSchedulables : FSchedulableID
activeSchedulables : FSchedulableID
missionTerminating : B
applicationTerminating : B
controllingSequencer : SchedulableID
state M State
M Init
M State ′
registeredSchedulables ′ = ∅
activeSchedulables ′ = ∅
missionTerminating = False
applicationTerminating = False
controllingSequencer = nullSequencerId
AddSchedulable
∆M State
s? : SchedulableID
s? 6∈ registeredSchedulables
registeredSchedulables ′ = registeredSchedulables ∪ {s?}
activeSchedulables ′ = activeSchedulables
missionTerminating ′ = missionTerminating
applicationTerminating ′ = applicationTerminating
controllingSequencer ′ = controllingSequencer
Start =̂(
start mission .mission ? mySequencer−→
controllingSequencer := mySequencer
)
@(
done toplevel sequencer−→
applicationTerminating := True
)
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InitializePhase =̂
initializeCall .mission −→
Initialize
Initialize =̂
(
Register ;
Initialize
)
@(
SetCeilingPriority;
Initialize
)
@(
initializeRet .mission−→
Skip
)

Register =̂
register ? s ! mission−→
(
checkSchedulable .mission ? check : (check = True)−→
AddSchedulable
)
@
checkSchedulable .mission ? check : (check = False)−→
throw .illegalStateException−→
Chaos


RegisterException =̂
register ? s ! mission−→
throw .illegalStateException−→
Chaos
SetCeilingPriority =̂
setCeilingPriority .mission ? o ? p−→
Skip
SetCeilingPriorityException =̂
setCeilingPriority .mission ? o ? p−→
throw .illegalStateException−→
Chaos
MissionPhase =̂
ExecuteJ{registeredSchedulables, activeSchedulables,missionTerminating ,
applicationTerminating , controllingSequencer} | {| done schedulables |} | ∅K
Exceptions
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Execute =̂
if registeredSchedulables = ∅−→(
done schedulables .mission−→
Skip
)
8registeredSchedulables 6= ∅−→
activate schedulables .mission −→
activeSchedulables := registeredSchedulables;
TerminateAndDoneJ{activeSchedulables} |
{| stop schedulables, done schedulables |} |
{missionTerminating}K
Methods


fi

\ {| done schedulables |}
TerminateAndDone =̂

SignalTerminationJ∅ | TerminateSync | {activeSchedulables}K
DoneSchedulables
 ;
done schedulables .mission−→
Skip

SignalTermination =̂
stop schedulables .mission−→
get activeSchedulables .mission ? schedulablesToStop−→
StopSchedulables(schedulablesToStop);
schedulables stopped .mission−→
Skip

4(schedulables stopped .mission −→ Skip)
StopSchedulables =̂ val schedulablesToStop : FSchedulableID •
9 s : schedulablesToStop •
signalTerminationCall . s−→
signalTerminationRet . s−→
Skip

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DoneSchedulables =̂

@ schedulable : activeSchedulables •
done schedulable . schedulable−→
activeSchedulables := activeSchedulables \ {schedulable};
Skip
 ;
if activeSchedulables = ∅−→(
schedulables stopped .mission−→
Skip
)
8activeSchedulables 6= ∅−→
DoneSchedulables
fi

@(
get activeSchedulables .mission ! activeSchedulables−→
DoneSchedulables
)
Methods =̂

RequestTerminationMethJ∅ | {| end mission terminations |} | ∅K
TerminationPendingMeth

J∅ | MTCSync | {missionTerminating}K
MissionTerminatingController

J{missionTerminating} | {| end mission terminations |} | ∅K
done schedulables .mission−→
end mission terminations .mission−→
Skip

RequestTerminationMeth =̂(
end mission terminations .mission−→
Skip
)
@
@ schedulable : registeredSchedulables •
requestTerminationCall .mission . schedulable−→

get missionTerminating .mission?mT : (mT = False)−→
set missionTerminating .mission ! True−→
stop schedulables .mission−→
requestTerminationRet .mission . schedulable .False−→
RequestTerminationMeth

@
get missionTerminating .mission?mT : (mT = True)−→
requestTerminationRet .mission . schedulable .True−→
RequestTerminationMeth



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TerminationPendingMeth =̂(
end mission terminations .mission−→
Skip
)
@
terminationPendingCall .mission−→
get missionTerminating .mission ? missionTerminating−→
terminationPendingRet .mission ! missionTerminating−→
TerminationPendingMeth

MissionTerminatingController =̂(
get missionTerminating .mission ! missionTerminating−→
MissionTerminatingController
)
@
set missionTerminating .mission ? newMissionTerminating−→
missionTerminating := newMissionTerminating;
MissionTerminatingController

@(
end mission terminations .mission−→
Skip
)
CleanupPhase =̂
CleanupJ{registeredSchedulables, activeSchedulables,
missionTerminating , applicationTerminating ,
controllingSequencer} | {| done schedulables |} | ∅K
Exceptions
Cleanup =̂
deregister !registeredSchedulables−→
CleanupSchedulables;
cleanupMissionCall .mission−→
cleanupMissionRet .mission ? continueSequencer−→
Finish(continueSequencer)

CleanupSchedulables =̂
9 s : registeredSchedulables •
cleanupSchedulableCall . s−→
cleanupSchedulableRet . s−→
Skip

Finish =̂ val continueSequencer : B •
end mission app .mission−→
done mission .mission ! continueSequencer−→
Skip
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Exceptions =̂
RegisterException9
SetCeilingPriorityException

@(
done schedulables .mission−→
Skip
)
•

µX • M Init ; Start ;
if applicationTerminating = False−→(
InitializePhase ; MissionPhase ; CleanupPhase ; X
)
8applicationTerminating = True−→(
end mission app .mission−→
Skip
)
fi


end
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C.11 SchedulableMissionSequencerFW
section SchedulableMissionSequencerFW parents SchedulableMissionSequencerChan,
SchedulableChan,MissionIds,MissionChan,
SchedulableId , scj prelude,SafeletMethChan,FrameworkChan
process SchedulableMissionSequencerFW =̂ sequencer : SchedulableID • begin
state SMS State
currentMission : MissionID
continueAbove : B
continueBelow : B
controllingMission : MissionID
applicationTerminating : B
state SMS State
SMS Init
SMS State ′
continueAbove ′ = True
continueBelow ′ = True
applicationTerminating ′ = False
currentMission ′ = nullMissionId
controllingMission ′ = nullMissionId
GetContinue
ΞSMS State
continue! : B
continueAbove = True ∧ continueBelow = True⇒ continue! = True
Start =̂(
Register ;
Activate
)
@(
done toplevel sequencer−→
applicationTerminating := True
)
@(
activate schedulables ? someMissionID−→
Start
)
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Register =̂
register . sequencer ? mID−→
controllingMission := mID
Activate =̂
activate schedulables.controllingMission−→
Skip
Execute =̂


RunMission;
end methods . sequencer−→
Skip

J{currentMission} | {| end methods |} | ∅K
Methods

J∅ | CCSync | {continueAbove, continueBelow}K
ContinueController

;
done schedulable . sequencer −→ Skip
RunMission =̂
GetNextMission;
StartMission;
Continue
GetNextMission =̂
getNextMissionCall . sequencer−→
getNextMissionRet . sequencer ? next−→
currentMission := next
StartMission =̂
if currentMission 6= nullMissionId −→
start mission . currentMission . sequencer−→
initializeRet . currentMission−→
SignalTerminationJ∅ | {| end terminations |} | ∅K
done mission . currentMission ? continueReturn−→
set continueBelow . sequencer ! continueReturn−→
end terminations . sequencer−→
Skip



8 currentMission = nullMissionId −→(
set continueBelow . sequencer ! False−→
Skip
)
fi
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Continue =̂(
get continue . sequencer ? continue : (continue = True)−→ RunMission
)
@(
get continue . sequencer ? continue : (continue = False)−→ Skip
)
SignalTermination =̂
(
end terminations . sequencer −→ Skip
)
@
signalTerminationCall . sequencer−→
set continueAbove . sequencer ! False−→
requestTerminationCall . currentMission . sequencer−→
requestTerminationRet . currentMission . sequencer ? isTerminating−→
signalTerminationRet . sequencer −→ Skip

;
end terminations . sequencer −→ Skip

Methods =̂(
SequenceTerminationPending ; Methods
)
@(
end methods . sequencer −→ Skip
)
SequenceTerminationPending =̂
sequenceTerminationPendingCall . sequencer−→
get continue . sequencer ? continue−→
sequenceTerminationPendingRet . sequencer ! continue−→
Skip
ContinueController =̂ var continue : B •(
GetContinue ; get continue . sequencer ! continue−→
ContinueController
)
@
set continueBelow . sequencer ? newContinueBelow−→
continueBelow := newContinueBelow ;
ContinueController

@
set continueAbove . sequencer ? newContinueAbove−→
continueAbove := newContinueAbove;
ContinueController

@(
end methods . sequencer−→
Skip
)
Cleanup =̂
cleanupSchedulableCall . sequencer−→
cleanupSchedulableRet . sequencer−→
Finish
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Finish =̂
done schedulable . sequencer−→
Skip
•

µX • SMS Init ; Start ;
if applicationTerminating = False−→(
Execute ; Cleanup ; X
)
8applicationTerminating = True−→(
end sequencer app . sequencer−→
Skip
)
fi


end
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C.12 PeriodicEventHandlerFW
section PeriodicEventHandlerFW parents MissionChan,SchedulableChan,
SchedulableId ,MissionId ,MissionIds,TopLevelMissionSequencerChan,
PeriodicEventHandlerChan,SafeletMethChan,FrameworkChan,PeriodicParameters
process PeriodicEventHandlerFW =̂
schedulable : SchedulableID ; periodicParameters : PeriodicParameters • begin
state PEH State
controllingMission : MissionID
applicationTerminating : B
period : JTime
startTime : JTime
deadline : JTime
deadlineMissHandler : SchedulableID
missedReleases : N
periodicTerminating : B
valueOf (deadline) ≤ valueOf (period)
state PEH State
PEH Init
PEH State ′
controllingMission ′ = nullMissionId
applicationTerminating ′ = False
periodicTerminating ′ = False
period ′ = periodOf (periodicParameters)
startTimeOf (periodicParameters) = NULL
⇒ startTime ′ = time (0, 0)
startTimeOf (periodicParameters) 6= NULL
⇒ startTime ′ = startTimeOf (periodicParameters)
deadlineOfPeriodic(periodicParameters) = NULL
⇒ deadline ′ = period ′
deadlineOfPeriodic(periodicParameters) 6= NULL
⇒ deadline ′ = deadlineOfPeriodic(periodicParameters)
missedReleases ′ = 0
deadlineMissHandler ′ = missHandlerOfPeriodic(periodicParameters)
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Start =̂(
Register ;
Activate
)
@(
activate schedulables?someMissionID−→
Start
)
@(
done toplevel sequencer−→
applicationTerminating := True
)
Register =̂
register . schedulable ? missionID−→
controllingMission := missionID
Activate =̂
activate schedulables . controllingMission−→
Skip
Execute =̂


wait valueOf (startTime);
if deadlineMissHandler 6= nullSchedulableId−→
RunningWithDeadlineDetection8deadlineMissHandler = nullSchedulableId−→
Running
fi

@(
end releases . schedulable−→
Skip
)

J{startTime} | {| stop period |} | ∅K
SignalTermination

J{startTime} | PTCSYnc | ∅K
PeriodicTerminatingController
Running =̂
PeriodicClockJ∅ | ReleaseSync | {missedReleases}K
Release(0)

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RunningWithDeadlineDetection =̂
RunningJ{missedReleases} | ReleaseSync | ∅K
DeadlineClock(0)

PeriodicClock =̂
release . schedulable−→
µX •


wait valueOf (period);
release . schedulable−→
X

@(
end releases . schedulable−→
Skip
)

Release =̂ val index : N •
if missedReleases = 0−→
release . schedulable−→
handleAsyncEventCall . schedulable−→
Skip

8missedReleases 6= 0−→
handleAsyncEventCall . schedulable−→
missedReleases := missedReleases − 1;
Skip

fi ;

handleAsyncEventRet . schedulable−→
periodic release complete . schedulable . index−→
Skip

J∅ | {| handleAsyncEventRet |} | ∅K
µX •


release . schedulable−→
missedReleases := missedReleases + 1;
X

@(
handleAsyncEventRet . schedulable−→
Skip
)



;

(
get periodicTerminating . schedulable ? pehTerm : (pehTerm = False)−→
Release(index + 1)
)
@(
get periodicTerminating . schedulable ? pehTerm : (pehTerm = True)−→
Skip
)

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DeadlineClock =̂ val index : N •


wait valueOf (deadline);
release . deadlineMissHandler−→
periodic release complete . schedulable . index−→
Skip

@(
periodic release complete . schedulable . index−→
Skip
)

9((wait valueOf (period);
DeadlineClock(index + 1)
))

4

end releases . schedulable−→
periodic release complete . schedulable ? index−→
Skip

SignalTermination =̂
signalTerminationCall . schedulable−→
set periodicTerminating . schedulable ! True−→
end releases . schedulable−→
signalTerminationRet . schedulable−→
done schedulable . schedulable−→
Skip
Cleanup =̂
cleanupSchedulableCall . schedulable−→
cleanupSchedulableRet . schedulable−→
Skip
PeriodicTerminatingController =̂(
get periodicTerminating . schedulable ! periodicTerminating−→
PeriodicTerminatingController
)
@
set periodicTerminating . schedulable ? newPeriodicTerminating−→
periodicTerminating := newPeriodicTerminating;
PeriodicTerminatingController

•

µX •

PEH Init ; Start ;
if applicationTerminating = False−→(
Execute ; Cleanup ; X
)
8applicationTerminating = True−→(
end periodic app . schedulable −→ Skip
)
fi



end
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C.13 AperiodicEventHandlerFW
section AperiodicEventHandlerFW parents MissionChan,SchedulableChan,
SchedulableId ,MissionId ,MissionIds,TopLevelMissionSequencerChan,
SafeletMethChan,FrameworkChan,AperiodicEventHandlerChan,
AperiodicParameters
process AperiodicEventHandlerFW =̂
schedulable : SchedulableID ; aperiodicType : AperiodicType;
aperiodicParameters : AperiodicParameters • begin
state APEH State
controllingMission : MissionID
applicationTerminating : B
pending : B
data : Z
deadline : JTime
deadlineMissHandler : SchedulableID
state APEH State
APEH Init
APEH State ′
controllingMission ′ = nullMissionId
applicationTerminating ′ = False
pending ′ = False
deadline ′ = deadlineOfAperiodic(aperiodicParameters)
deadlineMissHandler ′ = missHandlerOfAperiodic(aperiodicParameters)
Start =̂(
Register ;
Activate
)
@(
activate schedulables?someMissionID−→
Start
)
@(
done toplevel sequencer−→
applicationTerminating := True
)
Register =̂
register . schedulable ? missionID−→
controllingMission := missionID
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Activate =̂
activate schedulables . controllingMission−→
Skip
Execute =̂
if deadlineMissHandler ! = nullSchedulableId−→


if aperiodicType = aperiodic−→
Ready8aperiodicType = aperiodicLong−→
ReadyLong
fi

J{pending , data} | {| end releases |} | ∅K
SignalTermination

J{pending , data} |
DeadlineClockSync ∪ {| release.schedulable, releaseLong .schedulable |}
| ∅K


release . schedulable −→ Skip@
releaseLong . schedulable?data −→ Skip
 ; DeadlineClock

4
(
end releases.schedulable −→ Skip
)


8deadlineMissHandler = nullSchedulableId−→

if aperiodicType = aperiodic−→
Ready8aperiodicType = aperiodicLong−→
ReadyLong
fi

J{pending , data} | {| end releases |} | ∅K
SignalTermination

fi
DeadlineClock =̂
(
wait valueOf (deadline);
release . deadlineMissHandler −→DeadlineClock
)
@(
release complete . schedulable −→DeadlineClock
)

4
(
end releases . schedulable −→ Skip
)
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Ready =̂(
release.schedulable−→
handleAsyncEventCall . schedulable −→ Release
)
@(
end releases . schedulable −→ Skip
)
ReadyLong =̂
releaseLong . schedulable ? longData−→
data := longData;
handleAsyncLongEventCall . schedulable . data −→ ReleaseLong

@(
end releases . schedulable −→ Skip
)
SignalTermination =̂
signalTerminationCall . schedulable−→
end releases . schedulable−→
signalTerminationRet . schedulable−→
done schedulable . schedulable −→ Skip

Release =̂
release.schedulable−→
pending := True;
Release

@
handleAsyncEventRet .schedulable−→
if pending = True−→
pending := False;
release complete . schedulable−→
handleAsyncEventCall .schedulable−→
Release

8pending = False−→
Ready
fi

@(
end releases.schedulable −→ Skip
)
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ReleaseLong =̂
releaseLong .schedulable ? longData−→
data := longData;
pending := True;
ReleaseLong

@
handleAsyncLongEventRet .schedulable−→
if pending = True−→
pending := False;
release complete . schedulable−→
handleAsyncLongEventCall .schedulable.data−→
ReleaseLong

8pending = False−→
ReadyLong
fi

@(
end releases.schedulable −→ Skip
)
Cleanup =̂
cleanupSchedulableCall . schedulable−→
cleanupSchedulableRet . schedulable −→ Skip
•

µX •

APEH Init ; Start ;
if applicationTerminating = False−→(
Execute ; Cleanup ; X
)
8applicationTerminating = True−→(
end aperiodic app . schedulable −→ Skip
)
fi



end
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C.14 OneShotEventHandlerFW
section OneShotEventHandlerFW parents MissionChan,SchedulableChan,
SchedulableId ,MissionId ,MissionIds,TopLevelMissionSequencerChan,
OneShotEventHandlerChan,SafeletMethChan,FrameworkChan,
AperiodicParameters
process OneShotEventHandlerFW =̂
schedulable : SchedulableID ; startTime : JTime;
aperiodicParameters : AperiodicParameters • begin
state OSEH State
controllingMission : MissionID
applicationTerminating : B
deadline : JTime
deadlineMissHandler : SchedulableID
state OSEH State
OSEH Init
OSEH State ′
controllingMission ′ = nullMissionId
applicationTerminating ′ = False
deadline ′ = deadlineOfAperiodic(aperiodicParameters)
deadlineMissHandler ′ = missHandlerOfAperiodic(aperiodicParameters)
Start =̂(
Register ;
Activate
)
@(
activate schedulables?someMissionID−→
Start
)
@(
done toplevel sequencer−→
applicationTerminating := True
)
Register =̂
register . schedulable ? mID−→
controllingMission := mID
Activate =̂
activate schedulables . controllingMission−→
Skip
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Execute =̂

(
Run J∅ | MethodsSync | ∅K
Methods
)
J∅ | {| end releases |} | ∅K
SignalTermination

J∅ | STCSync | {startTime}K
StartTimeController

Run =̂
if deadlineMissHandler = nullSchedulableId−→
ScheduleOrWaitJ∅ | ReleaseSync | ∅K
Release

8deadlineMissHandler 6= nullSchedulableId−→

ScheduleOrWaitJ∅ | ReleaseSync | ∅K
Release

J∅ | DeadlineSync | ∅K
DeadlineClock

fi
ScheduleOrWait =̂
get startTime . schedulable ? startTime−→
if startTime! = NULL−→
Scheduled8startTime = NULL−→
NotScheduled
fi
Release =̂
handleAsyncEventCall . schedulable−→
handleAsyncEventRet . schedulable−→
release complete . schedulable−→
Release

@
reschedule handler . schedulable ? newStartTime−→
set startTime . schedulable ! newStartTime−→
Release

@
end releases . schedulable−→
stop release . schedulable−→
Skip

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DeadlineClock =̂
release . schedulable−→


wait valueOf (deadline);
release . deadlineMissHandler−→
DeadlineClock

@(
release complete . schedulable−→
DeadlineClock
)
@(
deschedule handler . schedulable−→
DeadlineClock
)


4
(
end releases . schedulable−→
Skip
)
Scheduled =̂
get startTime . schedulable ? startTime−→

wait valueOf (startTime)
release . schedulable−→
handleAsyncEventCall . schedulable−→
NotScheduled

4
(
deschedule handler . schedulable−→
NotScheduled
)
@
reschedule handler . schedulable ? newStartTime−→
set startTime . schedulable ! newStartTime−→
Scheduled



NotScheduled =̂(
deschedule handler . schedulable−→
NotScheduled
)
@
reschedule handler . schedulable ? newStartTime−→
set startTime . schedulable ! newStartTime−→
Scheduled

@(
end releases . schedulable−→
Skip
)
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Methods =̂(
Deschedule;
Methods
)
@(
GetNextReleaseTime;
Methods
)
@(
ScheduleNextRelease;
Methods
)
@(
end releases . schedulable−→
Skip
)
Deschedule =̂
var wasScheduled : B •
descheduleCall . schedulable−→
deschedule handler .schedulable−→
get startTime . schedulable ? startTime−→
if startTime = NULL−→
wasScheduled := False8startTime 6= NULL−→
wasScheduled := True
fi ;
set startTime . schedulable ! NULL−→
descheduleRet . schedulable ! wasScheduled−→
Skip

GetNextReleaseTime =̂
getNextReleaseTimeCall . schedulable−→
get startTime . schedulable ? startTime−→
getNextReleaseTimeRet . schedulable ! startTime−→
Skip
ScheduleNextRelease =̂
scheduleNextRelease . schedulable ? newStartTime−→
set startTime . schedulable ! newStartTime−→
if newStartTime = NULL−→(
deschedule handler .schedulable−→
Skip
)
8newStartTime 6= NULL−→(
reschedule handler ! schedulable ! newStartTime−→
Skip
)
fi
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SignalTermination =̂
signalTerminationCall . schedulable−→
end releases . schedulable−→
signalTerminationRet . schedulable−→
done schedulable . schedulable−→
Skip
StartTimeController =̂(
get startTime . schedulable ! startTime−→
StartTimeController
)
@(
set startTime . schedulable ? newStartTime−→
StartTimeController
)
Cleanup =̂
cleanupSchedulableCall . schedulable−→
cleanupSchedulableRet . schedulable−→
Skip
•

µX •

OSEH Init ; Start ;
if applicationTerminating = False−→(
Execute ; Cleanup ; X
)
8applicationTerminating = True−→(
end oneShot app . schedulable−→
Skip
)
fi



end
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C.15 ManagedThreadFW
section ManagedThreadFW parents ManagedThreadChan,SchedulableId ,MissionId ,
MissionIds,TopLevelMissionSequencerChan,SchedulableChan,SafeletMethChan,
FrameworkChan
process ManagedThreadFW =̂ schedulable : SchedulableID • begin
state MT State
controllingMission : MissionID
applicationTerminating : B
state MT State
MT Init
MT State ′
controllingMission ′ = nullMissionId
applicationTerminating ′ = False
Start =̂(
Register ;
Activate
)
@(
activate schedulables?someMissionID−→
Start
)
@(
done toplevel sequencer−→
applicationTerminating := True
)
Register =̂
register . schedulable ? mID−→
controllingMission := mID
Activate =̂
activate schedulables . controllingMission−→
Skip
Execute =̂ Run J∅ | {| done schedulable |} | ∅ KMethods
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Run =̂
runCall . schedulable−→
runRet . schedulable−→
done schedulable . schedulable−→
Skip
Methods =̂(
SignalTerminationMeth ; Methods
)
@
done schedulable . schedulable−→
Skip
SignalTerminationMeth =̂
signalTerminationCall . schedulable−→
signalTerminationRet . schedulable−→
Skip
Cleanup =̂
cleanupSchedulableCall . schedulable−→
cleanupSchedulableRet . schedulable−→
Skip
•

µX • MT Init ; Start ;
if applicationTerminating = False−→(
Execute ; Cleanup ; X
)
8applicationTerminating = True−→(
end managedThread app . schedulable−→
Skip
)
fi


end
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Appendix D
Circus BNF Encoding
This appendix presents our encoding in Z of the BNF description of Circus.
CircusProgram == seq CircusParagraph
CircusParagraph ::= para〈〈Paragraph〉〉 | chanDef 〈〈ChannelDefinition〉〉 |
chanSetDef 〈〈ChanSetDefinition〉〉 | procDef 〈〈ProcDefinition〉〉
ChannelDefinition == CDeclaration
CDeclaration ::= scDecl〈〈SCDeclaration〉〉 | multiDecl〈〈SCDeclaration × CDeclaration〉〉
SCDeclaration ::= chanName〈〈seq N 〉〉 | chanNameWithType〈〈seq N × Expression〉〉 |
scSe〈〈SchemaExp〉〉
ChanSetDefinition ::= csdName〈〈N × CSExpression〉〉
ProcDefinition ::= pd〈〈N × Process〉〉
Process ::= proc〈〈seq PParagraph ×Action〉〉 | procName〈〈N 〉〉 |
procSeq〈〈Process × Process〉〉 | procExtChoice〈〈Process × Process〉〉 |
procIntChoice〈〈Process × Process〉〉 | procPar〈〈Process × CSExpression × Process〉〉 |
procInter〈〈Process × Process〉〉 | procHide〈〈Process × CSExpression〉〉 |
procRename〈〈Process × seq N × seq N 〉〉 | procParam〈〈Declaration × Process〉〉 |
procInstP〈〈Process × seq Expression〉〉 | procGeneric〈〈seq N × Process〉〉 |
procInstG〈〈Process × seq Expression〉〉 |
procItrInter〈〈Declaration × Process〉〉
PParagraph ::= pPar〈〈Paragraph〉〉 | def 〈〈N ×Action〉〉
GuardedAction ::= thenAct〈〈Predicate ×Action〉〉 |
thenActComp〈〈Predicate ×Action ×GuardedAction〉〉
237
Action ::= actSe〈〈SchemaExp〉〉 | com〈〈Command〉〉 | skip | stop | chaos |
prefixExp〈〈Communication ×Action〉〉 |
guard〈〈Predicate ×Action〉〉 | seqExp〈〈Action ×Action〉〉 |
extChoice〈〈Action ×Action〉〉 | intChoice〈〈Action ×Action〉〉 |
actPar〈〈Action × CSExpression ×Action〉〉 | actInter〈〈Action ×Action〉〉 |
actHide〈〈Action × CSExpression〉〉 | mu〈〈N ×Action〉〉 | actParam〈〈Declaration ×Action〉〉 |
actInst〈〈Action × seq Expression〉〉
CSExpression ::= cs〈〈seq N 〉〉 | csName〈〈N 〉〉 |
union〈〈CSExpression × CSExpression〉〉 |
intersect〈〈CSExpression × CSExpression〉〉 |
subtract〈〈CSExpression × CSExpression〉〉
Communication == N × seq CParameter
CParameter ::= shriek〈〈N 〉〉 | shriekRestrict〈〈N × Predicate〉〉 | bang〈〈Expression〉〉 |
dotParam〈〈Expression〉〉
Command ::= spec〈〈seq N × Predicate × Predicate〉〉 | equals〈〈N × seq Expression〉〉
[Predicate,N ,Expression,Paragraph,SchemaExp,Declaration]
238
Appendix E
Formal Translation Functions
This appendix presents all of the translation functions discussed in Sect. 5.2. These functions
are written in Z and translate SCJ programs into our Circus model. As discussed in Sect. 5.2,
these functions formalise the core of our translation strategy.
Framework
This section presents the definition of the framework model. Since the Circus model of the
framework is generic and reused, it is defined here as a Circus program composed of the model
presented in Sect. C.
section Framework parents scj prelude,SCJBNFEncoding ,CircusBNFEncoding
[ID ]
[Type]
NullType : Type
SafeletFWName : N
TopLevelMissionSequencerFWNMame : N
controlTierSync : CSExpression
Tier0 : N
MissionIds : seq CircusParagraph
SchedulableIds : seq CircusParagraph
ThreadIds : seq CircusParagraph
ObjectIds : seq CircusParagraph
ServicesChan : seq CircusParagraph
GlobalTypes : seq CircusParagraph
JTime : seq CircusParagraph
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PrimitiveTypes : seq CircusParagraph
Priority : seq CircusParagraph
PriorityQueue : seq CircusParagraph
FrameworkChan : seq CircusParagraph
MissionId : seq CircusParagraph
SchedulableId : seq CircusParagraph
ObjectFW : CircusParagraph
ObjectChan : seq CircusParagraph
ObjectFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
ObjectMethChan : seq CircusParagraph
ThreadFW : CircusParagraph
ThreadChan : seq CircusParagraph
ThreadFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
ThreadMethChan : seq CircusParagraph
SafeletFW : CircusParagraph
SafeletFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
SafeletChan : seq CircusParagraph
SafeletMethChan : seq CircusParagraph
TopLevelMissionSequencerFW : CircusParagraph
TopLevelMissionSequencerChan : seq CircusParagraph
TopLevelMissionSequencerFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
MissionSequencerChan : seq CircusParagraph
MissionSequencerFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
MissionSequencerMethChan : seq CircusParagraph
MissionFW : CircusParagraph
MissionChan : seq CircusParagraph
MissionFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
MissionMethChan : seq CircusParagraph
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SchedulableChan : seq CircusParagraph
SchedulableMethChan : seq CircusParagraph
SchedulableFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
HandlerChan : seq CircusParagraph
HandlerFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
HandlerMethChan : seq CircusParagraph
PeriodicEventHandlerChan : seq CircusParagraph
PeriodicEventHandlerFW : CircusParagraph
PeriodicEventHandlerFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
PeriodicParameters : seq CircusParagraph
AperiodicEventHandlerChan : seq CircusParagraph
AperiodicEventHandlerFW : CircusParagraph
AperiodicLongEventHandlerMethChan : seq CircusParagraph
AperiodicParameters : seq CircusParagraph
OneShotEventHandlerChan : seq CircusParagraph
OneShotEventHandlerFW : CircusParagraph
OneShotEventHandlerFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
OneShotEventHandlerMethChan : seq CircusParagraph
SchedulableMissionSequencerFW : CircusParagraph
SchedulableMissionSequencerChan : seq CircusParagraph
SchedulableMissionSequencerFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
ManagedThreadFW : CircusParagraph
ManagedThreadChan : seq CircusParagraph
ManagedThreadFWChan : seq CircusParagraph
ManagedThreadMethChan : seq CircusParagraph
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framework : CircusProgram
framework = ServicesChan aGlobalTypes a JTime a PrimitiveTypesa
Priority a PriorityQueue a FrameworkChan aMissionIda
SchedulableId a 〈ObjectFW 〉aObjectChana
ObjectFWChan aObjectMethChan a 〈ThreadFW 〉a
ThreadChan a ThreadFWChan a ThreadMethChan a 〈SafeletFW 〉a
SafeletFWChan a SafeletChan a SafeletMethChana
〈TopLevelMissionSequencerFW 〉a TopLevelMissionSequencerChana
TopLevelMissionSequencerFWChan aMissionSequencerChana
MissionSequencerFWChan aMissionSequencerMethChan a 〈MissionFW 〉a
MissionChan aMissionFWChan aMissionMethChan a SchedulableChana
SchedulableMethChan a SchedulableFWChan aHandlerChan aHandlerFWChana
HandlerMethChan a 〈PeriodicEventHandlerFW 〉a
PeriodicEventHandlerChan a PeriodicEventHandlerFWChan a PeriodicParametersa
AperiodicEventHandlerChan a 〈AperiodicEventHandlerFW 〉a
AperiodicLongEventHandlerMethChan aAperiodicParametersa
OneShotEventHandlerChan a 〈OneShotEventHandlerFW 〉a
OneShotEventHandlerFWChan aOneShotEventHandlerMethChana
〈SchedulableMissionSequencerFW 〉a
SchedulableMissionSequencerChan a SchedulableMissionSequencerFWChana
〈ManagedThreadFW 〉aManagedThreadChana
ManagedThreadFWChan aManagedThreadMethChan
Build Phase
This section presents the functions that constitute the build phase. This phase extracts the
application-specific information from an SCJ program and build an environment for each
component.
section BuildPhase parents scj prelude,SCJBNFEncoding ,CircusBNFEncoding ,Framework
TranslatablePrograms : PSCJProgram
TranslatablePrograms =
{s : SCJProgram |
ProgTLMS (s) 6= NoSequencer
∧ ProgTiers(s) 6= 〈〉
∧ ProgClusters(s) 6= ∅
∧ ∀ c : ProgClusters(s)
• ClusterSchedulables(c) 6= ∅}
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AppEnv
Name : N
Parameters : seq Expression
ClusterAppEnv
Mission : AppEnv
Schedulables : FAppEnv
Schedulables 6= ∅
TierAppEnv
Clusters : seq ClusterAppEnv
Clusters 6= 〈〉
AppProcEnv
Safelet : AppEnv
TopLevelMS : AppEnv
Tiers : seq TierAppEnv
Tiers 6= 〈〉
GetSafeletAppEnv : AppProcEnv →AppEnv
∀ a : AppProcEnv •
GetSafeletAppEnv(a) = a.Safelet
GetTLMSAppEnv : AppProcEnv →AppEnv
∀ a : AppProcEnv •
GetTLMSAppEnv(a) = a.TopLevelMS
GetTiersAppEnv : AppProcEnv → seq TierAppEnv
∀ a : AppProcEnv •
GetTiersAppEnv(a) = a.Tiers
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IDof : Identifier →N
ParamsOf : seq ClassBodyDeclaration→ seq Expression
BuildSOAppEnv : PSchedulableObject → FAppEnv
∀ scheds : PSchedulableObject
• ∃manT : ManagedThread ; nestMS : NestedMissionSequencer ; eh : EventHandler
perEH : PeriodicEventHandler ; oneEH : OneShotEventHandler ;
apehShort : Identifier × EventHandlerClassBody ;
apehLong : Identifier × LongEventHandlerClassBody
• BuildSOAppEnv(scheds) = {a : AppEnv
| ∀ so : scheds • ∃name : N ; params : seq Expression
| so = mt(manT )⇒
name = IDof (manT .1) ∧ params = ParamsOf (manT .2.2)
∧ so = nms(nestMS )⇒
name = IDof (nestMS .1) ∧ params = ParamsOf (nestMS .2.2)
∧ so = handler(pehDecl(perEH ))⇒
name = IDof (perEH .1) ∧ params = ParamsOf (perEH .2.2)
∧ so = handler(osehDecl(oneEH ))⇒
name = IDof (oneEH .1) ∧ params = ParamsOf (oneEH .2.2)
∧ so = handler(apehDecl(apehType(apehShort)))⇒
name = IDof (apehShort .1) ∧ params = ParamsOf (apehShort .2.2)
∧ so = handler(apehDecl(aplehType(apehLong)))⇒
name = IDof (apehLong .1) ∧ params = ParamsOf (apehLong .2.2)
• a = 〈|Name == name,Parameters == params|〉}
BuildClusterAppEnv : Cluster → ClusterAppEnv
∀ c : Cluster
• ∃m : Mission; seqSO : FSchedulableObject
| c = (m, seqSO)
• BuildClusterAppEnv(c) =
〈|Mission == 〈|Name == IDof (m.1),Parameters == ParamsOf (m.2.3)|〉,
Schedulables == BuildSOAppEnv(seqSO)|〉
BuildClusterAppEnvs : seq Cluster → seq ClusterAppEnv
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BuildTierAppEnv : Tier → TierAppEnv
∀ tier : Tier
• BuildTierAppEnv(tier) = 〈|Clusters == BuildClusterAppEnvs(tier)|〉
BuildTiersAppEnv : seq Tier → seq TierAppEnv
∀ tiers : seq Tier
• # tiers = 1⇒ BuildTiersAppEnv(tiers) = 〈BuildTierAppEnv(head tiers)〉
∧ # tiers ≥ 1⇒ BuildTiersAppEnv(tiers) =
〈BuildTierAppEnv(head tiers)〉a BuildTiersAppEnv(tail tiers)
BuildAppProcEnv : SCJProgram 7→AppProcEnv
dom BuildAppProcEnv = TranslatablePrograms
∀ scjProg : dom BuildAppProcEnv
• ∃ safelet : Safelet ; tiers : seq Tier ; ms : MissionSequencer
| safelet = ProgSafelet(scjProg)
∧ tlms(ms) = ProgTLMS (scjProg)
∧ tiers = ProgTiers(scjProg)
• ∃ sfEnv : AppEnv ; tlmsEnv : AppEnv ;
tiersEnv : seq TierAppEnv
• sfEnv = 〈|Name == IDof (safelet .1),
Parameters == ParamsOf (safelet .2.4)|〉
∧ tlmsEnv = 〈|Name == IDof (ms.1),
Parameters == ParamsOf (ms.2.2)|〉
∧ tiersEnv = BuildTiersAppEnv(tiers)
∧ BuildAppProcEnv(scjProg) = 〈|Safelet == sfEnv ,
TopLevelMS == tlmsEnv ,Tiers == tiersEnv |〉
ClusterEnv
Mission : Identifier
NestedMissionSequencers : P Identifier
ManagedThreads : P Identifier
PeriodicEventHandlers : P Identifier
AperiodicEventHandlers : P Identifier
OneShotEventHandlers : P Identifier
disjoint〈NestedMissionSequencers,ManagedThreads,PeriodicEventHandlers,
AperiodicEventHandlers,OneShotEventHandlers〉⋃{NestedMissionSequencers,ManagedThreads,PeriodicEventHandlers,
AperiodicEventHandlers,OneShotEventHandlers} 6= ∅
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TierEnv
Clusters : seq ClusterEnv
Clusters 6= 〈〉
FWEnv
TopLevelMS : Identifier
Tiers : seq TierEnv
Tiers 6= 〈〉
GetTierFWEnvs : FWEnv → seq TierEnv
∀ env : FWEnv
• GetTierFWEnvs(env) = env .Tiers
GetIdentifiers : FSchedulableObject → F Identifier
∀ scheds : FSchedulableObject
• ∃manT : ManagedThread ; nestMS : NestedMissionSequencer ;
perEH : PeriodicEventHandler ; oneEH : OneShotEventHandler ;
eh : EventHandler ;
apehShort : Identifier × EventHandlerClassBody ;
apehLong : Identifier × LongEventHandlerClassBody
• GetIdentifiers(scheds) = {i : Identifier
| ∀ s : scheds
• s = mt(manT )⇒ i = manT .1
∧ s = nms(nestMS )⇒ i = nestMS .1
∧ s = handler(pehDecl(perEH ))⇒ i = perEH .1
∧ s = handler(apehDecl(apehType(apehShort)))⇒ i = apehShort .1
∧ s = handler(apehDecl(aplehType(apehLong)))⇒ i = apehLong .1
∧ s = handler(osehDecl(oneEH ))⇒ i = oneEH .1
}
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BuildSOEnvs : FSchedulableObject→
F Identifier × F Identifier × F Identifier×
F Identifier × F Identifier
∀ s : FSchedulableObject
• ∃ sms : F Identifier ; pehs : F Identifier ;
apehs : F Identifier ; osehs : F Identifier ; mts : F Identifier
| mts = GetIdentifiers({mtSched : s
| ∃m : ManagedThread
• mtSched = mt(m)})
∧ sms = GetIdentifiers({nmsSched : s
| ∃n : NestedMissionSequencer
• nmsSched = nms(n)})
∧ pehs = GetIdentifiers({pehSched : s
| ∃ p : PeriodicEventHandler
• pehSched = handler(pehDecl(p))})
∧ apehs = GetIdentifiers({apehSched : s
| ∃ a : Identifier × EventHandlerClassBody
• apehSched = handler(apehDecl(apehType(a)))})
∧ apehs = GetIdentifiers({apehLSched : s
| ∃ a : Identifier × LongEventHandlerClassBody
• apehLSched = handler(apehDecl(aplehType(a)))})
∧ osehs = GetIdentifiers({osehSched : s
| ∃ o : OneShotEventHandler
• osehSched = handler(osehDecl(o))})
• BuildSOEnvs(s) = (sms, pehs, apehs, osehs,mts)
BuildClusterEnv : Cluster 7→ ClusterEnv
∀ c : Cluster
• ∃missionName : Identifier ; sms : F Identifier ; pehs : F Identifier ;
apehs : F Identifier ; oseh : F Identifier ; mts : F Identifier ; cluster : ClusterEnv
| missionName = c.1.1
∧ (sms, pehs, apehs, oseh,mts) = BuildSOEnvs(c.2)
• BuildClusterEnv(c) =
〈|Mission == missionName,NestedMissionSequencers == sms,
PeriodicEventHandlers == pehs,AperiodicEventHandlers == apehs,
OneShotEventHandlers == oseh,ManagedThreads == mts|〉
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BuildClusterEnvs : seq Cluster → seq ClusterEnv
∀ c : seq Cluster
| c 6= 〈〉 ∧ ∀ s : seq Cluster • s 6= 〈〉
• # c = 1⇒ BuildClusterEnvs(c) = 〈BuildClusterEnv(head c)〉
∧ # c ≥ 1⇒
BuildClusterEnvs(c) = 〈BuildClusterEnv(head c)〉a BuildClusterEnvs(tail c)
BuildTierEnv : Tier → TierEnv
∀ tier : seq Cluster
• BuildTierEnv(tier) = 〈|Clusters == BuildClusterEnvs(tier)|〉
BuildTierEnvs : seq Tier → seq TierEnv
∀ tiers : seq Tier •
BuildTierEnvs(tiers) = 〈BuildTierEnv(head tiers)〉a BuildTierEnvs(tail tiers)
BuildFWEnv : SCJProgram 7→ FWEnv
dom BuildFWEnv = TranslatablePrograms
∀ scjProg : dom BuildFWEnv
• ∃ tlmsID : Identifier ; tlmsBody : MissionSequencerClassBody ;
tiers : seq Tier |
ProgTLMS (scjProg) 6= NoSequencer
⇒ ProgTLMS (scjProg) = tlms(tlmsID , tlmsBody)
• BuildFWEnv(scjProg) =
〈|TopLevelMS == tlmsID ,Tiers == BuildTierEnvs(ProgTiers(scjProg))|〉
BinderMethodEnv
MethodName : N
Locs : FN
LocType : Type
Callers : FN
CallerType : Type
ReturnType : Type
Params : seq Type
Synchronised : B
MCBEnv == FBinderMethodEnv
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BuildBinderMethodName : N →N
GetSFMethods : Safelet → seq ClassBodyDeclaration
∀ sf : Safelet
• GetSFMethods(sf ) = sf .2.4
GetTLMSMethods : MissionSequencer → seq ClassBodyDeclaration
∀ tlms : MissionSequencer
• GetTLMSMethods(tlms) = tlms.2.2
SuperInterfacesOf : ClassDeclaration→ FN
SuperClassOf : ClassDeclaration→N
ProgramClasses : FClassDeclaration
ClassName : ClassDeclaration→N
MethodsOf : ClassDeclaration→ FMethodDeclaration
MethodName : MethodDeclaration→N
TypeOf : ClassDeclaration→ Type
IsSync : MethodDeclaration→ B
ReturnTypeOf : MethodDeclaration→ Type
MethodParams : MethodDeclaration→ seq Type
ClassMethodMap : ClassDeclaration→ FBinderMethodEnv
∀ c : ClassDeclaration
| c ∈ ProgramClasses
• ClassMethodMap(c) =
{m : MethodsOf (c)
• 〈|MethodName == MethodName(m),
Locs == {ClassName(c)},
LocType == TypeOf (c),
Callers == ∅,
CallerType == NullType,
ReturnType == ReturnTypeOf (m),
Params == MethodParams(m),
Synchronised == IsSync(m)|〉}
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GetCallerType : N → Type
AddCaller : (BinderMethodEnv ×N )→ BinderMethodEnv
∀meth : BinderMethodEnv ; caller : N
• AddCaller((meth, caller)) =
〈|MethodName == meth.MethodName,
Locs == meth.Locs,
LocType == meth.LocType,
Callers == meth.Callers ∪ {caller},
CallerType == GetCallerType(caller),
ReturnType == meth.ReturnType,
Params == meth.Params,
Synchronised == meth.Synchronised |〉
IgnoredMethods : FN
ClassesIn : SCJProgram→ FClassDeclaration
IsMethodInvocation : BlockStatement → B
CallTypeName : BlockStatement 7→N
StatementsIn : MethodDeclaration→ FBlockStatement
NameOfMethod : MethodDeclaration→N
MakesExternalMethodCall : ClassDeclaration→ B
∀ c : ClassDeclaration
• MakesExternalMethodCall(c) = True⇔
∃m : MethodDeclaration
• m ∈ MethodsOf (c)
∧ NameOfMethod(m) 6∈ IgnoredMethods
∧ ∃ s : StatementsIn(m)
• IsMethodInvocation(s) = True
LocOfExternalMethodCall : ClassDeclaration→ ClassDeclaration
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BuildMCBEnvs : SCJProgram 7→MCBEnv
dom BuildMCBEnvs = TranslatablePrograms
∀ scjProg : dom BuildMCBEnvs
• ∀ c : ClassesIn(scjProg)
• ∃ calledClass : ClassDeclaration
| calledClass = LocOfExternalMethodCall(c)
• BuildMCBEnvs(scjProg) =
{bme : BinderMethodEnv
| bme ∈ ClassMethodMap(calledClass)
• AddCaller(bme,ClassName(c))}
ThreadEnv == (ThreadIds × Priority)
LockingEnv
Threads : FThreadEnv
Objects : FObjectIds
Empty : B
Empty = True⇔ Threads = ∅ ∧ Objects = ∅
BuildThreads : FClassDeclaration→ F(ThreadIds × Priority)
BuildObjects : FClassDeclaration→ FObjectIds
BuildLockEnv : SCJProgram 7→ LockingEnv
dom BuildLockEnv = TranslatablePrograms
∀ scjProg : SCJProgram
• ∃ progClasses : FClassDeclaration; threads : FThreadEnv ;
objects : FObjectIds; empty : B
• progClasses = ClassesIn(scjProg)
∧ threads = BuildThreads(progClasses)
∧ objects = BuildObjects(progClasses)
∧ (threads = ∅ ∧ objects = ∅)⇒ empty = True
∧ (threads 6= ∅ ∨ objects 6= ∅)⇒ empty = False
∧ BuildLockEnv(scjProg) =
〈|Threads == threads, Objects == objects,
Empty == empty |〉
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Generate Phase
This section presents the functions constituting the generate phase, which use the information
in the environments to generate the Circus model for each component.
section GeneratePhase parents scj prelude,Framework ,BuildPhase
procNameOf : Process →N
ControlTierSync : CSExpression
MissionSync : CSExpression
SchedulablesSync : CSExpression
TierSync : TierEnv × TierEnv → CSExpression
∀ t1, t2 : TierEnv
• ∃m : seq N
• TierSync(t) = cs(m)
GetMissionID : ClusterEnv →N
GenerateTiersFWProc : ClusterEnv → Process
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GenerateClusterFWProcs : seq ClusterEnv → Process
∀ clusters : seq ClusterEnv
• # clusters = 1
⇒ GenerateClusterFWProcs(clusters) =
procPar(
procName(GetMissionID(head clusters)),
MissionSync,
GenerateTiersFWProc(head clusters)
)
∧ # clusters ≥ 1
⇒ GenerateClusterFWProcs(clusters) =
procPar(
procPar(
procName(GetMissionID(head clusters)),
MissionSync,
GenerateTiersFWProc(head clusters)),
SchedulablesSync,
GenerateClusterFWProcs(tail clusters)
)
GenerateTierFWProcs : seq TierEnv → seq Process
∀ tiers : seq TierEnv
• # tiers = 1⇒
GenerateTierFWProcs(tiers) = 〈GenerateClusterFWProcs((head tiers).Clusters)〉
∧ # tiers ≥ 1⇒
GenerateTierFWProcs(tiers) =
〈GenerateClusterFWProcs((head tiers).Clusters)〉
aGenerateTierFWProcs(tail tiers)
GenerateTierFWProc : seq TierEnv → Process
ControlTier : N
TopLevelMissionSequencerFWName : N
GetParams : Identifier → seq Expression
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GenerateFWProcs : FWEnv → seq Process
∀ env : FWEnv
• ∃ fwProc : Process; controlTierProc : Process; tierProcs : seq Process
| fwProc = procPar(
procName(ControlTier),
TierSync(head env .Tiers),
GenerateTierFWProc(env .Tiers)
)
∧ controlTierProc = procPar(
procName(SafeletFWName),
ControlTierSync,
procInstP(procName(TopLevelMissionSequencerFWName),
GetParams(env .TopLevelMS ))
)
∧ tierProcs = GenerateTierFWProcs(env .Tiers)
• GenerateFWProcs(env) = 〈fwProc〉a 〈controlTierProc〉a tierProcs
GenerateAppTierProcs : seq TierAppEnv → Process
GenerateAppProc : AppProcEnv → Process
∀ appProcEnv : AppProcEnv
• ∃ sfAppEnv : AppEnv ; tlmsAppEnv : AppEnv ; tiersAppEnvs : seq TierAppEnv
| sfAppEnv = GetSafeletAppEnv(appProcEnv)
∧ tlmsAppEnv = GetTLMSAppEnv(appProcEnv)
∧ tiersAppEnvs = GetTiersAppEnv(appProcEnv)
• GenerateAppProc(appProcEnv) =
procInter(
procInter(
procInstP(procName(sfAppEnv .Name), sfAppEnv .Parameters),
procInstP(procName(tlmsAppEnv .Name), tlmsAppEnv .Parameters)
),
GenerateAppTierProcs(tiersAppEnvs)
)
Locking : N
Threads : N
ThreadSync : CSExpression
Objects : N
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BinderCallChan : N → seq N
NaturalCallChan : N → seq N
NaturalRetChan : N → seq N
BindeRetChan : N → seq N
MCBParams : seq Type→ Expression
GenerateMCBChan : BinderMethodEnv → CircusParagraph
∀ bme : BinderMethodEnv
• GenerateMCBChan(bme) = chanDef (
multiDecl(chanNameWithType(NaturalCallChan(bme.MethodName),
MCBParams(bme.Params)),
scDecl(chanNameWithType(NaturalRetChan(bme.MethodName),
MCBParams(bme.Params))))
)
MethodCallBinderSync : N
GenerateMethodCallBinderSync : PBinderMethodEnv → CircusParagraph
GenerateMCBChans : PBinderMethodEnv → seq CircusParagraph
∀ bEnvs : PBinderMethodEnv
| bEnvs 6= ∅
• ∃ seqCP : seq CircusParagraph
| ∀ bme : bEnvs • GenerateMCBChan(bme) ∈ ran seqCP
• GenerateMCBChans(bEnvs) = seqCP
BinderCallComm : N →N
NaturalCallComm : N →N
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NaturalRetComm : N →N
BindeRetComm : N →N
GenerateMCBName : N →N
BinderCallParams : seq Type→ seq CParameter
NaturalCallParams : seq Type→ seq CParameter
NaturalRetParams : seq Type→ seq CParameter
BinderRetParams : seq Type→ seq CParameter
BinderActions : N
DoneTLS : Communication
NoState : SchemaExp
MethodCallBinder : N
GenerateMCBAction : BinderMethodEnv → PParagraph
∀ bme : BinderMethodEnv
• GenerateMCBAction(bme) = actDef (GenerateMCBName(bme.MethodName),
prefixExp((BinderCallComm(bme.MethodName),
BinderCallParams(bme.Params)),
prefixExp((NaturalCallComm(bme.MethodName),
BinderCallParams(bme.Params)),
prefixExp((NaturalRetComm(bme.MethodName),
BinderCallParams(bme.Params)),
prefixExp((BindeRetComm(bme.MethodName),
BinderCallParams(bme.Params)),
actName(GenerateMCBName(bme.MethodName))
)
)
)
)
)
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GenerateMCBActions : PBinderMethodEnv → seq PParagraph
∀ bEnvs : FBinderMethodEnv
• ∃ seqPP : seq PParagraph
| ∀ bme : bEnvs • GenerateMCBAction(bme) ∈ ran seqPP
• GenerateMCBActions(bEnvs) = seqPP
GenerateMCBProc : PBinderMethodEnv → CircusParagraph
∀ bmes : PBinderMethodEnv
• GenerateMCBProc(bmes) =
procDef (pd(MethodCallBinder ,
proc(
〈〉,
NoState,
GenerateMCBActions(bmes),
actInterupt(actName(BinderActions), prefixExp(DoneTLS , skip))
)
))
GenerateMCBModel : MCBEnv → seq CircusParagraph
∀ bEnvs : MCBEnv
• bEnvs = ∅⇒ GenerateMCBModel(bEnvs) = 〈〉
∧ bEnvs 6= ∅⇒
GenerateMCBModel(bEnvs) = GenerateMCBChans(bEnvs)a
〈GenerateMethodCallBinderSync(bEnvs),GenerateMCBProc(bEnvs)〉
GenerateThreadProc : P(ThreadIds × Priority)→ Process
GenerateObjectProc : PObjectIds → Process
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GenerateLockModel : LockingEnv → seq CircusParagraph
∀ lEnv : LockingEnv
• lEnv .Empty = True
⇒ GenerateLockModel(lEnv) = 〈〉
∧ lEnv .Empty = False
⇒ GenerateLockModel(lEnv) =
〈
procDef (pd(Locking , procPar(procName(Threads),
ThreadSync,
procName(Objects)))
),
procDef (pd(Threads,GenerateThreadProc(lEnv .Threads))),
procDef (pd(Objects,GenerateObjectProc(lEnv .Objects)))
〉
Translate SCJ Program
This section presents the TransSCJProg function, which translates an SCJ program into
Circus using the functions defined in the previous sections.
section TransSCJProg parents scj prelude,SCJBNFEncoding ,CircusBNFEncoding ,
BuildPhase,GeneratePhase,Framework
ProcessID : N → ID
TransClasses : SCJProgram→ CircusProgram
FWName : N
AppName : N
MCBName : N
LockName : N
ProgName : Identifier 7→N
appComms : CSExpression
mcbComms : CSExpression
lockComms : CSExpression
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TransSCJProg : Identifier × SCJProgram 7→ CircusProgram
dom TransSCJProg = Identifier × TranslatablePrograms
∀name : Identifier ; scjProg : SCJProgram
• ∃ app : CircusProgram; program : CircusProgram;
fwProcs : seq Process; appProc : Process; lockModel : seq CircusParagraph;
mcbModel : seq CircusParagraph; fwEnv : FWEnv ;
appEnv : AppProcEnv ; mcbEnvs : MCBEnv ; lockEnv : LockingEnv |
fwEnv = BuildFWEnv(scjProg)
appEnv = BuildAppProcEnv(scjProg)
mcbEnvs = BuildMCBEnvs(scjProg)
lockEnv = BuildLockEnv(scjProg)
app = TransClasses(scjProg)
∧ fwProcs = GenerateFWProcs(fwEnv)
∧ appProc = GenerateAppProc(appEnv)
∧ mcbModel = GenerateMCBModel(mcbEnvs)
∧ lockModel = GenerateLockModel(lockEnv)
∧ program = 〈procDef (pd(ProgName(name),
procHide(procPar(
procHide(
procPar(
procName(FWName),
appComms,
procHide(
procPar(procName(AppName),
mcbComms,
procName(MCBName)),
mcbComms)),
appComms),
lockComms,
procName(LockName)),
lockComms)))〉 •
TransSCJProg(name, scjProg) =
framework a 〈procDef (pd(FWName, head fwProcs))〉
aapp a 〈procDef (pd(AppName, appProc))〉
amcbModel a lockModel a program
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Appendix F
Translated Application 1: Shared
Buffer
This appendix contains the full model of the aircraft application (described in Sect. 2.1.2).
Section F.1 contains the definitions of the process identifiers. Section F.2 contains the def-
inition of top-level network processes and channels. Then we present the models of the
paradigm objects: Sect. F.3 contains the safelet, Sect. F.4 contains the top-level mission
sequencer, Sect. F.5 contains the mission, and Sect. F.5.1 contains its schedulables.
F.1 ID Definitions
F.1.1 MissionIds
section MissionIds parents scj prelude,MissionId
MainMissionMID : MissionID
distinct〈nullMissionId ,MainMissionMID〉
F.1.2 SchedulablesIds
section SchedulableIds parents scj prelude,SchedulableId
MainMissionSequencerSID : SchedulableID
ProducerSID : SchedulableID
ConsumerSID : SchedulableID
distinct〈nullSequencerId ,nullSchedulableId ,MainMissionSequencerSID ,
ProducerSID ,ConsumerSID〉
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F.1.3 NonParadignIds
section NonParadigmIds parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes
BufferID : NonParadigmID
distinct〈BufferID〉
F.2 Network
F.2.1 Network Channel Sets
section NetworkChan parents scj prelude,MissionId ,MissionIds,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MissionChan,TopLevelMissionSequencerFWChan,
FrameworkChan,SafeletChan,AperiodicEventHandlerChan,ManagedThreadChan,
OneShotEventHandlerChan,PeriodicEventHandlerChan,MissionSequencerMethChan
channelset TerminateSync ==
{| schedulables terminated , schedulables stopped , get activeSchedulables |}
channelset ControlTierSync ==
{| start toplevel sequencer , done toplevel sequencer , done safeletFW |}
channelset TierSync ==
{| start mission .PCMission, done mission .PCMission,
done safeletFW , done toplevel sequencer |}
channelset MissionSync ==
{| done safeletFW , done toplevel sequencer , register ,
signalTerminationCall , signalTerminationRet , activate schedulables, done schedulable,
cleanupSchedulableCall , cleanupSchedulableRet |}
channelset SchedulablesSync ==
{| activate schedulables, done safeletFW , done toplevel sequencer |}
channelset ClusterSync ==
{| done toplevel sequencer , done safeletFW |}
channelset SafeltAppSync =̂ {| getSequencerCall , getSequencerRet ,
initializeApplicationCall , initializeApplicationRet , end safelet app |}
channelset MissionSequencerAppSync ==
{| getNextMissionCall , getNextMissionRet , end sequencer app |}
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channelset MissionAppSync ==
{| initializeCall , register , initializeRet , cleanupMissionCall , cleanupMissionRet |}
channelset AppSync ==⋃{SafeltAppSync,MissionSequencerAppSync,MissionAppSync,
MTAppSync,OSEHSync,APEHSync,PEHSync,
{| getSequencer , end mission app, end managedThread app,
setCeilingPriority , requestTerminationCall ,
requestTerminationRet , terminationPendingCall ,
terminationPendingRet , handleAsyncEventCall , handleAsyncEventRet |}}
channelset ThreadSync ==
{| raise thread priority , lower thread priority ,
isInterruptedCall , isInterruptedRet , get priorityLevel |}
channelset LockingSync ==
{| lockAcquired , startSyncMeth, endSyncMeth,waitCall ,waitRet ,
notify , isInterruptedCall , isInterruptedRet , interruptedCall , interruptedRet ,
done toplevel sequencer , get priorityLevel |}
F.2.2 MethodCallBinder
section MethodCallBindingChannels parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes,
FrameworkChan,MissionId ,MissionIds,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,
ThreadIds,NonParadigmIds
channel binder readCall : NonParadigmID × SchedulableID × ThreadID
channel binder readRet : NonParadigmID × SchedulableID × ThreadID × Z
readLocs == {BufferID}
readCallers == {ConsumerSID}
channel binder writeCall : NonParadigmID × SchedulableID × ThreadID × Z
channel binder writeRet : NonParadigmID × SchedulableID × ThreadID
writeLocs == {BufferID}
writeCallers == {ProducerSID}
channelset MethodCallBinderSync == {| done toplevel sequencer , binder readCall ,
binder readRet , binder writeCall , binder writeRet |}
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section NetworkMethodCallBinder parents scj prelude,MissionId ,MissionIds,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels,BuffeMethChan,
PCMissionMethChan
process MethodCallBinder =̂ begin
read MethodBinder =̂
binder readCall ? loc : (loc ∈ readLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ readCallers) ? callingThread−→
readCall . loc . caller . callingThread−→
readRet . loc . caller . callingThread ? ret−→
binder readRet . loc . caller . callingThread ! ret−→
read MethodBinder

write MethodBinder =̂
binder writeCall ? loc : (loc ∈ writeLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ writeCallers) ? callingThread ? p1−→
writeCall . loc . caller . callingThread ! p1−→
writeRet . loc . caller . callingThread−→
binder writeRet . loc . caller . callingThread −→
write MethodBinder

BinderActions =̂
read MethodBinder9
write MethodBinder

• BinderActions 4 (done toplevel sequencer −→ Skip)
end
F.2.3 Locking
section NetworkLocking parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes,FrameworkChan,
MissionId ,MissionIds,ThreadIds,NetworkChannels,ObjectFW ,ThreadFW ,Priority
process Threads =̂(
ThreadFW (ProducerTID , 10) 9 ThreadFW (ConsumerTID , 10))
process Objects =̂(
ObjectFW (BufferOID)
)
process Locking =̂ (Threads J ThreadSync KObjects)4 (done toplevel sequencer −→ Skip)
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F.2.4 Program
section NetworkProgram parents scj prelude,MissionId ,MissionIds,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MissionChan,SchedulableMethChan,MissionFW ,
SafeletFW ,TopLevelMissionSequencerFW ,NetworkChannels,ManagedThreadFW ,
SchedulableMissionSequencerFW ,PeriodicEventHandlerFW ,ObjectFW ,
AperiodicEventHandlerFW ,OneShotEventHandlerFW ,ThreadFW ,
PCSafeletApp,PCMissionSequencerApp,PCMissionApp,
ProducerApp,ConsumerApp
process ControlTier =̂
SafeletFWJControlTierSyncK
TopLevelMissionSequencerFW (PCMissionSequencer)

process Tier0 =̂
MissionFW (PCMissionID)JMissionSyncK
ManagedThreadFW (ProducerID)JSchedulablesSyncK
ManagedThreadFW (ConsumerID)


process Framework =̂
ControlTierJTierSyncK
Tier0

process Application =̂
PCSafeletApp9
PCMissionSequencerApp9
PCMissionApp9
ProducerApp(PCMissionID)9
ConsumerApp(PCMissionID)9
BufferApp

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section Network parents NetworkProgram,MethodCallBindingChannels,
NetworkMethodCallBinder ,NetworkChan,NetworkLocking
process Bound Application =̂ Application JMethodCallBinderSync KMethodCallBinder
process Program =̂
(
Framework JAppSync K Bound Application) J LockingSync K Locking
F.3 BSafelet
section BSafeletApp parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,SafeletChan,
MethodCallBindingChannels
process BSafeletApp =̂ begin
InitializeApplication =̂
initializeApplicationCall−→
initializeApplicationRet−→
Skip

GetSequencer =̂
getSequencerCall−→
getSequencerRet ! MainMissionSequencerSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂
GetSequencer@
InitializeApplication
 ; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end safelet app −→ Skip)
end
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F.4 MainMissionSequencer
section MainMissionSequencerApp parents TopLevelMissionSequencerChan,
MissionId ,MissionIds,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,PCMissionSequencerClass,
MethodCallBindingChannels
process MainMissionSequencerApp =̂ begin
State
this : ref PCMissionSequencerClass
state State
Init
State ′
this ′ = circnewPCMissionSequencerClass()
GetNextMission =̂ var ret : MissionID •
getNextMissionCall .PCMissionSequencerSID−→
ret := this . getNextMission();
getNextMissionRet .PCMissionSequencerSID ! ret−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
GetNextMission
)
; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end sequencer app .PCMissionSequencerSID −→ Skip)
end
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section MainMissionSequencerClass parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,SafeletChan
,MethodCallBindingChannels,MissionId ,MissionIds
class MainMissionSequencerClass =̂ begin
state State
returnedMission : B
state State
initial Init
State ′
returnedMission ′ = False
protected getNextMission =̂
if (¬ returnedMission)−→(
returnedMission := True;
ret := PCMissionMID
)
8¬ (¬ returnedMission)−→(
ret := nullMissionId
)
fi

• Skip
end
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F.5 MainMission
section MainMissionApp parents scj prelude,MissionId ,MissionIds,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MissionChan,SchedulableMethChan,
MethodCallBindingChannels
process MainMissionApp =̂ begin
InitializePhase =̂
initializeCall .PCMissionMID−→
register ! ProducerSID ! PCMissionMID−→
register ! ConsumerSID ! PCMissionMID−→
initializeRet .PCMissionMID−→
Skip

CleanupPhase =̂ var ret : B •
cleanupMissionCall .PCMissionMID−→(
ret := False
)
;
cleanupMissionRet .PCMissionMID ! ret−→
Skip

Methods =̂

InitializePhase@
CleanupPhase
 ; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end mission app .PCMissionMID −→ Skip)
end
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F.5.1 Schedulables of MainMission
section ProducerApp parents ManagedThreadChan,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,
MethodCallBindingChannels,MissionMethChan,BufferMethChan,ObjectIds,ThreadIds
process ProducerApp =̂
pcMission : MissionID • begin
Run =̂
runCall .ProducerSID−→
var i : Z • i := 1;
µX •
terminationPendingCall . pcMission−→
terminationPendingRet . pcMission ? terminationPending−→
var loopVar : B • loopVar := (¬ terminationPending);
if (loopVar = True)−→
binder writeCall .BufferID .ProducerSID .ProducerTID ! i−→
binder writeRet .BufferID .ProducerSID .ProducerTID−→
Skip;
i := i + 1;
if (i ≥ 5)−→
requestTerminationCall . pcMission .ProducerSID−→
requestTerminationRet . pcMission .ProducerSID ? rt−→
Skip

8¬ (i ≥ 5)−→ Skip
fi

; X
8 (loopVar = False)−→ Skip
fi


;
runRet .ProducerSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
Run
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end managedThread app .ProducerSID −→ Skip)
end
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section ConsumerApp parents ManagedThreadChan,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,
MethodCallBindingChannels,MissionMethChan,BufferMethChan,ObjectIds,ThreadIds
process ConsumerApp =̂
pcMission : MissionID • begin
Run =̂
runCall .ConsumerSID−→
µX •
terminationPendingCall . pcMission−→
terminationPendingRet . pcMission ? terminationPending−→
var loopVar : B • loopVar := (¬ terminationPending);
if (loopVar = True)−→
var result : Z • result := 999;
binder readCall .BufferID .ConsumerSID .ConsumerTID−→
binder readRet .BufferID .ConsumerSID .ConsumerTID ? b−→
Skip

; X8 (loopVar = False)−→ Skip
fi


;
runRet .ConsumerSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
Run
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end managedThread app .ConsumerSID −→ Skip)
end
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Appendix G
Translated Application 2: Aircraft
This appendix contains the full model of the aircraft application (described in Sect. 2.1.3).
Section G.1 contains the definitions of the process identifiers. Section G.2 contains the defini-
tion of top-level network processes and channels. Then we present the models of the paradigm
objects: Sect. G.3 contains the safelet, Sect. G.4 contains the top-level mission sequencer,
and Sect. G.5 contains each of the missions followed by its schedulables.
G.1 ID Files
G.1.1 MissionIds
section MissionIds parents scj prelude,MissionId
MainMissionMID : MissionID
TakeOffMissionMID : MissionID
CruiseMissionMID : MissionID
LandMissionMID : MissionID
distinct〈nullMissionId ,MainMissionMID ,TakeOffMissionMID ,
CruiseMissionMID ,LandMissionMID〉
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G.1.2 SchedulablesIds
section SchedulableIds parents scj prelude,SchedulableId
MainMissionSequencerSID : SchedulableID
ACModeChangerSID : SchedulableID
EnvironmentMonitorSID : SchedulableID
ControlHandlerSID : SchedulableID
FlightSensorsMonitorSID : SchedulableID
CommunicationsHandlerSID : SchedulableID
AperiodicSimulatorSID : SchedulableID
LandingGearHandlerTakeOffSID : SchedulableID
TakeOffMonitorSID : SchedulableID
TakeOffFailureHandlerSID : SchedulableID
BeginLandingHandlerSID : SchedulableID
NavigationMonitorSID : SchedulableID
GroundDistanceMonitorSID : SchedulableID
LandingGearHandlerLandSID : SchedulableID
InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorSID : SchedulableID
SafeLandingHandlerSID : SchedulableID
distinct〈nullSequencerId ,nullSchedulableId ,MainMissionSequencerSID ,
ACModeChangerSID ,EnvironmentMonitorSID ,
ControlHandlerSID ,FlightSensorsMonitorSID ,
CommunicationsHandlerSID ,AperiodicSimulatorSID ,
LandingGearHandlerTakeOffSID ,TakeOffMonitorSID ,
TakeOffFailureHandlerSID ,BeginLandingHandlerSID ,
NavigationMonitorSID ,GroundDistanceMonitorSID ,
LandingGearHandlerLandSID , InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorSID ,
SafeLandingHandlerSID〉
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G.1.3 ThreadIds
section ThreadIds parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes
InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorTID : ThreadID
SafeLandingHandlerTID : ThreadID
GroundDistanceMonitorTID : ThreadID
CommunicationsHandlerTID : ThreadID
ControlHandlerTID : ThreadID
AperiodicSimulatorTID : ThreadID
TakeOffFailureHandlerTID : ThreadID
LandingGearHandlerLandTID : ThreadID
EnvironmentMonitorTID : ThreadID
FlightSensorsMonitorTID : ThreadID
NavigationMonitorTID : ThreadID
ACModeChangerTID : ThreadID
BeginLandingHandlerTID : ThreadID
LandingGearHandlerTakeOffTID : ThreadID
TakeOffMonitorTID : ThreadID
distinct〈SafeletTId ,nullThreadId ,
InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorTID ,SafeLandingHandlerTID ,
GroundDistanceMonitorTID ,CommunicationsHandlerTID ,
ControlHandlerTID ,AperiodicSimulatorTID ,
TakeOffFailureHandlerTID ,LandingGearHandlerLandTID ,
EnvironmentMonitorTID ,FlightSensorsMonitorTID ,
NavigationMonitorTID ,ACModeChangerTID ,
BeginLandingHandlerTID ,LandingGearHandlerTakeOffTID ,
TakeOffMonitorTID〉
G.1.4 ObjectIds
section ObjectIds parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes
TakeOffMissionOID : ObjectID
LandMissionOID : ObjectID
distinct〈TakeOffMissionOID ,LandMissionOID〉
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G.2 Network
G.2.1 Network Channel Sets
section NetworkChan parents scj prelude,MissionId ,MissionIds,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MissionChan,TopLevelMissionSequencerFWChan,
FrameworkChan,SafeletChan,AperiodicEventHandlerChan,ManagedThreadChan,
OneShotEventHandlerChan,PeriodicEventHandlerChan,MissionSequencerMethChan
channelset TerminateSync ==
{| schedulables terminated , schedulables stopped , get activeSchedulables |}
channelset ControlTierSync ==
{| start toplevel sequencer , done toplevel sequencer , done safeletFW |}
channelset TierSync ==
{| start mission .MainMission, done mission .MainMission,
done safeletFW , done toplevel sequencer |}
channelset MissionSync ==
{| done safeletFW , done toplevel sequencer , register ,
signalTerminationCall , signalTerminationRet , activate schedulables, done schedulable,
cleanupSchedulableCall , cleanupSchedulableRet |}
channelset SchedulablesSync ==
{| activate schedulables, done safeletFW , done toplevel sequencer |}
channelset ClusterSync ==
{| done toplevel sequencer , done safeletFW |}
channelset SafeltAppSync =̂ {| getSequencerCall , getSequencerRet ,
initializeApplicationCall , initializeApplicationRet , end safelet app |}
channelset MissionSequencerAppSync ==
{| getNextMissionCall , getNextMissionRet , end sequencer app |}
channelset MissionAppSync ==
{| initializeCall , register , initializeRet , cleanupMissionCall , cleanupMissionRet |}
channelset AppSync ==⋃{SafeltAppSync,MissionSequencerAppSync,MissionAppSync,
MTAppSync,OSEHSync,APEHSync,PEHSync,
{| getSequencer , end mission app, end managedThread app,
setCeilingPriority , requestTerminationCall ,
requestTerminationRet , terminationPendingCall ,
terminationPendingRet , handleAsyncEventCall , handleAsyncEventRet |}}
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channelset ThreadSync ==
{| raise thread priority , lower thread priority ,
isInterruptedCall , isInterruptedRet , get priorityLevel |}
channelset LockingSync ==
{| lockAcquired , startSyncMeth, endSyncMeth,waitCall ,waitRet ,
notify , isInterruptedCall , isInterruptedRet , interruptedCall , interruptedRet ,
done toplevel sequencer , get priorityLevel |}
channelset Tier0Sync == {| done toplevel sequencer , done safeletFW ,
start mission .TakeOffMission, done mission .TakeOffMission,
initializeRet .TakeOffMission,
requestTermination .TakeOffMission .MainMissionSequencer ,
start mission .CruiseMission, done mission .CruiseMission,
initializeRet .CruiseMission,
requestTermination .CruiseMission .MainMissionSequencer ,
start mission .LandMission, done mission .LandMission,
initializeRet .LandMission,
requestTermination .LandMission .MainMissionSequencer |}
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G.2.2 MethodCallBinder
section MethodCallBindingChannels parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes,FrameworkChan,
MissionId ,MissionIds,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,ThreadIds
channel binder setCabinPressureCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel binder setCabinPressureRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
setCabinPressureLocs == {MainMissionMID}
setCabinPressureCallers == {EnvironmentMonitorSID}
channel binder setFuelRemainingCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel binder setFuelRemainingRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
setFuelRemainingLocs == {MainMissionMID}
setFuelRemainingCallers == {EnvironmentMonitorSID}
channel binder getAltitudeCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel binder getAltitudeRet : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
getAltitudeLocs == {MainMissionMID}
getAltitudeCallers == {NavigationMonitorSID ,TakeOffMonitorSID ,
GroundDistanceMonitorSID ,SafeLandingHandlerSID}
channel binder setHeadingCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel binder setHeadingRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
setHeadingLocs == {MainMissionMID}
setHeadingCallers == {FlightSensorsMonitorSID}
channel binder stowLandingGearCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel binder stowLandingGearRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
stowLandingGearLocs == {TakeOffMissionMID ,LandMissionMID}
stowLandingGearCallers == {LandingGearHandlerSID ,LandingGearHandlerLandSID}
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channel binder takeOffAbortCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel binder takeOffAbortRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
takeOffAbortLocs == {TakeOffMissionMID}
takeOffAbortCallers == {TakeOffFailureHandlerSID}
channel binder setAltitudeCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel binder setAltitudeRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
setAltitudeLocs == {MainMissionMID}
setAltitudeCallers == {FlightSensorsMonitorSID}
channel binder getHeadingCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel binder getHeadingRet : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
getHeadingLocs == {MainMissionMID}
getHeadingCallers == {NavigationMonitorSID}
channel binder getAirSpeedCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel binder getAirSpeedRet : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
getAirSpeedLocs == {MainMissionMID}
getAirSpeedCallers == {NavigationMonitorSID ,TakeOffFailureHandlerSID}
channel binder deployLandingGearCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel binder deployLandingGearRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
deployLandingGearLocs == {TakeOffMissionMID ,LandMissionMID}
deployLandingGearCallers == {LandingGearHandlerSID ,
LandingGearHandlerLandSID}
channel binder setEmergencyOxygenCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel binder setEmergencyOxygenRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
setEmergencyOxygenLocs == {MainMissionMID}
setEmergencyOxygenCallers == {EnvironmentMonitorSID}
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channel binder setAirSpeedCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel binder setAirSpeedRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
setAirSpeedLocs == {MainMissionMID}
setAirSpeedCallers == {FlightSensorsMonitorSID}
channel binder isLandingGearDeployedCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel binder isLandingGearDeployedRet : MissionID × SchedulableID × B
isLandingGearDeployedLocs == {TakeOffMissionMID ,LandMissionMID}
isLandingGearDeployedCallers == {LandingGearHandlerSID ,LandingGearHandlerLandSID}
channelset MethodCallBinderSync == {| done toplevel sequencer ,
binder setCabinPressureCall , binder setCabinPressureRet ,
binder setFuelRemainingCall , binder setFuelRemainingRet ,
binder getAltitudeCall , binder getAltitudeRet ,
binder setHeadingCall , binder setHeadingRet ,
binder stowLandingGearCall , binder stowLandingGearRet ,
binder takeOffAbortCall , binder takeOffAbortRet ,
binder setAltitudeCall , binder setAltitudeRet ,
binder getHeadingCall , binder getHeadingRet ,
binder getAirSpeedCall , binder getAirSpeedRet ,
binder deployLandingGearCall , binder deployLandingGearRet ,
binder setEmergencyOxygenCall , binder setEmergencyOxygenRet ,
binder setAirSpeedCall , binder setAirSpeedRet ,
binder isLandingGearDeployedCall , binder isLandingGearDeployedRet |}
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section NetworkMethodCallBinder parents scj prelude,MissionId ,MissionIds,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels,
MainMissionMethChan,LandMissionMethChan
process MethodCallBinder =̂ begin
setCabinPressure MethodBinder =̂
binder setCabinPressureCall
? loc : (loc ∈ setCabinPressureLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ setCabinPressureCallers) ? p1−→
setCabinPressureCall . loc . caller ! p1−→
setCabinPressureRet . loc . caller−→
binder setCabinPressureRet . loc . caller −→
setCabinPressure MethodBinder

setFuelRemaining MethodBinder =̂
binder setFuelRemainingCall
? loc : (loc ∈ setFuelRemainingLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ setFuelRemainingCallers) ? p1−→
setFuelRemainingCall . loc . caller ! p1−→
setFuelRemainingRet . loc . caller−→
binder setFuelRemainingRet . loc . caller −→
setFuelRemaining MethodBinder

getAltitude MethodBinder =̂
binder getAltitudeCall
? loc : (loc ∈ getAltitudeLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ getAltitudeCallers)−→
getAltitudeCall . loc . caller−→
getAltitudeRet . loc . caller ? ret−→
binder getAltitudeRet . loc . caller ! ret−→
getAltitude MethodBinder

setHeading MethodBinder =̂
binder setHeadingCall
? loc : (loc ∈ setHeadingLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ setHeadingCallers) ? p1−→
setHeadingCall . loc . caller ! p1−→
setHeadingRet . loc . caller−→
binder setHeadingRet . loc . caller −→
setHeading MethodBinder

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stowLandingGear MethodBinder =̂
binder stowLandingGearCall
? loc : (loc ∈ stowLandingGearLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ stowLandingGearCallers)−→
stowLandingGearCall . loc . caller−→
stowLandingGearRet . loc . caller−→
binder stowLandingGearRet . loc . caller −→
stowLandingGear MethodBinder

takeOffAbort MethodBinder =̂
binder takeOffAbortCall
? loc : (loc ∈ takeOffAbortLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ takeOffAbortCallers)−→
takeOffAbortCall . loc . caller−→
takeOffAbortRet . loc . caller−→
binder takeOffAbortRet . loc . caller −→
takeOffAbort MethodBinder

setAltitude MethodBinder =̂
binder setAltitudeCall ? loc : (loc ∈ setAltitudeLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ setAltitudeCallers) ? p1−→
setAltitudeCall . loc . caller ! p1−→
setAltitudeRet . loc . caller−→
binder setAltitudeRet . loc . caller −→
setAltitude MethodBinder

getHeading MethodBinder =̂
binder getHeadingCall ? loc : (loc ∈ getHeadingLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ getHeadingCallers)−→
getHeadingCall . loc . caller−→
getHeadingRet . loc . caller ? ret−→
binder getHeadingRet . loc . caller ! ret−→
getHeading MethodBinder

getAirSpeed MethodBinder =̂
binder getAirSpeedCall
? loc : (loc ∈ getAirSpeedLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ getAirSpeedCallers)−→
getAirSpeedCall . loc . caller−→
getAirSpeedRet . loc . caller ? ret−→
binder getAirSpeedRet . loc . caller ! ret−→
getAirSpeed MethodBinder

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deployLandingGear MethodBinder =̂
binder deployLandingGearCall
? loc : (loc ∈ deployLandingGearLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ deployLandingGearCallers)−→
deployLandingGearCall . loc . caller−→
deployLandingGearRet . loc . caller−→
binder deployLandingGearRet . loc . caller −→
deployLandingGear MethodBinder

setEmergencyOxygen MethodBinder =̂
binder setEmergencyOxygenCall
? loc : (loc ∈ setEmergencyOxygenLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ setEmergencyOxygenCallers) ? p1−→
setEmergencyOxygenCall . loc . caller ! p1−→
setEmergencyOxygenRet . loc . caller−→
binder setEmergencyOxygenRet . loc . caller −→
setEmergencyOxygen MethodBinder

setAirSpeed MethodBinder =̂
binder setAirSpeedCall
? loc : (loc ∈ setAirSpeedLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ setAirSpeedCallers) ? p1−→
setAirSpeedCall . loc . caller ! p1−→
setAirSpeedRet . loc . caller−→
binder setAirSpeedRet . loc . caller −→
setAirSpeed MethodBinder

isLandingGearDeployed MethodBinder =̂
binder isLandingGearDeployedCall
? loc : (loc ∈ isLandingGearDeployedLocs)
? caller : (caller ∈ isLandingGearDeployedCallers)−→
isLandingGearDeployedCall . loc . caller−→
isLandingGearDeployedRet . loc . caller ? ret−→
binder isLandingGearDeployedRet . loc . caller ! ret−→
isLandingGearDeployed MethodBinder

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BinderActions =̂
setCabinPressure MethodBinder9
setFuelRemaining MethodBinder9
getAltitude MethodBinder9
setHeading MethodBinder9
stowLandingGear MethodBinder9
takeOffAbort MethodBinder9
setAltitude MethodBinder9
getHeading MethodBinder9
getAirSpeed MethodBinder9
deployLandingGear MethodBinder9
setEmergencyOxygen MethodBinder9
setAirSpeed MethodBinder9
isLandingGearDeployed MethodBinder

• BinderActions 4 (done toplevel sequencer −→ Skip)
end
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G.2.3 Program
section NetworkProgram parents scj prelude,MissionId ,MissionIds,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MissionChan,SchedulableMethChan,MissionFW ,
SafeletFW ,TopLevelMissionSequencerFW ,NetworkChannels,ManagedThreadFW ,
SchedulableMissionSequencerFW ,PeriodicEventHandlerFW ,
OneShotEventHandlerFW ,AperiodicEventHandlerFW ,ObjectFW ,ThreadFW ,
ACSafeletApp,MainMissionSequencerApp,MainMissionApp,ACModeChangerApp,
ControlHandlerApp,CommunicationsHandlerApp,EnvironmentMonitorApp,
FlightSensorsMonitorApp,TakeOffMissionApp,LandingGearHandlerApp,
TakeOffFailureHandlerApp,TakeOffMonitorApp,CruiseMissionApp,
BeginLandingHandlerApp,NavigationMonitorApp,LandMissionApp,
LandingGearHandlerLandApp,SafeLandingHandlerApp,
GroundDistanceMonitorApp, InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorApp
process ControlTier =̂
SafeletFWJControlTierSyncK
TopLevelMissionSequencerFW (MainMissionSequencer)

process Tier0 =̂
MissionFW (MainMissionID)JMissionSyncK
SchedulableMissionSequencerFW (ACModeChanger2ID)JSchedulablesSyncK
AperiodicEventHandlerFW (ControlHandlerID , aperiodic,
(time(10, 0),nullSchedulableId))JSchedulablesSyncK
AperiodicEventHandlerFW (CommunicationsHandlerID , aperiodic,
(NULL,nullSchedulableId))JSchedulablesSyncK
PeriodicEventHandlerFW (EnvironmentMonitorID ,
(time(10, 0),NULL,NULL,nullSchedulableId))JSchedulablesSyncK
PeriodicEventHandlerFW (FlightSensorsMonitorID ,
(time(10, 0),NULL,NULL,nullSchedulableId))


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process Tier1 =̂
MissionFW (TakeOffMissionID)JMissionSyncK
AperiodicEventHandlerFW (LandingGearHandlerID , aperiodic,
(NULL,nullSchedulableId))JSchedulablesSyncK
AperiodicEventHandlerFW (TakeOffFailureHandlerID , aperiodic,
(NULL,nullSchedulableId))JSchedulablesSyncK
PeriodicEventHandlerFW (TakeOffMonitorID ,
(time(0, 0), time(500, 0),NULL,nullSchedulableId))


JClusterSyncK
MissionFW (CruiseMissionID)JMissionSyncK
AperiodicEventHandlerFW (BeginLandingHandlerID , aperiodic,
(NULL,nullSchedulableId))JSchedulablesSyncK
PeriodicEventHandlerFW (NavigationMonitorID ,
(time(0, 0), time(10, 0),NULL,nullSchedulableId))


JClusterSyncK
MissionFW (LandMissionID)JMissionSyncK
AperiodicEventHandlerFW (LandingGearHandlerLandID , aperiodic,
(NULL,nullSchedulableId))JSchedulablesSyncK
AperiodicEventHandlerFW (SafeLandingHandlerID , aperiodic,
(NULL,nullSchedulableId))JSchedulablesSyncK
PeriodicEventHandlerFW (GroundDistanceMonitorID ,
(time(0, 0), time(10, 0),NULL,nullSchedulableId))JSchedulablesSyncK
PeriodicEventHandlerFW (InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorID ,
(time(0, 0), time(10, 0),NULL,nullSchedulableId))


process Framework =̂
ControlTierJTierSyncK
Tier0JTier0SyncK
Tier1


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process Application =̂
ACSafeletApp9
MainMissionSequencerApp9
MainMissionApp9
ACModeChanger2App(MainMissionID)9
ControlHandlerApp9
CommunicationsHandlerApp9
EnvironmentMonitorApp(MainMissionID)9
FlightSensorsMonitorApp(MainMissionID)9
TakeOffMissionApp9
LandingGearHandlerApp(TakeOffMissionID)9
TakeOffFailureHandlerApp(TakeOffMissionID , 10.0)9
TakeOffMonitorApp(TakeOffMissionID , 10.0, landingGearHandlerID)9
CruiseMissionApp9
BeginLandingHandlerApp9
NavigationMonitorApp9
LandMissionApp9
LandingGearHandlerLandApp(LandMissionID)9
SafeLandingHandlerApp(10.0)9
GroundDistanceMonitorApp(0.0)9
InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorApp(LandMissionID)

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section Network parents NetworkProgram,MethodCallBindingChannels,
NetworkMethodCallBinder ,NetworkChan,NetworkLocking
process Bound Application =̂ Application JMethodCallBinderSync KMethodCallBinder
process Program =̂ Framework JAppSync K Bound Application
G.3 ACSafelet
section ACSafeletApp parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,SafeletChan,
MethodCallBindingChannels
process ACSafeletApp =̂ begin
InitializeApplication =̂
initializeApplicationCall−→
initializeApplicationRet−→
Skip

GetSequencer =̂
getSequencerCall−→
getSequencerRet ! MainMissionSequencerSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂
GetSequencer@
InitializeApplication
 ; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end safelet app −→ Skip)
end
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G.4 MainMissionSequencer
section MainMissionSequencerApp parents TopLevelMissionSequencerChan,
MissionId ,MissionIds,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MainMissionSequencerClass,
MethodCallBindingChannels
process MainMissionSequencerApp =̂ begin
State
this : ref MainMissionSequencerClass
state State
Init
State ′
this ′ = new MainMissionSequencerClass()
GetNextMission =̂ var ret : MissionID •
getNextMissionCall .MainMissionSequencerSID−→
ret := this . getNextMission();
getNextMissionRet .MainMissionSequencerSID ! ret−→
Skip


Methods =̂(
GetNextMission
)
; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end sequencer app .MainMissionSequencerSID −→ Skip)
end
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section MainMissionSequencerClass parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,
SchedulableIds,SafeletChan,MethodCallBindingChannels,MissionId ,MissionIds
class MainMissionSequencerClass =̂ begin
state State
returnedMission : B
state State
initial Init
State ′
returnedMission ′ = False
protected getNextMission =̂
if (¬ returnedMission)−→(
returnedMission := True;
ret := MainMissionMID
)
8¬ (¬ returnedMission)−→(
ret := nullMissionId
)
fi

• Skip
end
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G.5 Missions
G.5.1 MainMission
section MainMissionApp parents scj prelude,GlobalTypes,MissionId ,MissionIds,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MissionChan,SchedulableMethChan,
MainMissionMethChan,MainMissionClass,MethodCallBindingChannels
process MainMissionApp =̂ begin
State
this : ref MainMissionClass
state State
Init
State ′
this ′ = new MainMissionClass()
InitializePhase =̂
initializeCall .MainMissionMID−→
register ! ACModeChanger2SID ! MainMissionMID−→
register ! EnvironmentMonitorSID ! MainMissionMID−→
register ! ControlHandlerSID ! MainMissionMID−→
register ! FlightSensorsMonitorSID ! MainMissionMID−→
register ! CommunicationsHandlerSID ! MainMissionMID−→
initializeRet .MainMissionMID−→
Skip

CleanupPhase =̂
cleanupMissionCall .MainMissionMID−→
cleanupMissionRet .MainMissionMID ! True−→
Skip

getAirSpeedMeth =̂ var ret : R •
getAirSpeedCall .MainMissionMID ? caller−→
ret := this . getAirSpeed();
getAirSpeedRet .MainMissionMID . caller ! ret−→
Skip


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getAltitudeMeth =̂ var ret : R •
getAltitudeCall .MainMissionMID ? caller−→
ret := this . getAltitude();
getAltitudeRet .MainMissionMID . caller ! ret−→
Skip


getCabinPressureMeth =̂ var ret : R •
getCabinPressureCall .MainMissionMID−→
ret := this . getCabinPressure();
getCabinPressureRet .MainMissionMID ! ret−→
Skip


getEmergencyOxygenMeth =̂ var ret : R •
getEmergencyOxygenCall .MainMissionMID−→
ret := this . getEmergencyOxygen();
getEmergencyOxygenRet .MainMissionMID ! ret−→
Skip


getFuelRemainingMeth =̂ var ret : R •
getFuelRemainingCall .MainMissionMID−→
ret := this . getFuelRemaining();
getFuelRemainingRet .MainMissionMID ! ret−→
Skip


getHeadingMeth =̂ var ret : R •
getHeadingCall .MainMissionMID ? caller−→
ret := this . getHeading();
getHeadingRet .MainMissionMID . caller ! ret−→
Skip


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setAirSpeedMeth =̂
setAirSpeedCall .MainMissionMID ? caller ? newAirSpeed−→
this . setAirSpeed(newAirSpeed);
setAirSpeedRet .MainMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

setAltitudeMeth =̂
setAltitudeCall .MainMissionMID ? caller ? newAltitude−→
this . setAltitude(newAltitude);
setAltitudeRet .MainMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

setCabinPressureMeth =̂
setCabinPressureCall .MainMissionMID ? caller ? newCabinPressure−→
this . setCabinPressure(newCabinPressure);
setCabinPressureRet .MainMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

setEmergencyOxygenMeth =̂
setEmergencyOxygenCall .MainMissionMID ? caller
? newEmergencyOxygen−→
this . setEmergencyOxygen(newEmergencyOxygen);
setEmergencyOxygenRet .MainMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

setFuelRemainingMeth =̂
setFuelRemainingCall .MainMissionMID ? caller ? newFuelRemaining−→
this . setFuelRemaining(newFuelRemaining);
setFuelRemainingRet .MainMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

setHeadingMeth =̂
setHeadingCall .MainMissionMID ? caller ? newHeading−→
this . setHeading(newHeading);
setHeadingRet .MainMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

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Methods =̂

InitializePhase@
CleanupPhase@
getAirSpeedMeth@
getAltitudeMeth@
getCabinPressureMeth@
getEmergencyOxygenMeth@
getFuelRemainingMeth@
getHeadingMeth@
setAirSpeedMeth@
setAltitudeMeth@
setCabinPressureMeth@
setEmergencyOxygenMeth@
setFuelRemainingMeth@
setHeadingMeth

; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end mission app .MainMissionMID −→ Skip)
end
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section MainMissionClass parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,
SafeletChan,MethodCallBindingChannels
class MainMissionClass =̂ begin
state State
cabinPressure : R
emergencyOxygen : R
fuelRemaining : R
altitude : R
airSpeed : R
heading : R
state State
initial Init
State ′
public getAirSpeed =̂(
ret := airSpeed
)
public getAltitude =̂(
ret := altitude
)
public getCabinPressure =̂(
ret := cabinPressure
)
public getEmergencyOxygen =̂(
ret := emergencyOxygen
)
public getFuelRemaining =̂(
ret := fuelRemaining
)
public getHeading =̂(
ret := heading
)
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public setAirSpeed =̂ var newAirSpeed : R •(
airSpeed := newAirSpeed
)
public setAltitude =̂ var newAltitude : R •(
altitude := newAltitude
)
public setCabinPressure =̂ var newCabinPressure : R •(
cabinPressure := newCabinPressure
)
public setEmergencyOxygen =̂ var newEmergencyOxygen : R •(
emergencyOxygen := newEmergencyOxygen
)
public setFuelRemaining =̂ var newFuelRemaining : R •(
fuelRemaining := newFuelRemaining
)
public setHeading =̂ var newHeading : R •(
heading := newHeading
)
• Skip
end
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section MainMissionMethChan parents GlobalTypes,MissionId ,SchedulableId
channel getAirSpeedCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel getAirSpeedRet : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel getAltitudeCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel getAltitudeRet : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel getCabinPressureCall : MissionID
channel getCabinPressureRet : MissionID × R
channel getEmergencyOxygenCall : MissionID
channel getEmergencyOxygenRet : MissionID × R
channel getFuelRemainingCall : MissionID
channel getFuelRemainingRet : MissionID × R
channel getHeadingCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel getHeadingRet : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel setAirSpeedCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel setAirSpeedRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel setAltitudeCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel setAltitudeRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel setCabinPressureCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel setCabinPressureRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel setEmergencyOxygenCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel setEmergencyOxygenRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel setFuelRemainingCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel setFuelRemainingRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel setHeadingCall : MissionID × SchedulableID × R
channel setHeadingRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
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G.5.2 Schedulables of MainMission
section ACModeChangerApp parents TopLevelMissionSequencerChan,MissionId ,
MissionIds,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,ACModeChangerClass,MethodCallBindingChannels
process ACModeChangerApp =̂
controllingMission : MissionID • begin
GetNextMission =̂ var ret : MissionID •
getNextMissionCall .ACModeChangerSID−→
ret := this . getNextMission();
getNextMissionRet .ACModeChangerSID ! ret−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
GetNextMission
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end sequencer app .ACModeChangerSID −→ Skip)
end
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section ACModeChangerClass parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,
SafeletChan,MethodCallBindingChannels,MissionId ,MissionIds
class ACModeChangerClass =̂ begin
state State
modesLeft : Z
state State
initial Init
State ′
modesLeft ′ = 3
protected getNextMission =̂ var ret : MissionID •
if (modesLeft = 3)−→(
modesLeft := modesLeft − 1;
ret := TakeOffMissionMID
)
8¬ (modesLeft = 3)−→
if (modesLeft = 2)−→(
modesLeft := modesLeft − 1;
ret := CruiseMissionMID
)
8¬ (modesLeft = 2)−→
if (modesLeft = 1)−→(
modesLeft := modesLeft − 1;
ret := LandMissionMID
)
8¬ (modesLeft = 1)−→(
ret := nullMissionId
)
fi
fi
fi

• Skip
end
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section ControlHandlerApp parents AperiodicEventHandlerChan,SchedulableId ,
SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels
process ControlHandlerApp =̂ begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .ControlHandlerSID−→
handleAsyncEventRet .ControlHandlerSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end aperiodic app .ControlHandlerSID −→ Skip)
end
section CommunicationsHandlerApp parents AperiodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels
process CommunicationsHandlerApp =̂ begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .CommunicationsHandlerSID−→
handleAsyncEventRet .CommunicationsHandlerSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end aperiodic app .CommunicationsHandlerSID −→ Skip)
end
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section EnvironmentMonitorApp parents PeriodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels
process EnvironmentMonitorApp =̂
controllingMission : MissionID • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .EnvironmentMonitorSID−→
binder setCabinPressureCall . controllingMission
.EnvironmentMonitorSID ! 0−→
binder setCabinPressureRet . controllingMission
.EnvironmentMonitorSID−→
binder setEmergencyOxygenCall . controllingMission
.EnvironmentMonitorSID ! 0−→
binder setEmergencyOxygenRet . controllingMission
.EnvironmentMonitorSID−→
binder setFuelRemainingCall . controllingMission
.EnvironmentMonitorSID ! 0−→
binder setFuelRemainingRet . controllingMission
.EnvironmentMonitorSID−→
Skip

;
handleAsyncEventRet .EnvironmentMonitorSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end periodic app .EnvironmentMonitorSID −→ Skip)
end
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section FlightSensorsMonitorApp parents PeriodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels
process FlightSensorsMonitorApp =̂
controllingMission : MissionID • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .FlightSensorsMonitorSID−→
binder setAirSpeedCall . controllingMission
.FlightSensorsMonitorSID ! 0−→
binder setAirSpeedRet . controllingMission .FlightSensorsMonitorSID−→
binder setAltitudeCall . controllingMission
.FlightSensorsMonitorSID ! 0−→
binder setAltitudeRet . controllingMission .FlightSensorsMonitorSID−→
binder setHeadingCall . controllingMission
.FlightSensorsMonitorSID ! 0−→
binder setHeadingRet . controllingMission .FlightSensorsMonitorSID−→
Skip

;
handleAsyncEventRet .FlightSensorsMonitorSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end periodic app .FlightSensorsMonitorSID −→ Skip)
end
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G.5.3 TakeOffMission
section TakeOffMissionApp parents scj prelude,MissionId ,MissionIds,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MissionChan,SchedulableMethChan,
TakeOffMissionMethChan,TakeOffMissionClass,MethodCallBindingChannels,
LandingGearMethChan
process TakeOffMissionApp =̂
controllingMission : MissionID • begin
State
this : ref TakeOffMissionClass
state State
Init
State ′
this ′ = new TakeOffMissionClass()
InitializePhase =̂
initializeCall .TakeOffMissionMID−→
register ! LandingGearHandlerSID ! TakeOffMissionMID−→
register ! TakeOffMonitorSID ! TakeOffMissionMID−→
register ! TakeOffFailureHandlerSID ! TakeOffMissionMID−→
initializeRet .TakeOffMissionMID−→
Skip

CleanupPhase =̂ var ret : B •
cleanupMissionCall .TakeOffMissionMID−→
ret := (¬ this . abort);
cleanupMissionRet .TakeOffMissionMID ! ret−→
Skip


takeOffAbortMeth =̂
takeOffAbortCall .TakeOffMissionMID ? caller−→
this . takeOffAbort();
takeOffAbortRet .TakeOffMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

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deployLandingGearMeth =̂
deployLandingGearCall .TakeOffMissionMID ? caller−→
this . deployLandingGear();
deployLandingGearRet .TakeOffMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

stowLandingGearMeth =̂
stowLandingGearCall .TakeOffMissionMID ? caller−→
this . stowLandingGear();
stowLandingGearRet .TakeOffMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

isLandingGearDeployedMeth =̂ var ret : B •
isLandingGearDeployedCall .TakeOffMissionMID ? caller−→
ret := this . isLandingGearDeployed();
; isLandingGearDeployedRet .TakeOffMissionMID . caller ! ret−→
Skip


Methods =̂

InitializePhase@
CleanupPhase@
takeOffAbortMeth@
deployLandingGearMeth@
stowLandingGearMeth@
isLandingGearDeployedMeth

; Methods
• (Init ; Methods)4 (end mission app .TakeOffMissionMID −→ Skip)
end
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section TakeOffMissionClass parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,
SafeletChan,MethodCallBindingChannels
class TakeOffMissionClass =̂ begin
state State
SAFE AIRSPEED THRESHOLD : R
TAKEOFF ALTITUDE : R
abort : B
landingGearDeployed : B
state State
initial Init
State ′
SAFE AIRSPEED THRESHOLD ′ = 10.0
TAKEOFF ALTITUDE ′ = 10.0
abort ′ = false
public takeOffAbort =̂(
abort := True
)
public deployLandingGear =̂(
landingGearDeployed := True
)
public stowLandingGear =̂(
landingGearDeployed := False
)
public isLandingGearDeployed =̂(
ret := landingGearDeployed
)
• Skip
end
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section TakeOffMissionMethChan parents GlobalTypes,MissionId ,SchedulableId
channel takeOffAbortCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel takeOffAbortRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
G.5.4 Schedulables of TakeOffMission
section LandingGearMethChan parents GlobalTypes,MissionId ,SchedulableId
channel deployLandingGearCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel deployLandingGearRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel stowLandingGearCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel stowLandingGearRet : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel isLandingGearDeployedCall : MissionID × SchedulableID
channel isLandingGearDeployedRet : MissionID × SchedulableID × B
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section LandingGearHandlerTakeOffApp parents AperiodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels
process LandingGearHandlerApp =̂
mission : MissionID • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .LandingGearHandlerSID−→
binder isLandingGearDeployedCall .mission .LandingGearHandlerSID−→
binder isLandingGearDeployedRet .mission .LandingGearHandlerSID
? isLandingGearDeployed−→
var landingGearIsDeployed : B •
landingGearIsDeployed := isLandingGearDeployed ;
if landingGearIsDeployed = True−→
binder stowLandingGearCall .mission .LandingGearHandlerSID−→
binder stowLandingGearRet .mission .LandingGearHandlerSID−→
Skip

8¬ landingGearIsDeployed = True−→
binder deployLandingGearCall .mission .LandingGearHandlerSID−→
binder deployLandingGearRet .mission .LandingGearHandlerSID−→
Skip

fi

;
handleAsyncEventRet .LandingGearHandlerSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end aperiodic app .LandingGearHandlerSID −→ Skip)
end
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section TakeOffFailureHandlerApp parents AperiodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels,
MainMissionMethChan,MissionMethChan
process TakeOffFailureHandlerApp =̂
mainMission : MissionID ;
takeoffMission : MissionID ;
threshold : R • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .TakeOffFailureHandlerSID−→
binder getAirSpeedCall .mainMission
.TakeOffFailureHandlerSID−→
binder getAirSpeedRet .mainMission
.TakeOffFailureHandlerSID ? getAirSpeed−→
var currentSpeed : R • currentSpeed := getAirSpeed ;
if (currentSpeed < threshold)−→
binder takeOffAbortCall . takeoffMission
.TakeOffFailureHandlerSID−→
binder takeOffAbortRet . takeoffMission
.TakeOffFailureHandlerSID−→
requestTerminationCall . takeoffMission
.TakeOffFailureHandlerSID−→
requestTerminationRet . takeoffMission
.TakeOffFailureHandlerSID ? rt−→
Skip

8¬ (currentSpeed < threshold)−→
Skip
fi

;
handleAsyncEventRet .TakeOffFailureHandlerSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end aperiodic app .TakeOffFailureHandlerSID −→ Skip)
end
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section TakeOffMonitorApp parents PeriodicEventHandlerChan,SchedulableId ,
SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels,
MainMissionMethChan,MissionMethChan
process TakeOffMonitorApp =̂
mainMission : MissionID ;
takeOffMission : MissionID ;
takeOffAltitude : R;
landingGearHandler : SchedulableID • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .TakeOffMonitorSID−→
binder getAltitudeCall .mainMission .TakeOffMonitorSID−→
binder getAltitudeRet .mainMission .TakeOffMonitorSID ? getAltitude−→
var altitude : R • altitude := getAltitude;
if (altitude > takeOffAltitude)−→
release . landingGearHandler−→
requestTerminationCall . takeOffMission .TakeOffMonitorSID−→
requestTerminationRet . takeOffMission .TakeOffMonitorSID ? rt−→
Skip

8¬ (altitude > takeOffAltitude)−→ Skip
fi

;
handleAsyncEventRet .TakeOffMonitorSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end periodic app .TakeOffMonitorSID −→ Skip)
end
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G.5.5 CruiseMission
section CruiseMissionApp parents scj prelude,MissionId ,MissionIds,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MissionChan,SchedulableMethChan,
MethodCallBindingChannels
process CruiseMissionApp =̂
controllingMission : MissionID • begin
InitializePhase =̂
initializeCall .CruiseMissionMID−→
register ! BeginLandingHandlerSID ! CruiseMissionMID−→
register ! NavigationMonitorSID ! CruiseMissionMID−→
initializeRet .CruiseMissionMID−→
Skip

CleanupPhase =̂
cleanupMissionCall .CruiseMissionMID−→
cleanupMissionRet .CruiseMissionMID ! True−→
Skip

Methods =̂

InitializePhase@
CleanupPhase
 ; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end mission app .CruiseMissionMID −→ Skip)
end
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G.5.6 Schedulables of CruiseMission
section BeginLandingHandlerApp parents AperiodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels,MissionMethChan
process BeginLandingHandlerApp =̂
controllingMission : MissionID • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .BeginLandingHandlerSID−→
requestTerminationCall . controllingMission .BeginLandingHandlerSID−→
requestTerminationRet . controllingMission .BeginLandingHandlerSID ? rt−→
Skip
 ;
handleAsyncEventRet .BeginLandingHandlerSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end aperiodic app .BeginLandingHandlerSID −→ Skip)
end
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section NavigationMonitorApp parents PeriodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels,
MainMissionMethChan
process NavigationMonitorApp =̂
mainMission : MissionID • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .NavigationMonitorSID−→
binder getHeadingCall .mainMission .NavigationMonitorSID−→
binder getHeadingRet .mainMission
.NavigationMonitorSID ? getHeading−→
var heading : R • heading := getHeading;
binder getAirSpeedCall .mainMission .NavigationMonitorSID−→
binder getAirSpeedRet .mainMission
.NavigationMonitorSID ? getAirSpeed−→
var airSpeed : R • airSpeed := getAirSpeed ;
binder getAltitudeCall .mainMission .NavigationMonitorSID−→
binder getAltitudeRet .mainMission
.NavigationMonitorSID ? getAltitude−→
var altitude : R • altitude := getAltitude

;
handleAsyncEventRet .NavigationMonitorSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end periodic app .NavigationMonitorSID −→ Skip)
end
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G.5.7 LandMission
section LandMissionApp parents scj prelude,MissionId ,MissionIds,SchedulableId ,
SchedulableIds,MissionChan,SchedulableMethChan,LandingGearMethChan,
LandMissionClass,MethodCallBindingChannels
process LandMissionApp =̂
controllingMission : MissionID • begin
State
this : ref LandMissionClass
state State
Init
State ′
this ′ = new LandMissionClass()
InitializePhase =̂
initializeCall .LandMissionMID−→
register ! GroundDistanceMonitorSID ! LandMissionMID−→
register ! LandingGearHandlerLandSID ! LandMissionMID−→
register ! InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorSID ! LandMissionMID−→
register ! SafeLandingHandlerSID ! LandMissionMID−→
initializeRet .LandMissionMID−→
Skip

CleanupPhase =̂ var ret : B •
cleanupMissionCall .LandMissionMID−→
ret := False;
cleanupMissionRet .LandMissionMID ! ret−→
Skip

deployLandingGearMeth =̂
deployLandingGearCall .LandMissionMID ? caller−→
this . deployLandingGear();
deployLandingGearRet .LandMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

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stowLandingGearMeth =̂
stowLandingGearCall .LandMissionMID ? caller−→
this . stowLandingGear();
stowLandingGearRet .LandMissionMID . caller−→
Skip

isLandingGearDeployedMeth =̂ var ret : B •
isLandingGearDeployedCall .LandMissionMID ? caller−→
ret := this . isLandingGearDeployed();
isLandingGearDeployedRet .LandMissionMID . caller ! ret−→
Skip

Methods =̂

InitializePhase@
CleanupPhase@
deployLandingGearMeth@
stowLandingGearMeth@
isLandingGearDeployedMeth

; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end mission app .LandMissionMID −→ Skip)
end
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section LandMissionClass parents scj prelude,SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,
SafeletChan,MethodCallBindingChannels
class LandMissionClass =̂ begin
state State
SAFE LANDING ALTITUDE : R
ALTITUDE READING ON GROUND : R
abort : B
landingGearDeployed : B
state State
initial Init
State ′
SAFE LANDING ALTITUDE ′ = 10.0
ALTITUDE READING ON GROUND ′ = 0.0
abort ′ = false
public deployLandingGear =̂(
landingGearDeployed := True
)
public stowLandingGear =̂(
landingGearDeployed := False
)
public isLandingGearDeployed =̂(
ret := landingGearDeployed
)
• Skip
end
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G.5.8 Schedulables of LandMission
section LandingGearHandlerLandApp parents AperiodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels,LandMissionMethChan
process LandingGearHandlerLandApp =̂
mission : MissionID • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .LandingGearHandlerLandSID−→
binder isLandingGearDeployedCall .mission .LandingGearHandlerLandSID−→
binder isLandingGearDeployedRet .mission .LandingGearHandlerLandSID
? isLandingGearDeployed−→
var landingGearIsDeployed : B •
landingGearIsDeployed := isLandingGearDeployed ;
if landingGearIsDeployed −→
binder stowLandingGearCall .mission .LandingGearHandlerLandSID−→
binder stowLandingGearRet .mission .LandingGearHandlerLandSID−→
Skip

8¬ landingGearIsDeployed −→
binder deployLandingGearCall .mission .LandingGearHandlerLandSID−→
binder deployLandingGearRet .mission .LandingGearHandlerLandSID−→
Skip

fi

;
handleAsyncEventRet .LandingGearHandlerLandSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end aperiodic app .LandingGearHandlerLandSID −→ Skip)
end
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section SafeLandingHandlerApp parents AperiodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels,MainMissionMethChan
process SafeLandingHandlerApp =̂
mainMission : MissionID ;
threshold : R • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .SafeLandingHandlerSID−→
binder getAltitudeCall .mainMission .SafeLandingHandlerSID−→
binder getAltitudeRet .mainMission .SafeLandingHandlerSID
? getAltitude−→
var altitude : R • altitude := getAltitude;
if (altitude < threshold)−→
Skip8¬ (altitude < threshold)−→
Skip
fi

;
handleAsyncEventRet .SafeLandingHandlerSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end aperiodic app .SafeLandingHandlerSID −→ Skip)
end
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section GroundDistanceMonitorApp parents PeriodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels,MissionMethChan
process GroundDistanceMonitorApp =̂
mainMission : MissionID ;
readingOnGround : R • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall .GroundDistanceMonitorSID−→
binder getAltitudeCall .mainMission .GroundDistanceMonitorSID−→
binder getAltitudeRet .mainMission .GroundDistanceMonitorSID ? getAltitude−→
var distance : R • distance := getAltitude;
if (distance = readingOnGround)−→
requestTerminationCall .mainMission .GroundDistanceMonitorSID−→
requestTerminationRet .mainMission .GroundDistanceMonitorSID ? rt−→
Skip

8¬ (distance = readingOnGround)−→ Skip
fi

;
handleAsyncEventRet .GroundDistanceMonitorSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end periodic app .GroundDistanceMonitorSID −→ Skip)
end
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section InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorApp parents PeriodicEventHandlerChan,
SchedulableId ,SchedulableIds,MethodCallBindingChannels
process InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorApp =̂
mission : MissionID • begin
handleAsyncEvent =̂
handleAsyncEventCall . InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorSID−→
handleAsyncEventRet . InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorSID−→
Skip

Methods =̂(
handleAsyncEvent
)
; Methods
• (Methods)4 (end periodic app . InstrumentLandingSystemMonitorSID −→ Skip)
end
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